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Abstract
This thesis consist of two essays on macroeconomics with heterogeneity. First essay quan-
tifies the importance of aggregate fluctuations in microeconomic uncertainty for the firm
dynamics over the business cycle in an economy with frictional financial markets. To begin,
it documents facts on asymmetric response across age and size groups of firms in the U.S.
to the changes in aggregate economic conditions. I argue that age rather than size is a
relevant margin for the cyclical employment dynamics; in particular total employment of
young firms varies 2.6 times more relative to the old firms. Then I propose a theory that,
contrary to the existing studies, generates endogenously a link between firm’s age and size
and its ability to obtain financing, and induces an asymmetric response to shocks. A key
element of my theory is a financial friction, originated from the firm’s private information
and long-term, efficient lending contract between a risk averse entrepreneur and financial
intermediary, which manifests itself as a borrowing constraint. I argue that, for any given
expected return on project, young firms are more constrained in borrowing and they grow
out of the constraint as they age up to the optimal, unconstrained size. Next I establish
that, for any given age, firm’s financing increases in line with the average return on a
project. In times of high idiosyncratic uncertainty the financial contract calls for tighten-
ing of the borrowing constraint transmitting the initial impulse into a decline in demand
for production inputs and further, including general equilibrium effects, into an economic
downturn. This mechanism affects disproportionally young firms. Not only are they more
constrained in borrowing but also they start smaller due to a reduced level of initial fi-
nancing. A quantitative version of the model accounts for the fall of the aggregate output,
employment and investment, decline of credit to GDP ratio and asymmetric employment
dynamics of different groups of firms observed in the US data in recessions.
Second essay studies optimal taxation in an environment where heterogeneous house-
holds face uninsurable idiosyncratic risk. To do this, we formulate a Ramsey problem in a
standard infinite horizon incomplete markets model. We solve numerically for the optimal
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path of proportional capital and labor income taxes, (possibly negative) lump-sum trans-
fers, and government debt. The solution maximizes welfare along the transition between an
initial steady state, calibrated to replicate key features of the US economy, and an endoge-
nously determined final steady state. We find that in the optimal (utilitarian) policy: (i)
capital income taxes are front-loaded hitting the imposed upper bound of 100 percent for
33 years before decreasing to 45 percent in the long-run; (ii) labor income taxes are reduced
to less than half of their initial level, from 28 percent to about 13 percent in the long-run;
and (iii) the government accumulates assets over time reducing the debt-to-output ratio
from 63 percent to −17 percent in the long-run. Relative to keeping fiscal instruments at
their initial levels, this leads to an average welfare gain equivalent to a permanent 4.9 per-
cent increase in consumption. Even though non-distortive lump-sum taxes are available,
the optimal plan has positive capital and labor taxes. Such taxes reduce the proportions
of uncertain and unequal labor and capital incomes in total income, increasing welfare by
providing insurance and redistribution. We are able to quantify these welfare effects. We
also show that calculating the entire transition path (as opposed to considering steady
states only) is quantitatively important. Implementing the policy that maximizes welfare
in steady state leads to a welfare loss of 6.4 percent once transitory effects are accounted
for.
iv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Heterogeneity of individuals is ubiquitous feature of reality. However, for many years
macroeconomic profession has been operating under the assumption of representative
household and representative firm. This approach by construction limited the set of ques-
tions macroeconomists were able to address. Recently, macroeconomic models with het-
erogenous agents have become a major tool used to address research questions. This thesis
contributes to this stream of research. It presents two essays which use the environment
with heterogeneity to address research questions. The first essay Optimal Fiscal Policy
in the Heterogenous Agents Economy starts with the fundamental question in public eco-
nomics: to what extent should governments use fiscal policy instruments to provide redis-
tribution and insurance? The main contribution of this essay is to provide a quantitative
analysis and answer to this question using the model that replicates inequality and individ-
ual risk present in the US economy. The second essay Endogenous Borrowing Constraints
in Heterogenous Firms Economy starts with the key observation that age rather than size
of the firm is a determinant of the cyclical employment dynamics. As a result employ-
ment of the young firms is 2.6. times more volatile relative to the employment of the old
firms over the business cycle. Next, the essay proposes a theory of endogenous borrowing
constraints and asymmetric firm dynamics over the business cycles, which builds on two
ubiquitous features of the credit markets: relevance of past performance and long-term
nature of financial arrangements. The innovative part of this essay is a quantitative theory
of economic downturn and credit crunch that relies on the efficient, risk sharing financial
1
2arrangements between firms and financial intermediaries facing the presence of the private
information in the financial markets. The theme which unites the essays is the focus on
the role of heterogeneity for the economic questions of interests. On the one hand, hetero-
geneity of agents in terms of wealth and productivity implies new insights for the shape
of fiscal policy and leads to results contrasting starkly with well established ones in the
representative agent literature. On the other hand, the empirical observation documented
in the second essay calls immediately for the model with firm heterogeneity in terms of
their age and size. The concept of a representative firm is inadequate to understand the
driving forces behind business cycle employment fluctuations of various groups of firms
shaping the aggregate employment dynamics.
Chapter 2
Optimal Fiscal Policy in the
Heterogenous Agents Economy
2.1 Introduction
How and to what extent should governments tax capital and labor income if they care
about individual income inequality and risk? We want to provide a quantitative answer
to this question. We, therefore, need a model that is able to generate realistic levels of
income inequality and uninsurable risk. Our approach in this paper is to numerically solve
a Ramsey problem in a quantitative general equilibrium model with heterogenous agents
and uninsurable idiosyncratic risk - from now on referred to as the standard incomplete
markets (SIM) model1.
The SIM model has been used extensively for positive analysis and been relatively
successful at matching some basic facts about inequality and uncertainty2. In this envi-
ronment agents face uncertainty with respect to their individual labor productivity which
they cannot directly insure against (only a risk-free asset is available). Depending on their
productivity realizations they make different savings choices which leads to endogenous
wealth inequality. As a result, on top of the usual concern about not distorting agents
1This type of model was originally developed and analyzed by Bewley (1986), Imrohoruglu (1989),
Huggett (1993), and Aiyagari (1994).
2Our calibration strategy is similar to the ones in Domeij and Heathcote (2004) and
Castan˜eda, Dı´az-Gime´nez, and R´ıos-Rull (2003).
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4decisions, a (utilitarian) Ramsey planner has two additional objectives: to redistribute
resources across agents, and to provide insurance against their idiosyncratic productivity
risk.
The study of optimal fiscal policy in the SIM model has focused, so far, on the max-
imization of steady state welfare3. In contrast, we allow policy to be time varying and
the welfare function to depend on the associated transition path. We calibrate the initial
steady state to replicate several aspects of the US economy; in particular the fiscal policy,
the distribution of wealth, and statistical properties of the individual labor income pro-
cess. The final steady state is, then, endogenously determined by the path of fiscal policy.
The Ramsey planner finances an exogenous stream of government expenditures with four
instruments: proportional capital and labor income taxes, (possibly negative) lump-sum
transfers, and government debt.
Labor and capital income taxes are distortive, however, they can be used to provide
insurance and redistribution. The only uncertainty that agents face, in our environment,
is with respect to their labor productivities4. Hence, labor income is the only risky part
of the agents’ income. By taxing labor income and rebating the extra revenue via lump-
sum, the planner can reduce the proportion of the agents’ income that is uncertain and
effectively provide insurance. On the other hand, capital income is particularly unequal,
since the inequality of individual asset holdings is high, and by taxing capital the planner
can reduce the proportion of unequal income in total income and, this way, provide redis-
tribution. The effect of government debt is more subtle. Increasing government debt the
government crowds out capital which affects prices indirectly, in particular reducing wages
and increasing interest rates which leads to a less uncertain but more unequal distribution
of income. The optimal fiscal policy weighs all these effects against each other.
We find that capital income taxes should be front-loaded hitting the imposed upper
bound of 100 percent for 33 years then decreases to 45 percent in the long-run. Labor
3See, for instance, Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009a), and Nakajima
(2010).
4Panousi and Reis (2012) and Evans (2014) focus instead on investment risk. One justification for our
focus on labor income risk is the fact that it is a bigger share of the total income for most agents in the
economy. The bottom 80 percent in the distribution of net worth have a a share of labor income above 77
percent, in the 2007 SCF.
5income taxes are reduced to less than half of their initial level, from 28 percent to about
13 percent in the long-run. The ratio of lump-sum transfers to output is reduced to about
a half of its initial level of 8 percent and the government accumulates assets over time; the
debt-to-output ratio decreases from 63 percent to −17 percent in the long-run. Relative
to keeping fiscal instruments at their initial levels, this leads to a welfare gain equivalent
to a permanent 4.9 percent increase in consumption.
Unlike the Ramsey problem solved for representative-agent economies, in this paper we
do not rule out lump-sum taxation. The optimal levels of distortive taxation are, therefore,
derived rather than imposed. Even though lump-sum taxes are available, the planner
chooses to tax both capital and labor income at positive rates, rebating the associated
revenue via lump-sum transfers. Relative to a system that obtains all revenue via lump-
sum taxes, such a tax system changes the composition of agents’ after-tax income, reducing
the proportions associated with uncertain and unequal labor and capital incomes and
increasing the proportion of certain and equal transfer income; providing insurance and
redistribution. To clarify this point and to understand exactly how the optimal policy
reacts to changes in uncertainty and inequality we provide an analytic characterization of
the solution to the Ramsey problem in a simple two-period version of the SIM model.
We decompose the average welfare gains of 4.9 percent associated with implementing
the optimal policy into three parts: (i) 3.7 percent come from the more efficient allocation
of aggregate resources due to the reduction of the distortions of agents’ decisions; (ii)
4.9 percent come from redistribution - the reduction in ex-ante inequality; and (iii) −3.7
percent come from the reduction in insurance - there is more uncertainty about individual
consumption and labor streams under the optimal policy. The optimal policy implies an
overall increase of capital taxes and a reduction of labor taxes. The net effect on the
distortions of agents’ savings and labor supply decisions is positive. The higher capital
taxes decrease the proportion of the agents’ income associated with the highly unequal
asset income and lead to the redistributional gains. Finally, a lower labor income tax leads
to a higher proportion of the agents’ income to come from the uncertain labor income, thus
the negative insurance effect.
We show that disregarding transitory welfare effects can be severely misleading. To
6make this point we compute the stationary fiscal policy that maximizes welfare in the final
steady state, which leads to a 9.8 percent greater steady state welfare than the initial steady
state. However, once transitory effects are considered, implementing this policy leads to a
welfare loss of 6.4 percent relative to keeping the initial fiscal policy. Relative to the fiscal
policy that maximizes welfare over transition it leads to a welfare loss of 11.3 percent.
In order to illustrate the role of market incompleteness in our findings, we develop
the following build-up. We start from the representative agent economy and sequentially
introduce heterogeneity in initial assets; different (but constant and certain) individual
productivity levels; and, finally, uninsurable idiosyncratic productivity risk which adds up
to the SIM model. At each intermediate step, building on the work of Werning (2007), we
analytically characterize and then numerically compute the optimal fiscal policy over tran-
sition identifying the effect of adding each feature. In particular, we show that the planner
will choose to keep capital taxes at the upper bound in the initial periods if there is asset
heterogeneity, before reducing it to zero. Productivity heterogeneity rationalizes positive
(and virtually constant) labor taxes. The key qualitative difference of the solution once
uninsurable idiosyncratic productivity risk is introduced is that long-run capital income
taxes are set to a positive level. Rationales for this result already exist in the literature
and are discussed in the next section. To our knowledge, however, the level of the optimal
long-run capital taxes in the SIM model had not been obtained before.
Finally, we present robustness exercises with respect to the welfare function and the
calibration of the labor income process. Our benchmark results are for the utilitarian wel-
fare function which implies a particular social choice with respect to the equality versus
efficiency trade-off. We introduce a parameter in the welfare function that allows for dif-
ferent choices, in particular for the planner to completely ignore equality concerns. The
long-run levels of capital and labor taxes are surprisingly resistant to changes in this pa-
rameter. What does change significantly, however, is how long the capital tax is maintained
at the upper bound; the more the planner “cares” about inequality the more years it keeps
those taxes at the upper bound. With respect to different calibrations of the labor in-
come process, the magnitudes of the taxes are affected, but the qualitative features are
maintained.
7Related Literature
This paper is related to several strands of literature. First, it is related to the litera-
ture on the steady state optimal fiscal policy in the SIM model. In an influential paper,
Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009a) solve for the tax system that maximizes steady state
welfare in an overlapping generations SIM model. Their result includes an optimal long-
run capital income tax of 36 percent. It is important to note that though this result is
similar to ours the reasons behind it are different. They diagnose that their optimal cap-
ital tax level follows from the planner’s inability to condition taxes on age, and the fact
that a positive capital tax can mimic age-conditioned taxes in a welfare improving way
(see Erosa and Gervais (2002)). This mechanism is not present in our analysis since we
abstract from life-cycle issues.
Aiyagari (1995) and Chamley (2001) provide rationales for positive long-run capital
taxes in environments similar to ours. Aiyagari (1995)’s logic depends on the planner
choosing the path of government expenditure (appearing separably in the agent’s utility
function). The associated Euler equation implies the modified golden rule level of capital
which can only be achieved by taxing savings; the planner does not have precautionary mo-
tives while the agents do. In our environment positive long-run capital taxes are preserved
with exogenous governmental spending. Chamley (2001) shows, in a partial equilibrium
version of the SIM model, that enough periods in the future every agent has the same proba-
bility of being in each of the possible individual (asset/productivity) states. It is, therefore,
Pareto improving to transfer from the consumption-rich to the consumption-poor in the
long-run. If the correlation of asset holdings with consumption is positive, this transfer can
be achieved by a positive capital tax rebated via lump-sum. In short, an agent’s asset level
in the long-run is a good proxy for how lucky she has been; hence, taxing it is a good way
to provide insurance in the long-run. In recent work, Da´vila, Hong, Krusell, and Rı´os-Rull
(2012) solve the problem of a planner that is restricted to satisfy agents’ budget constraints,
but is allowed to choose the savings of each agent. If the consumption-poor’s share of la-
bor income is higher than the average, increasing the aggregate capital stock relative to
the undistorted equilibrium can improve welfare through its indirect effect on wages and
interest rates. In our setup, the Ramsey planner taxes capital to affect after tax interest
rates directly and achieves the same goal.
8Another important work on fiscal policy in the SIM model is Aiyagari and McGrattan
(1998), who search for the level of debt-to-output that maximizes steady state welfare.
Interestingly, they find that the optimal level is very close to the pre recession level of
around 67 percent. The fact that they abstract from the transitional dynamics makes the
result even more remarkable: the government could chose its level of asset without having
to finance it over time, it could, for instance choose to have enough assets to finance all
its expenditures and yet it chooses to remain in debt. By holding debt, the government
crowds out capital increasing interest rates and decreasing wages. This effectively provides
insurance since the proportion of uncertain labor income out of total income is reduced.
This benefit is what drives the choice of the government to hold debt. However, there
is another effect associated with such a policy; it increases inequality (the proportion
of the unequal asset income out of total income increases). This negative effect is not
particularly important in Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) because their calibration focuses
on matching labor income processes which leads to an underestimation of wealth inequality.
Winter and Roehrs (2014) replicate their experiment with a calibration that targets wealth
inequality statistics and find the opposite result, i.e. the government chooses to hold high
levels of assets. Our calibration procedure is closer to that of Winter and Roehrs (2014),
which elucidates our result that the Ramsey planner chooses to accumulate assets over
time.
Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2014) and Gottardi, Kajii, and Nakajima (2014b)
characterize the optimal fiscal policy in stylized versions of the SIM model. Their ap-
proaches lead to elegant and insightful closed-form solutions. The environment and Ramsey
problem in Gottardi, Kajii, and Nakajima (2014b) is similar to ours except for the simpli-
fications that yield tractability; i.e. exogenous labor supply, the absence of borrowing con-
straints, and i.i.d. shocks to human capital accumulation. Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante
(2014), on the other hand, focus on different, though related, questions. By abstract-
ing from capital accumulation, they are able to retain tractability in a model with pro-
gressive taxation, partial insurance, endogenous government expenditure and skill choices
(with imperfect substitution between skill types). This leads to several interesting di-
mensions that, in our paper, we abstract from. However, the simplifications in these
9models do not allow them to match some aspects of the data which we find to be im-
portant for the determination of the optimal tax system. In particular, the model in
Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2014) implies no wealth inequality (wealth is zero
for all agents). Our calibration strategy allows us to match the distribution of wealth in
the US.
We also contribute to the literature highlighting the importance of transition for pol-
icy prescriptions in incomplete markets models. Domeij and Heathcote (2004) use the
SIM model to evaluate the implementation of a zero capital income tax policy taking
into account the transitional welfare effects. They conclude that such a reform would
be detrimental to welfare due to its transitory effect on inequality. Krueger and Ludwig
(2013), Poschke, Kaymak, and Bakis (2012), and Winter and Roehrs (2014) also conduct
experiments in this spirit. Acikgoz (2013) claims that the optimal long-run fiscal policy
is independent of initial conditions and the transition towards it. He, then, studies the
properties of fiscal policy in the long-run, but is silent about the optimal transition path
which is the focus of this paper.
There is an extensive literature that studies the Ramsey problem in complete market
economies; see Chari and Kehoe (1999) for a survey. The most well known result for the
deterministic subset of these economies is due to Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986); capital
taxes should converge to zero in the long run. Among others, Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi
(1997) and Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe (1999), show this result is robust to a relaxation of
a number of assumptions. As was described above we make an effort to relate our main
results to the results in this literature.
The New Dynamic Public Finance literature takes an alternative approach to answer
our initial question. It focuses on the design of a mechanism that would allow the planner
to extract information about the agents’ unobservable productivities efficiently. It assumes
tax instruments are unrestricted and in this sense it dominates the Ramsey approach
in terms of generality, since the latter ignores the information extraction problem5 and
imposes ad-hoc linearity restrictions on the tax system. One of the main results steaming
5The Ramsey planner is also unable to observe productivity levels, it is not allowed to condition taxes
on them.
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from this literature is the inverse Euler equation; see Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski
(2003). Farhi and Werning (2012) show that starting from the allocations from the steady
state of an undistorted SIM model and applying perturbations to implement the inverse
Euler equation leads to small welfare gains, of the order of 0.2 percent. Moreover, it
is difficult to solve the private information problem in dynamic economies with persistent
shocks. Farhi and Werning (2013) and Troshkin, Tsyvinski, and Golosov (2010) have made
advancements in this direction in partial equilibrium settings and find that restrictions to
linear taxes lead to small welfare losses. Our view is that, even if only as a benchmark to
more elaborate tax systems, it is useful to understand the properties of a simpler optimal
linear tax system in a quantitative general equilibrium environment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 illustrates the main mechanism
behind our results in a two-period economy. Section 2.3 describes the infinite horizon
model, sets up the Ramsey problem and discusses our solution technique. Section 2.4
describes the calibration. Section 2.5 presents the main results of the paper. Section
2.6 presents the build-up from the complete market economy results to our main results.
Section 2.7 provides results for alternative welfare functions and calibrations and Section
2.8 concludes.
2.2 Mechanism: Two-Period Economy
In the SIM model, there are two dimensions of heterogeneity: productivity and wealth.
Agents have different levels of productivity which follow an exogenous random process. In
addition, markets are incomplete and only a risk-free asset exists. Therefore, the idiosyn-
cratic productivity risk cannot be diversified away. It follows that the history of shocks,
affects the amount of wealth accumulated by each agent and there is an endogenously
determined distribution of wealth.
In a two-period economy, it is possible to evaluate how each dimension of heterogeneity
affects the optimal tax system. Since there is no previous history of shocks the initial
wealth inequality can be set exogenously. In this section, we characterize, under some
assumptions about preferences, the optimal tax system when the government has access to
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linear labor and capital income taxes, and (possibly negative) lump-sum transfers. First,
we assume agents have the same level of wealth but face an idiosyncratic productivity shock
- we call this the uncertainty economy . Then, we shut down uncertainty and introduce
ex-ante wealth inequality - this is referred to as the inequality economy . Next we consider
the case in which there is uncertainty and inequality and discuss the relationship with the
infinite horizon problem.
2.2.1 Uncertainty economy
Consider an economy with a measure one of ex-ante identical agents who live for two
periods. Suppose they have time-additive, von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions.
Denote the period utility function by u (c, n) where c and n are the levels of consumption
and labor supplied. Assume u satisfies the usual conditions and denote the discount factor
by β. In the first period each agent is endowed with ω units of the consumption good
which can be either consumed or invested into a risk-free asset, a, and supplies n¯ units of
labor inelastically.
In period 2, consumers receive income from the asset they saved in period 1 and from
labor. Labor is supplied endogenously by each agent in period 2 and the individual labor
productivity, e, is random and can take two values: eL with probability π and eH > eL with
probability 1−π, with the normalization πeL+(1− π) eH = 1. Due to the independence of
shocks across consumers a law of large numbers operates so that in period 2 the fraction of
agents with eL is π and with eH is (1− π). Letting ni be the labor supply of an agent with
productivity ei, it follows that the aggregate labor supply is N = πeLnL + (1− π) eHnH .
The planner needs to finance an expenditure of G in period 2. It has three instruments
available: labor and capital income taxes, τn and τk, and lump-sum transfers T which can
be positive or negative. Let w be the wage rate and r the interest rate. The total period 2
income of an agent with productivity ei is, therefore, (1− τn)weini+
(
1 +
(
1− τk) r) a+T .
In period 2, output is produced using capital, K, and labor and a constant-returns-to-scale
neoclassical production function f (K,N). We assume that f (·) is net of depreciation.
Definition 1. A tax distorted competitive equilibrium is a vector (K,nL, nH , r, w;
τn, τk, T ) such that
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1. (K,nL, nH) solves
max
a,nL,nH
u (ω − a, n¯)+βE [u (ci, ni)] s.t. ci = (1− τn)weini+
(
1 +
(
1− τk
)
r
)
a+T ;
2. r = fK (K,N), w = fN (K,N), where N = πeLnL + (1− π) eHnH ;
3. and, τnwN + τkrK = G+ T .
The Ramsey problem is to choose τn, τk, and T to maximize welfare. Since agents
are ex-ante identical there is no ambiguity about which welfare function to use, it is the
expected utility of the agents. If there is no risk, i.e. eL = eH , the agents are also ex-
post identical and the usual representative agent result applies: since negative lump-sum
transfers are available, it is optimal to obtain all revenue via this undistortive instrument
and set τn = τk = 0.
In order to provide a sharp characterization of the optimal tax system we make the
following assumption discussed below6.
Assumption 1. No income effects on labor supply and constant Frisch elasticity, κ, i.e.
ucn − uccun
uc
= 0, and
uccun
n (uccunn − u2cn)
= κ.
We pursue a variational approach. Suppose
(
K,nL, nH , r, w; τ
n, τk, T
)
is a tax distorted
equilibrium7. We consider a small variation on the tax system
(
dτn, dτk, dT
)
, such that
all the equilibrium conditions are satisfied. Then, evaluate the effect of such a variation
on welfare, taking as given the optimal decision rules of the agents. Using this method we
establish the following proposition (derivations and proofs are in Appendix A.1).
6In a similar two-period environment, Gottardi et al. (2014a) characterize the solution to Ramsey prob-
lem without Assumption A. However, they impose an alternative assumption about endogenous variables
which are satisfied under Assumption A. Further, this assumption allows us to provide a sharper charac-
terization of the optimal tax system (besides the signs of taxes we also characterize the levels).
7Since the equilibrium does not exist for τn ≥ 1 or τk ≥ (1 + r) /r, we impose the restrictions that
τn < 1 and τk < (1 + r) /r.
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Proposition 1. In the uncertainty economy, if u satisfies Assumption A, then, the optimal
tax system is such that τk = 0,
τn =
(ν − 1) π(1− π) (eHnH − eLnL)
(ν − 1) π(1 − π) (eHnH − eLnL) + κN (πν + (1− π)) > 0, (2.1)
where ν ≡ uc(cL,nL)
uc(cH ,nH)
, and T < 0 balances the budget.
Notice that the planner could choose to finance G with T but chooses a positive dis-
tortive labor income tax instead. The revenue from labor taxation is rebated via lump-sum
transfers and the proportion of the agents’ income that comes from the uncertain labor
income is reduced. Hence, this tax system effectively provides insurance to the agents.
Why not provide full insurance by taxing away all the labor income? This is exactly what
would happen if labor were supplied inelastically. In fact, notice that in this case κ = 0 and
equation (2.1) implies τn = 1. However, with an endogenous labor supply the planner has
to balance two objectives: minimize distortions to agents’ decisions and provide insurance.
This balance is explicit in equation (2.1) seeing as a higher κ implies a lower τn. That
is, the more responsive labor supply is to changes in labor taxes the more distortive these
taxes are and the planner chooses a lower labor tax. In the limit, if κ → ∞ it will be
optimal to set τn = 0.
With income effects on labor supply, distortions of the savings decision would spill
over to the labor supply decision and vice-versa. Thus, it could be optimal, for instance,
to choose τk so as to mitigate the distortion imposed by a positive τn. This complex
relationship complicates the analysis considerably. Assumption 1 unties this relationship
and as a result it is optimal to set τk = 0.
Next, suppose that eL = 1− ǫunc/π and eH = 1 + ǫunc/ (1− π), so that ǫunc is a mean
preserving spread on the productivity levels. It is easy to see that if ǫunc = 0 equation (2.1)
implies that τn = 0. The effect of an increase in ǫunc on the optimal τn is not as obvious
since the right hand side of equation (2.1) contains endogenous variables. An application
of the implicit function theorem, however, clarifies that as long as ∂ν/∂ǫunc > 0 and
∂ν/∂τn < 0, it follows that ∂τn/∂ǫunc > 0, i.e. the optimal labor income tax is increasing
in the level of risk in the economy. Under standard calibrations, the equilibrium ratio of
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marginal utilities, ν, is in fact increasing in the level of risk (∂ν/∂ǫunc > 0) and decreasing
in the labor income tax (∂ν/∂τn < 0), as an example see section 2.2.3.
2.2.2 Inequality economy
Consider the environment described above only without uncertainty and with initial wealth
inequality. That is, suppose the productivity levels do not vary between agents, i.e. eL =
eH = 1, and that ω can take two values: ωL for a proportion p of the agents and ωH > ωL
for the rest, with ω¯ ≡ pωL + (1− p)ωH .
Definition 2. A tax distorted competitive equilibrium is
(
aL, aH , nL, nH , r, w; τ
n, τk, T
)
such that
1. For i ∈ {L,H}, (ai, ni) solves
max
ai,ni
u (ωi − ai, n¯) + βu (ci, ni) , s.t. ci = (1− τn)wni +
(
1 +
(
1− τk
)
r
)
ai + T ;
2. r = fK (K,N), w = fN (K,N), where K = paL + (1− p) aH and N = pnL +
(1− p)nH ;
3. and, τnwN + τkrK = G+ T .
In this economy the concept of optimality is no longer unambiguous. Since agents are
different ex-ante, a decision must be made with respect to the social welfare function. In
what follows, by optimal we mean the one that maximizes W ≡ pUL + (1− p)UH ; the
utilitarian welfare function. The following proposition follows.
Proposition 2. In the inequality economy, if u satisfies Assumption A and has CARA is
GHH as in equation (2.4), then the optimal tax system is such that τn = 0,
τk =
(
1+r
r
)
(ν − 1) p(1− p) (ωH − ωL)
(ν − 1) p(1− p) (ωH − ωL) + ρψ (pν + (1− p))
> 0, (2.2)
where ρ ≡ 2+(1−τk)r2+r for CARA, ρ ≡ 1+β
−
1
σ (1+(1−τk)r)σ−1σ
1+r+β
1
σ (1+(1−τk)r) 1σ
for GHH, and ψ is the level of
absolute risk aversion8. T < 0 balances the budget.
8The level of absolute risk aversion is endogenous is the GHH case.
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The planner chooses a positive capital income tax which distorts savings decisions but
allows for redistribution between agents. The ex-ante wealth inequality is exogenously
given. However, agents with different wealth levels in the first period will save different
amounts and have different asset levels in the second period. This endogenously generated
asset inequality is the one the tax system is able to affect. A positive capital tax rebated
via lump-sum transfers directly reduces the proportion of the agents’ income that will be
dependent on unequal asset income achieving the desired redistribution which implies a re-
duction of consumption inequality. A related result was established in Da´vila et al. (2012).
They show that the competitive equilibrium allocation in the SIM model is constrained
inefficient. That is, the incomplete market structure itself induces outcomes that could be
improved upon if consumers merely acted differently; if they used the same set of markets
but departed from purely self-interested optimization. The constrained inefficiency results
from a pecuniary externality. The savings and labor supply decisions of the agents affects
the wage and interest rates and, therefore, the uncertainty and inequality in the economy.
These effects are not internalized by the agents and inefficiency follows. Notice that the
planner’s problem in their environment is significantly different from the Ramsey problem
described here. There the planner affects allocations directly and prices indirectly whereas
the Ramsey planner affects (after tax) prices directly and allocations indirectly. In the
inequality economy, for instance, Da´vila et al. (2012) show that there is underaccumula-
tion of capital. A higher level of capital would decrease interest rates and increase wages,
reducing inequality. A naive extrapolation of this logic would suggest that capital taxes
should be negative so as to encourage savings. This logic, however, does not take into
account the more relevant direct effect of the tax system on after tax prices. Proposition
2 shows that the opposite is true: capital taxes should be positive.
One of the key elements of equation (2.2) is the inverse of the coefficient of absolute risk
aversion, 1/ψ, which is proportional to the agents’ intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
This elasticity indicates the responsiveness of savings to changes in τk. Hence, the higher
this elasticity is the lower is the optimal τk, since providing redistribution becomes more
costly. The τn = 0 result is again associated with Assumption 1.
Assuming that ωL = 1 − ǫine/p and ωH = 1 − ǫine/ (1− p). The effect of an increase
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in ǫine on the optimal τk can again be found by applying the implicit function theorem on
equation (2.2). It follows that, if ∂ν/∂ǫine > 0 and ∂ν/∂τk < 0, then ∂τk/∂ǫine > 0; the
optimal capital income tax is increasing in the level of inequality in the economy. Under
the assumptions of Proposition 2 it is possible to show that this will always be the case.
2.2.3 Uncertainty and inequality
If both uncertainty and inequality are present, the optimal tax system has to balance
three objectives: minimize distortions, provide insurance and redistribution. A reasonable
conjecture is that under Assumption 1 the optimal tax system will be a convex combination
of the ones in Propositions 1 and 2, that is, positive labor and capital income taxes with
magnitudes associated with the levels of uncertainty and inequality in the economy. A more
subtle extrapolation of the results above points to another interesting prediction associated
with Assumption 1: the capital (labor) income taxes should be invariant with respect to
the level of uncertainty (inequality). We corroborate these conjectures with a numerical
example the results of which are in Figure 2.19.
The first row of Figure 2.1 shows the optimal tax system with the level of uncertainty
(embodied by the parameter ǫunc) in the x-axis with two levels of inequality: ǫine = 0
(solid line) and ǫine = 0.1 (dashed line). The solid lines corroborate Proposition 1. The
comparison between the dashed and the solid lines corroborates the conjectures made
above. The labor tax is increasing with the level of uncertainty and independent on the level
of inequality whereas capital taxes increase with the level of inequality and are independent
on level of risk. The second row of Figure 2.1 shows the results for the analogous experiment
with ǫine on the x-axis and ǫunc = 0 (solid) and ǫunc = 0.1 (dashed).
2.2.4 Relationship with infinite horizon problem
The two-period examples are useful to understand the key trade-offs faced by the Ramsey
planner, since they allow for the exogenous setting of the levels of uncertainty (ex-post risk)
9We use GHH preferences which satisfy Assumption 1. The most relevant interpretation of this two-
period economy is that each period corresponds to half of the working life of a person. Accordingly, we set
β = 0.9520 and δ = 1− 0.920 . Other parameters are set to satisfy the usual targets: σ = 2, κ = 0.72, χ = 6,
n¯ = 0.3, ω = 3.5, pi = p = 0.5, and f (K,N) = KαN1−α − δK with α = 0.36. G is set to 0, but any other
feasible level would just shift the lump-sum transfers correspondingly.
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Figure 2.1: Optimal taxes in the presence of both uncertainty and inequality.
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and inequality (ex-ante risk). In the infinite horizon version of the SIM model, however,
these concepts are inevitably intertwined. The characterization of the optimal tax system,
therefore, becomes considerably more complex. Labor income taxes affect not only the
level of uncertainty through the mechanism described above, but also the labor income
inequality and the distribution of assets over time. An agent’s asset level at a particular
period depends not only on its initial value, but on the history of shocks this agent has
experienced. Therefore, capital income taxation affects not only the ex-ante risk faced by
the agent but also the ex-post. Nevertheless, these results are useful to understand some
of the key features of the optimal fiscal policy in the infinite horizon model as will become
clear in what follows.
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2.3 The Infinite-Horizon Model
Time is discrete and infinite, indexed by t. There is a continuum of agents with standard
preferences E0
[∑
t β
tu (ct, nt)
]
where ct and nt denote consumption and labor supplied in
period t and u satisfies the usual conditions. Individual labor productivity, e ∈ E where
E ≡ {e1, ..., eL}, are i.i.d. across agents and follow a Markov process governed by Γ, a
transition matrix10. Agents can only accumulate a risk-free asset, a. Let A ≡ [a,∞) be
the set of possible values for a and S ≡ E × A. Individual agents are indexed by the a
pair (e, a) ∈ S. Given a sequence of prices {rt, wt}∞t=0, labor income {τnt }∞t=0, (positive)
capital income {τkt }∞t=0, and lump-sum transfers {Tt}∞t=0, each household, at time t, chooses
ct (a, e), nt (a, e), and at+1 (a, e) to solve
vt(a, e) = maxu(ct(a, e), nt(a, e)) + β
∑
et+1∈E
vt+1(at+1(a, e), et+1)Γe,et+1
subject to
(1 + τ c)ct(a, e) + at+1(a, e) = (1− τnt )wtent(a, e) + (1 + (1− I{a≥0}τkt )rt)a+ Tt
at+1(a, e) ≥ a.
Note that value and policy functions are indexed by time, because policies {τkt , τnt , Tt}∞t=0
and aggregate prices {rt, wt}∞t=0 are time-varying. The consumption tax, τ c, is a parame-
ter11. Let {λt} be a sequence of probability measures over the Borel sets S of S with λ0
given. Since the path for taxes is known, there will be a deterministic path for prices and
for {λt}∞t=0. Hence, we do not need to keep track of the distribution as an additional state;
time is a sufficient statistic.
10A law of large numbers operates so that the probability distribution over E at any date t is represented
by a vector pt ∈ R
L such that given an initial distribution p0, pt = p0Γ
t. In our exercise we make sure that
Γ is such that there exists a unique p∗ = limt→∞ pt. We normalize
∑
i
p∗i ei = 1.
11We could potentially allow consumption taxes to also be chosen by the Ramsey planner and it is not
without loss of generality that we impose this restriction. There are two reasons for this choice. The
first is practical, we are already using the limit of the computational power available to us, and allowing
for one more choice variable would increase it substantially. Second, for the US in particular capital and
labor income taxes are chosen by the Federal Government while consumption taxes are chosen by the
states, so this Ramsey problem can be understood as the one relevant for a Federal Government that takes
consumption taxes as given. We need to add τ c as a parameter for calibration purposes.
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Competitive firms own a constant-returns-to-scale technology f (·) that uses capital,
Kt, and efficient units of labor, Nt, to produce output each period (f (·) denotes output
net of depreciation - δ denotes the capital depreciation rate). A representative firm exists
that solves the usual static problem. The government needs to finance an exogenous
constant stream of expenditure, G, and lump-sum transfers with taxes on consumption,
labor income, and (positive) capital income. It can also issue debt {Bt+1} and, thus, has
the following intertemporal budget constraint
G+ rtBt = Bt+1 −Bt + τ cCt + τnt wtNt + τkt rtAˆt − Tt, (2.3)
where Ct is aggregate consumption and Aˆt is the tax base for the capital income tax.
Definition 3. Given an initial distribution λ0 and a policy π ≡ {τkt , τnt , Tt}∞t=0, a competi-
tive equilibrium is a sequence of value functions {vt}∞t=0, an allocation X ≡ {ct, nt, at+1,Kt,
Nt, Bt}∞t=0, a price system P ≡ {rt, wt}∞t=0, and a sequence of distributions {λt}∞t=0, such
that for all t:
1. Given P and π, ct(a, e), nt(a, e), and at+1(a, e) solve the household’s problem and
vt(a, e) is the respective value function;
2. Factor prices are set competitively,
rt = fK(Kt, Nt), wt = fN (Kt, Nt);
3. The probability measure λt satisfies
λt+1 =
∫
S
Qt ((a, e),S) dλt, ∀S ∈ S
where Qt is the transition probability measure;
4. The government budget constraint, (2.3), holds and debt is bounded;
5. Markets clear,
Ct +Gt +Kt+1 −Kt = f (Kt, Nt) , Kt +Bt =
∫
A×E
at(a, e)dλt.
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2.3.1 The Ramsey Problem
We now turn to the problem of choosing the optimal tax policy in the economy described
above. We assume that, in period 0, the government announces a commits to a sequence
of future taxes {τkt , τnt , Tt}∞t=1, taking period 0 taxes as given. We need the following
definitions:
Definition 4. Given λ0, for every policy π equilibrium allocation rules X (π) and
equilibrium price rules P (π) are such that π, X (π), P (π) and corresponding {vt}∞t=0
and {λt}∞t=0 constitute a competitive equilibrium.
Definition 5. Given λ0, τ
k
0 , τ
n
0 , T0 and a welfare function W (π), the Ramsey problem
is to maxpiW (π) such that X (π) and P (π) are equilibrium allocation and price rules.
In our benchmark experiments we assume that the Ramsey planner maximizes the
utilitarian welfare function: the ex-ante expected lifetime utility of a newborn agent who
has its initial state, (a, e), chosen at random from the initial stationary distribution λ0.
The planner’s objective is thus given by
W (π) =
∫
S
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct (a, e|π) , nt (a, e|π)) dλ0.
In Section 2.7 we provide results for alternative welfare functions.
2.3.2 Solution method
We solve this problem numerically. Given an initial stationary equilibrium, for any policy π
we can compute the transition to a new stationary equilibrium consistent with the policy12
and calculate welfare W (π). We then search for the policy π that maximizes W (π). This
is, however, a daunting task since it involves searching in the space of infinite sequences.
In order to make it computationally feasible we impose the following ad-hoc constraints:
that each path {τkt , τnt , Tt}∞t=1 be smooth over time and become constant after a finite
amount of periods. We denote the set of policies that satisfy these properties by ΠR.
These conditions are restrictive, but they allow the problem to be solved and are flexible
enough to characterize some of the key features of the optimal paths of taxes.
12As long as the taxes become constant at some point.
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The statement about the ad-hoc constraints must be qualified. It is well know from the
existing solutions to the Ramsey problem in complete markets economies that capital taxes
should be front-loaded. We obtain similar results in Section 2.6. Hence, in defining the set
ΠR we take this under consideration. That is, we allow capital taxes to hit the imposed
upper bound of 100 percent for the first t∗ periods, where a model period is equivalent to
one calendar year. Importantly, t∗ is endogenously chosen and is allowed to be zero, so the
fact that the solution displays a capital tax at the upper bound for a positive amount of
periods is not an assumption but a result. Other than this, we assume that the paths for{
τkt
}∞
t=t∗+1
and {τnt , Tt}∞t=1 follow splines with nodes set at exogenously selected periods.
The placement of the nodes is arbitrary, we started with a small number of them and
sequentially added more until the solution converged. In the main experiment the planner
was allowed to choose 17 variables in total: t∗, τkt∗+1, τ
k
45, τ
k
60, τ
k
100, τ
n
1 , τ
n
15, τ
n
t∗+1, τ
k
45,
τk60, τ
k
100, T1, T15, Tt∗+1, T45, T60, and T100. In the intermediate periods the paths follow
a spline function and after the final period they become constant at the last level. The
choice of the periods 1, 15, 45, 60, and 100, were a result of the fact that for experiments
with less nodes, the optimal t∗ was always close to 30, hence we placed the nodes at the
same distance from each other except for the last ones which are supposed to capture the
long run levels13.
Solving the problem described above is a particularly hard computational task. Effec-
tively we are maximizing W (π) on the domain π ∈ ΠR, where each element of ΠR can be
defined by a vector with a finite number of elements (the nodes described above). We know
very little about its properties; it is a multivariate function with potentially many kinks,
irregularities and multiple local optima14. Thus, we need a powerful and thorough proce-
dure to make sure we find the global optimum. We use a global optimization algorithm
that randomly draws a very large number of policies in ΠR and computes the transition
between the exogenously given initial stationary equilibrium and a final stationary equi-
librium that depends on the policy. Then, we compute welfare W (π) for each of those
policies and select those that yield the highest levels of welfare. These selected policies
are then clustered, similar policies placed in the same cluster. For each cluster we run an
13If the solver chooses t∗ close to one of these predetermined nodes the algorithm replaces that node for
t = 30. For instance, if t∗ = 43 the periods became 1, 15, 30, t∗ + 1, 60, and 100.
14See Guvenen (2011) for a discussion of how to deal with such problems.
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efficient derivative free local optimizer. The whole procedure is repeated depending on how
many local optima have been found and a Bayesian stopping rule is used to figure out if
enough global procedures have been run. A more detailed description of the algorithm can
be found in Appendix A.415.
2.4 Calibration
We calibrate the initial stationary equilibrium of the model economy to replicate key prop-
erties of the US economy relevant for the shape of the optimal fiscal policy. Table 2.1
summarizes our parameters choices together with the targets we use to discipline their
values and their model counterparts. We use data from the NIPA tables for the period
between 1995 and 200716 and from the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).
2.4.1 Preferences and technology
We assume GHH preferences17 with period utility given by
u (c, n) =
1
1− σ
(
c− χn
1+ 1
κ
1 + 1
κ
)1−σ
, (2.4)
where σ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, κ is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply
and χ is the weight on the disutility of labor. These preferences exhibit no wealth effects
on labor supply, which is consistent with microeconometric evidence showing these effects
are in fact small18. Further, they imply that aggregate labor supply is independent of the
distribution of wealth which is convenient for computing out of steady state allocations in
our main experiment. We set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution to 0.5; the number
frequently used in the literature (e.g. Da´vila et al. (2012) and Conesa et al. (2009a)). For
15The algorithm was parallelized for multiple cores. For each global iteration, we drew 131, 072 policies
and computed the transition and welfare for each of them. The number of transitions run for each cluster
is endogenously determined by the local solver, on average it amounted to around 150 transitions to find
each local maximum. A total of 8 global iterations were needed. We performed our analysis on the Itasca
cluster at the Minnesota Supercomputing Institute using 1024 cores.
16We choose this time period to be consistent with the one used to pin down fiscal policy parameters
which we take from Trabandt and Uhlig (2011).
17See Greenwood et al. (1988).
18See Holtz-Eakin et al. (1993), Imbens et al. (2001) and Chetty et al. (2012) for details.
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Table 2.1: Benchmark Model Economy: Target Statistics and Parameters
Statistic Target Model Parameter Value
Preferences and Technology
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 0.50 0.50 σ 2.00*
Frisch elasticity 0.72 0.72 ν 0.72*
Average hours worked 0.30 0.30 χ 4.12
Capital to output 2.72 2.71 β 0.97
Capital income share 0.38 0.38 α 0.38*
Investment to output 0.27 0.27 δ 0.10
Borrowing Constraint
Households with negative wealth (%) 18.6 19.1 a −0.04
Fiscal Policy
Capital income tax (%) 36.0 36.0 τk 0.36*
Labor income tax (%) 28.0 28.0 τn 0.28*
Consumption tax (%) 5.0 5.0 τc 0.05*
Transfer to output (%) 8.0 8.0 T 0.08
debt-to-output (%) 63.0 63.0 G 0.15
Labor Productivity Process
Wealth Gini index 0.82 0.81 e1/e2 0.62
Percentage of wealth in 1st quintile −0.2 −0.2 e3/e2 3.89
Percentage of wealth in 4th quintile 11.2 10.2 Γ11 0.94
Percentage of wealth in 5th quintile 83.4 83.4 Γ12 0.05
Percentage of wealth in top 5% 60.3 60.8 Γ21 0.01
Correlation btw wealth and labor income 0.29 0.29 Γ22 0.92
Autocorrelation of labor income 0.90 0.90 Γ31 0.01
Standard Deviation of labor income 0.20 0.20 Γ32 0.04
Notes: Parameter values marked with (*) were set exogenously, all the others were endogenously and jointly
determined.
the Frisch elasticity, κ, we rely on estimates from Heathcote et al. (2010a) and use 0.72.
This value is intended to capture both the intensive and the extensive margins of labor
supply adjustment together with the typical existence of two earners within a household.
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It is also close to 0.82, the number reported by Chetty et al. (2011) in their meta-analysis
of estimates for the Frisch elasticity using micro data. The value for χ is chosen so that
average hours worked equals 0.3 of total available time endowment19. To pin down the
discount factor, β, we target a capital to output ratio of 2.72, and the depreciation rate,
δ, is set to match an investment to output ratio of 27 percent20.
The aggregate technology is given by a Cobb-Douglas production function Y = AKαN1−α+
(1− δ)K with capital share equal to α. The total factor productivity A is set to normal-
ize output per capita, Y , to 1. The capital share parameter, α, is set to its empirical
counterpart of 0.38.
2.4.2 Borrowing Constraints
We discipline the borrowing constraint a using the percentage of households in debt (neg-
ative net worth). We target 18.6 percent following the findings of Wolff (2011) based on
the 2007 SCF.
2.4.3 Fiscal policy
In order to set the tax rates in the initial stationary equilibrium we use the effective
average tax rates computed by Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) from 1995 to 2007 and average
them. The lump-sum transfers to output ratio is set to 8 percent and we discipline the
government expenditure by imposing a debt to output ratio of 63 percent also following
Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). The latter is close to the numbers used in the literature
(e.g. Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), Domeij and Heathcote (2004) or Winter and Roehrs
(2014)). The calibrated value implies a government expenditure to output ratio of 15
percent, the data counterpart for the relevant period is approximately 18 percent. Further,
we also approximate well the actual income tax schedule as can be seen in Figure 2.2.
19It is understood that in any general equilibrium model all parameters affect all equilibrium objects.
For the presentation purposes, we associate a parameter with the variable it affects quantitatively most.
20Capital is defined as nonresidential and residential private fixed assets and purchases of consumer
durables. Investment is defined in a consistent way.
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Figure 2.2: Income tax schedule
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Notes: The data was generously supplied by Heathcote et al. (2014) who used PSID and the TAXSIM
program to compute it. The axis units are income relative to the mean.
2.4.4 Labor income process
The individual labor productivity levels e and transition probabilities in matrix Γ are
chosen to match the US wealth distribution, statistical properties of the estimated labor
income process and the correlation between wealth and labor income. There are three
levels of labor productivity in our model. Since we normalize the average productivity to
one we are left with two degrees of freedom. The transition matrix is 3 × 3. The fact
that it is a probability matrix implies its rows add up to one, therefore we are left with an
additional six degrees of freedom. Thus, we end up with eight parameters to choose
It is common to use the Tauchen method when calibrating the Markov process for pro-
ductivities. This method imposes symmetry of the Markov matrix which further reduces
the number of free parameters. Following Castan˜eda et al. (2003) we do not impose sym-
metry which allows us to target at the same time statistics from the labor income process
and the individual wealth distribution.
To match the wealth distribution we target shares of wealth owned by the first, fourth
and fifth quintile, the share of wealth owned by individuals in the top 5 percent and the
Gini index. The targets are taken from the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances21. We also
21For a general overview of this data see Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (2011).
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target properties of individual labor income estimated as the AR(1) process, namely its
autocorrelation and its standard deviation22. According to Domeij and Heathcote (2004),
existing studies estimate the first order autocorrelation of (log) labor income to lie between
0.88 and 0.96 and the standard deviation (of the innovation term in the continuous rep-
resentation) of 0.12 and 0.25. We calibrate the productivity process so that the Markov
matrix and vector e imply an autocorrelation of (log) labor income of 0.9 and a stan-
dard deviation of 0.223 (in Section 2.7 we provide robustness results with respect to these
choices). Finally, we target the correlation between wealth and labor income which is 0.29
in the 2007 SCF data. This way we discipline to some extent the labor income distribution
using the wealth distribution that we match accurately. The resulting productivity vector,
transition matrix and stationary distribution of productivities, λ∗e, are
e =

0.79
1.27
4.94
 , Γ =

.956 .043 .001
.071 .929 .000
.012 .051 .937
 , and λ∗e =

.616
.377
.007
 .
2.4.5 Model performance
Table A.1 presents statistics about the wealth and labor income distributions. We target
five of the wealth distribution statistics, so it is not surprising that we match that distri-
bution quite well. Table A.2 presents another crucial dimension along which our model is
consistent with the data: income sources over the quintiles of wealth. The composition of
income, specially of the consumption-poor agents, plays an important role in the determi-
nation of the optimal fiscal policy. The fraction of uncertain labor income determines the
strength of the insurance motive and the fraction of the unequal asset income affects the
redistributive motive. Our calibration delivers, without targeting, a good approximation
of the income composition. Finally, we also match the consumption Gini which remained
fairly constant around 0.27 in the period from 1995 to 2007 (see Krueger and Perri (2006)).
22Including transitory shocks would allow a better match to the labor income process. However, these
types of shocks can, for the most part, be privately insured against (see Guvenen and Smith (2013)) so we
chose to abstract from them to keep the model parsimonious.
23We follow Nakajima (2012) in choosing these targets. The targets are associated with labor income,
wen, which includes the endogenous variables w and n. Therefore, to calibrate the parameters governing
the individual productivity process, the model must be solved repeatedly until the targets are satisfied.
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2.5 Main Results
The optimal paths for the fiscal policy instruments are portrayed in Figure 2.3. Capital
taxes should be front-loaded hitting the upper bound for 33 initial periods then decrease
to 45 percent in the long-run. Labor income taxes are substantially reduced to less than
half of its initial level, from 28 percent to about 13 percent in the long-run. The ratio of
lump-sum transfers to output decreases initially to about 3 percent, then increases back
to its initial level of 8 percent before it starts converging to its final level of 3.5 percent.
The government accumulates assets in the initial periods of high capital taxes reaching a
level of debt-to-output of about −125 percent, which then converges to a final level of −17
percent. Relative to keeping fiscal instruments at their initial levels, this leads to a welfare
gain equivalent to a permanent 4.9 percent increase in consumption.
Figure 2.3: Optimal Fiscal Policy: Benchmark
(a) Capital tax
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Notes: Dashed line: initial stationary equilibrium; Solid line: optimal transition; The black dots are the choice
variables: the spline nodes and t∗, the point at which the capital tax leaves the upper bound.
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2.5.1 Aggregates
The aggregates associated with the implementation of the optimal policy are shown in
Figure A.1. The capital level initially decreases by about 8 percent in the first 13 years,
but then increases towards a final level 20 percent higher than the initial steady state.
The increase might be surprising at a first glance given the higher capital taxes. First
notice that, even if capital income taxes were set to 100 percent forever, there would still
be precautionary incentives for the agents with relatively high productivity to save: if they
receive a negative shock they can then consume their savings. The decrease in government
debt also contributes substantially to this increase - an effect we explain further below in
Section 2.5.4. Most importantly though, the level of aggregate labor increases by about
15 percent immediately after the policy change following the reduction in labor taxes,
increasing the marginal productivity of capital.
The higher levels of capital and labor lead to higher levels of output and consumption,
which increases by 15 and 20 percent respectively over the transition. The concomitant
increase in average consumption and labor has ambiguous effects on the welfare of the
average agent. Hence, we also plot in Figure A.1f what we call the average consumption-
labor composite, defined below in equation (2.5), which is the more relevant measure for
welfare. On impact the labor-consumption composite increases by 13 percent as the higher
consumption levels (due to the initial reduction in savings) more than compensate for the
higher supply of labor. It then decreases for some periods following the reduction in output
and the increasing savings. In the long-run it returns to a level about 13 percent higher
than the one in the initial steady state.
2.5.2 Distributional Effects
Movements in the levels do not provide a full picture of what results from the implementa-
tion of the optimal fiscal policy. It is also important to understand its effects on inequality
and on the risk faced by the agents. Figure 2.4a plots the evolution of the Gini index
for consumption24. Notice that, though it takes some time for the reduction to start, the
24Since labor supply is proportional to productivity levels, the inequality of hours is unaffected by the
policy, it is in fact determined exogenously. Hence, here we can focus on consumption inequality.
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consumption Gini is significantly reduced over the transition reaching a low about 16 per-
cent lower than the initial level. As will become clear below, this reduction in inequality
is behind most of the welfare gains associated with the optimal policy. Not surprisingly,
such a change would be supported by most agents in the economy with the exception of
the highly productive and, therefore, wealthier ones - see Table 2.2.
Figure 2.4b displays the evolution of the shares of labor, capital and transfer income
out of total income. Importantly, notice that the share of labor income is significantly
increased under the optimal policy. Since all the risk faced by agents in the SIM model is
associated with their labor income, it turns out that they face more risk after the policy is
implemented. This has an obvious negative effect on welfare which is, however, outweighed
by the gains associated with the higher levels of consumption and the reduction in inequality
it provides. The next sections will clarify some of these issues.
Figure 2.4: Inequality measures
(a) Consumption Gini
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Notes (a) and (b): Dashed lines: initial stationary equilibrium; Solid lines: optimal transition. Notes (b): Red lines:
labor income share; Blue lines: transfer income share; Green lines: asset income share
Table 2.2: Proportion in favor of reform
e = L e =M e = H All
99.6 98.3 3.7 99.5
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2.5.3 Welfare decomposition
Here we present a result that will be particularly helpful for understanding the properties
of the optimal fiscal policy. First, let xt be the individual consumption-labor composite
(the term inside the utility function 2.4), that is
xt ≡ ct − χn
1+ 1
κ
t
1 + 1
κ
, (2.5)
and Xt denote its aggregate. The utilitarian welfare function can increase for three reasons.
First, it will increase if the utility of the average agent, U ({Xt}), increases; we call this
the level effect. Reductions in distortive taxes will achieve this goal by allocating resources
more efficiently25. Second, since agents are risk averse, it increases if the uncertainty about
individual paths {xt}∞t=0 is reduced; we call this the insurance effect. By redistributing from
the (ex-post) lucky to the (ex-post) unlucky, a tax reform can reduce the uncertainty faced
by the agents. Finally, it will increase if the inequality across the certainty equivalents of
the individual paths {xt}∞t=0, for agents with different initial (asset/productivity) states,
is reduced; we call this the redistribution effect. By redistributing from the rich (ex-
ante lucky) to the poor (ex-ante unlucky), the tax reform reduces the inequality between
agents. In Appendix A.3 we give precise definitions for each of these effects and show
how it is possible to measure them. Then, letting ∆ be the average welfare gain, ∆L
the gains associated with the level effect, ∆I with the insurance effect, and ∆R with the
redistribution effect, we prove the following proposition.
Proposition 3. If preferences are GHH as in (2.4), then
1 + ∆ = (1 + ∆L) (1 + ∆I) (1 + ∆R) .
Hence, it is possible to decompose the average welfare gains into the components de-
scribed above26. The results for this decomposition for our main results are in Table 2.3.
25This is the only relevant effect in a representative agent economy.
26The welfare gains described above are in terms of consumption-labor composite units. The decompo-
sition does not hold exactly in terms of consumption units. To keep our results comparable with others,
we report the average welfare gains in terms of consumption units and normalize the numbers for ∆L, ∆I ,
and ∆R accordingly.
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Most of the welfare gains implied by the implementation of the optimal fiscal policy come
from the reduction in ex-ante inequality (redistribution effect). The also substantial wel-
fare gains associated with the reduction in distortions (level effect) is almost exactly offset
by welfare losses due to the increase in uncertainty (insurance effect).
Table 2.3: Welfare decomposition
Average Level Insurance Redistribution
welfare gain effect effect effect
∆ ∆L ∆I ∆R
4.9 3.7 -3.7 4.9
2.5.4 Fixed instruments
In order to understand the role played by each instrument in the optimal fiscal policy, we
ran experiments in which we hold each of them fixed and optimize only with respect to
the others. Figures A.2, A.3, A.4, and A.5 display the solutions and Table 2.4 the welfare
decomposition for each of these experiments.
Capital taxes
It is clear from the welfare decomposition in Table 2.4 that the path of capital taxes
plays a crucial role in the redistributional gains associated with the unrestricted optimal
policy. Restricting capital taxes to their initial level brings the redistribution effect from
4.9 percent to −0.2 percent. In line with the result in Proposition 2, the increase in capital
taxes especially in the initial years leads to a strong redistribution effect as the proportion
of unequal asset income is reduced (actually brought to zero in the first 33 years). Relative
to the optimal policy, the restriction on capital taxes also leads to higher labor taxes (which
explains the better insurance effect) and a lower accumulation of assets by the government.
Labor taxes
Fixing labor taxes at their initial level is particularly detrimental to the level effect. In
the optimal policy labor taxes are reduced substantially and the labor supply distortions
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reduced accordingly. The redistributional gains are virtually unaffected whereas the in-
surance effect is improved, which is consistent with the result in Proposition 1 since the
restriction implies higher labor taxes. The fact that the insurance effect is still negative
might be surprising though. What is behind this effect is the role played by the accumu-
lation of assets by the government which we explain bellow.
Lump-sum transfers
Restricting lump-sum transfers to its initial level doesn’t affect the results as much as the
other restrictions; the average welfare gains are reduced from 4.9 percent to 4.4 percent.
Most of the losses come from the reduction in the level effect. The restriction leads to a
higher overall level of transfers and, therefore, higher labor taxes relative to the unrestricted
optimal policy whereas capital taxes are virtually unaffected. This leads to an overall higher
level of distortions which explains the lower level effect.
Table 2.4: Welfare decomposition: Fixed instruments
∆ ∆L ∆I ∆R
Fixed capital taxes 1.0 3.7 -2.5 -0.2
Fixed labor taxes 3.3 0.0 -1.6 4.8
Fixed lump-sum 4.4 1.8 -2.5 5.1
Fixed debt 4.0 3.8 -3.2 3.2
Benchmark 4.9 3.7 -3.7 4.9
Government debt
In the absence of borrowing constraints an increase in government debt is innocuous,
in response agents simply adjust their savings one-to-one and the Ricardian equivalence
holds. In the SIM model, however, agents face borrowing constraints (which are binding
for some of them). The Ricardian equivalence breaks down and in response to an increase
in government debt aggregate savings increase by less than one-to-one. Since the asset
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market must clear (i.e. At = Kt + Bt), it follows that capital must decrease as a result.
Hence, increases in government debt crowd out capital while decreases crowd in capital27.
In order to understand why the government accumulates assets in the optimal policy
it is important to look at its effect on equilibrium prices28. A lower amount of government
debt leads to a higher level of capital which reduces interest rates and increases wages.
Hence, besides the positive level effect associated with the higher levels of capital such
a policy also affects the insurance and redistribution effects. It effectively reduces the
proportion of the agents’ income associated with the unequal asset income and increases
the proportion associated with uncertain labor income. The result is a positive redistri-
bution effect and a negative insurance effect. Thus, when government debt-to-output is
held fixed the redistributional gains are reduced from 4.9 percent to 3.2 percent while the
insurance loss is reduced from −3.7 percent to −3.2 percent. This also clarifies why the
planner chooses to accumulate assets when the instrument is not restricted: the welfare
gains associated with the resulting redistribution outweigh the losses from the increased
uncertainty.
2.5.5 Transitory effects
In this section we first compute the optimal fiscal policy ignoring transitory welfare effects.
A comparison with our benchmark results allows us to measure the importance of account-
ing for these transitory effects. If the difference was small this would be a validation of
experiments of this kind performed in the literature. It turns out, however, that the results
are remarkably different. A better option, is to solve for the optimal policy with constant
instruments accounting for transitory welfare effects. The welfare loss associated with hold-
ing the instruments constant, however, is still significant. The results are summarized in
Tables 2.5 and 2.6.
27See Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) and Winter and Roehrs (2014) for an extensive discussion os this
issue.
28The fact that the government accumulates assets does not imply that it becomes the owner of part
of the capital stock. Agents own the capital, but on average owe the government (in the form of IOU
contracts) more than the value of their capital holdings.
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Table 2.5: Final Stationary Equilibrium: transitory effects
τh τk T/Y B/Y K H r w
Initial equilibrium 28.0 36.0 8.0 63.0 1.65 0.33 4.1 1.14
Stat. equil. 18.0 - 3.7 -
326.1
4.01 0.44 0.0 1.45
Stat. equil. fixed debt 4.7 -5.2 -5.4 63.0 2.84 0.43 1.9 1.26
Constant policy 7.6 73.7 3.5 49.8 1.31 0.36 7.1 1.01
Benchmark 12.6 45.1 3.5 -16.9 2.00 0.38 3.7 1.16
Notes: The values of τh, τk, T/Y , B/Y , and r are in percentage points.
Table 2.6: Welfare decomposition: transitory effects
∆ ∆L ∆I ∆R
Stat. equil. 24.7 19.6 -4.6 9.3
Stat. equil. fixed debt 9.8 18.8 -5.2 -2.6
Constant policy 3.3 3.4 -3.0 3.0
Benchmark 4.9 3.7 -3.7 4.9
Stationary equilibrium policy
Here the the planner chooses stationary levels of all four fiscal policy instruments to max-
imize welfare in the final steady state. In particular, the planner can choose any level of
government debt without incurring in the transitional costs associated with it. It chooses
a debt-to-output ratio of −326 percent. At this level the amount of capital that is crowded
in is close to the golden rule level, that is, such that interest rates (net of depreciation)
equal to zero. Thus, taxing capital income in this scenario has no relevant effect and we
actually find multiple solutions with different levels of capital taxes which is why we do not
display that number in Table 2.5. The average welfare gains associated with this policy
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are of 24.7 percent, that is, agents would be willing to pay this percentage of their con-
sumption in order to be born in the stationary equilibrium of an economy that has this
policy instead of the initial stationary equilibrium. However, these welfare gains ignore the
transitory effects, it is as if the economy jumped immediately to a new steady state in with
the government has a large amount of assets without incurring in the costs associated with
accumulating it.
A more reasonable experiment, which is closer to the one studied by Conesa et al.
(2009a), is to restrict the level of debt-to-output ratio to remain at its initial level. When
this is the case, the planner reduces labor taxes and capital taxes substantially obtaining
most of the necessary revenue via lump-sum taxes. This has detrimental insurance and
redistribution effects, but the associated level effect more than makes up for it. The policy
leads to a welfare gain of 9.8 percent relative to the initial steady state when transitory
effects are ignored. However, once transitory effects are considered, implementing this
policy leads to a welfare loss of 6.4 percent. Hence, ignoring transitory effects can be
severely misleading. Importantly, the transitory distributional effects of the policy and
the costs associated with the accumulation of capital (or assets by the government) are
ignored.
Transition with constant policy
Here we consider the problem of finding the constant optimal fiscal policy that maximizes
the same welfare function we use in our benchmark experiment, in which transitory effects
are accounted for. We present a comparison with the benchmark results in Figures A.7 and
A.6. The level of capital taxes is close to average between the upper bound of 100 percent
and the final capital tax in the benchmark experiment. Labor taxes are reduced from a
long-run level of 12.6 percent to 7.6 percent and lump-sum transfers converge much faster
to the final level of 3.5 percent. The main difference in the fiscal policy instruments is the
fact that with a constant policy the government is not able to accumulate assets via higher
initial capital taxes. The debt-to-output ratio remains close to the initial level29. As a
result of the higher long-run capital tax and relatively higher debt-to-output ratio, capital
decreases by about 20 percent in the long-run whereas it increases by approximately the
29We do not restrict debt-to-output ratio to be constant in this experiment.
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same amount in the benchmark experiment. The associated higher interest rates and lower
wages lead to the reduction in the redistributional gains and reduces the insurance losses
associated with the lower labor tax. This policy leads to an average welfare gain of 3.3
percent whereas the time varying policy increases welfare by 4.9 percent. That is, the
restriction to constant policies leads a welfare loss of 1.6 percent.
2.6 Complete Market Economies
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to solve the Ramsey problem in the SIM environ-
ment. In order to provide further insight and relate it to other results in the literature,
we provide a build up to our benchmark result. First, we start from the representative
agent economy (Economy 1) and introduce heterogeneity only in initial assets (Economy
2), heterogeneity only in individual productivity levels (constant and certain) (Economy
3), and heterogeneity both in initial assets and in individual productivity levels (Economy
4). Introducing idiosyncratic productivity shocks and borrowing constraints brings us back
to the SIM model. At each step, we analyze the optimal fiscal policy identifying the effect
of each feature.
In what follows we examine the optimal fiscal policy in Economies 1-4. Their formal
environments can be quickly described by starting from the SIM environment delineated
above. Economy 4 is the SIM economy with transition matrix, Γ, set to the identity matrix.
and borrowing constraints replaced by no-Ponzi conditions. Then, we obtain Economy 3 by
setting initial asset levels to its average, Economy 2 by setting the productivity levels to its
average, e = 1, and Economy 1 by equalizing both initial assets and levels of productivity.
Figure 2.5 contains the numerical results.
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Figure 2.5: Optimal Taxes: Complete Market Economies
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Notes: Dashed line: initial taxes; Solid line: optimal taxes.
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2.6.1 Economy 1: representative agent
To avoid a trivial solution, the usual Ramsey problem in the representative agent economy
does not consider lump-sum transfers to be an available instrument. Since in this paper
we do, the solution is, in fact, very simple. It is optimal to obtain all revenue via lump-
sum taxes and set capital and labor income taxes so as not to distort any of the agent’s
decisions. This amounts to τkt = 0 and τ
n
t = −τ c for all t ≥ 1. Since consumption taxes are
exogenously set to a constant level, zero capital taxes leaves savings decisions undistorted
and labor taxes equal to minus the consumption tax ensures labor supply decisions are
not distorted as well. In this setup the Ricardian equivalence holds so that the path for
lump-sum taxes and debt are indeterminate: there is no lesson to be learned from this
model about the timing of lump-sum taxes or the path of government debt. This will also
be the case in Economies 2, 3 and 4.
2.6.2 Economy 2: add heterogeneity in initial assets
Introducing heterogeneity in the initial level of assets we can diagnose the effect of this
particular feature on the Ramsey policies by comparing it to the representative agent ones.
We extend the procedure introduced by Werning (2007)30 to characterize the optimal
policies for this and the next two economies. We describe them in a proposition leaving
the proof to Appendix A.2.
Proposition 4. There exists a finite integer t∗ ≥ 1 such that the optimal31 tax system is
given by τkt = 1 for 1 ≤ t < t∗ and τkt = 0 for all t > t∗; and τnt = −τ c for all t ≥ 1.
Once again, there is no reason to distort labor decisions since labor income is certain
and the same for all agents. However, the paths for capital taxes and lump-sum transfer
do differ from the representative agent ones. Proposition 2 provides a rationale for taxing
capital in this case; since agents have different initial asset levels, capital taxes can be used
to provide redistribution. This fact together with the fact that capital taxes are zero in
30Werning (2007) solves for separable and balance growth path utility functions. Besides solving for GHH
preferences we also impose the upper bound on capital income taxes and remove the possibility of time zero
taxation.
31All propositions in this section are valid for any set of welfare weights, not only the Utilitarian ones.
The associated numerical results do assume a Utilitarian welfare function though.
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the long-run determine the optimal path for capital taxes32. Capital taxes are positive
and front-loaded, hitting the upper bound in the initial periods subsequently being driven
to zero. The extra revenue obtained via capital taxation is redistributed via lump-sum
transfers (or a reduction in lump-sum taxes relative to the representative agent level). It
is important to reemphasize that since lump-sum transfers are an unrestricted instrument,
there is no reason to tax capital in the initial periods other than for redistributive motives.
In order to have a sense of the magnitudes of t∗ and the increase in lump-sum transfers,
we apply the same procedure to the one we used to solve for the optimal tax system in
the benchmark economy. All we need to do is choose the initial distribution of assets.
The stationary distribution of assets in this economy is indeterminate33, hence, we can
choose any one we want. To keep the results comparable we choose the initial stationary
distribution from the benchmark experiment 34.
2.6.3 Economy 3: add heterogeneity in productivity levels
It turns out that the Ramsey policies for this economy are a bit more complex. Let Φ, Ψ,
and Ωn be constants (defined in Appendix A.2) and define
Θt ≡ Ct
Ωnχ κ1+κN
1+κ
κ
t
− 1.
The following proposition can be established.
Proposition 5. Assuming capital taxes are bounded only by the positivity of gross interest
rates, the optimal labor tax, τnt , can be written as a function of Θt given by
τnt (Θt) =
(1 + τ c)ΨΘt
ΦΘt +Ψ(σ +Θt)
− τ c, for t ≥ 1, (2.6)
32Straub and Werning (2014) show that capital taxes can be positive in environments similar to this.
The reason why their logic does not apply here is the fact that the planner has lump-sum taxes as an
available instrument. In particular, the proof of Proposition 4 does not impose convergence of any Lagrange
multipliers.
33For the preferences chosen above, consumption is linear on, and labor supply is independent of the
individual asset level. It follows that the equilibrium levels of aggregates are independent of the as-
set distribution and equal to the representative agent ones (see Chatterjee (1994)). In a steady state,
β
(
1 +
(
1− τk
)
r
)
= 1 and, therefore, every agent will keep its asset level constant.
34In fact, a rescaling of it since the steady state aggregate level of assets is different when there is no
idiosyncratic risk (since there is no precautionary savings).
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with sensitivity
Θt
dτnt (Θt)
dΘt
=
σ (τnt (Θt) + τ
c)2
(1 + τ c)Θt
. (2.7)
It is optimal to set the capital-income tax rate according to
Rt+1
R∗t+1
=
τnt + τ
c
τnt+1 + τ
c
1− τnt+1
1− τnt
, for t ≥ 1. (2.8)
Since labor income in unequal, there is a reason to tax it, in order to provide redistri-
bution. Optimal labor taxes are not constant over time since they depend on Θt. If they
were constant, however, equation (2.8) would imply τkt = 0 for all t ≥ 2. Thus, capital
taxes will fluctuate around zero to the extent that labor taxes vary over time. We disregard
the upper bound on capital taxes, τkt+1 ≤ 1, because it would complicate the result even
further and in a non-interesting way. It could be that the bound is violated if the variation
of Θt between t and t+1 is large enough. However, as discussed below, quantitatively this
is unlikely.
To obtain a numerical solution we set the productivity levels to the ones in the bench-
mark economy and apply the same procedure. To have a sense of the magnitude of the
sensitivity of τnt to Θt we plug the initial stationary equilibrium numbers (τ
n = 0.221,
τ c = 0.046, σ = 2, and Θ ≈ 2) into equation (2.7). This implies a sensitivity of 0.06, i.e.
a 1 percent increase in Θt changes the tax rate by 0.06 of a percentage point, from 0.221
to 0.2209. We can then calculate the path of Θt, which we plot in Figure A.8. Notice that
the volatility of Θt over time is unsubstantial. It follows that the optimal labor taxes are
virtually constant and capital taxes virtually zero.
In any case, the fact that capital is taxed at all seems to be inconsistent with the logic
put forward so far. It is not, when labor taxes vary over time they distort the savings
decision, capital taxes are then set to “undo” this distortion. The analogous is not the case
in Economy 2 because of the absence of income effects on labor supply; distortions of the
savings decision do not affect the labor supply.
2.6.4 Economy 4: add heterogeneity in both
The result for this economy is a combination of the last two.
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Proposition 6. There exists a finite integer t∗ ≥ 1 such that the optimal tax system is
given by τkt = 1 for 1 ≤ t < t∗, τkt follows equation (2.8) for t > t∗; τnt evolves according to
equation (2.8) for 1 ≤ t < t∗; and τnt is determined by equation (2.6) for all t ≥ t∗.
Optimal capital taxes are very similar to Economy 2 and for the same reasons. Labor
taxes are determined by the same equation as in Economy 3 for t ≥ t∗. In initial period,
1 ≤ t < t∗, while capital taxes are at the upper bound, Rt = 1 < R∗t and, therefore,
equation (2.8) implies that labor taxes should be increasing. Lump-sum transfers are
higher than the in Economies 2 and 3 since they are used to redistribute the capital and
labor tax revenue.35
2.7 Robustness
Figure 2.6 shows that the solution with 4 nodes (t∗,τkt∗+1,τ
n
1 , and T1) produces a reasonable
approximation for the benchmark solution, at least with respect to its basic features. In
this section, we make use of this fact, and present results for alternative welfare functions
and for different calibrations of the labor income process using these 4 nodes.
35Bhandari et al. (2013) solve recursively for Ramsey policies in an economy similar to Economy 4 with
aggregate risk.
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Figure 2.6: Optimal Fiscal Policy with 4 nodes
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Notes: Dashed thin line: initial stationary equilibrium; Dashed thick line: optimal transition with 17 nodes (bench-
mark); Solid line: optimal transition with 4 nodes.
2.7.1 Welfare function
All the results presented so far used the same social welfare function: the utilitarian one,
which places equal Pareto weights on each agent. This implies a particular social preference
with respect to the equality versus efficiency trade-off. Here we consider different welfare
functions that rationalize different preferences about this trade-off. With this in mind we
propose the following function
W σˆ =
(∫
x¯ (a0, e0)
1−σˆ dλ0
) 1
1−σˆ
,
where λ0 is the initial distribution of individual states (a0, e0), x¯ denotes the individual cer-
tainty equivalents of labor-consumption composite (given a particular initial state (a0, e0)),
and, following Benabou (2002), we call σˆ the planner’s degree of inequality aversion. First
notice that if σˆ = σ (the agents’ degree of risk aversion), maximizing W σ is equivalent to
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maximizing the utilitarian welfare function 36. If σˆ = 0, then maximizing W 0 is equivalent
to maximizing (1 + ∆L) (1 + ∆I), that is, the planner has no redistributive concerns and
focuses instead in the reduction of distortions and the provision of insurance37. Finally, as
σˆ → ∞ the welfare function approaches W∞ = min (x¯ (a0, e0)). Hence, by choosing dif-
ferent levels for σˆ we can place different weights on the equality versus efficiency trade-off,
from the extreme of completely ignoring equality (σˆ = 0), passing through the utilitarian
welfare function (σˆ = σ), and in the limit reaching the Rawlsian welfare function (σˆ →∞).
Table 2.7 displays the results for different levels of σˆ.
Table 2.7: Robustness: Welfare Function
t∗ τk τn T/Y B/Y ∆ ∆L ∆I ∆R
σˆ = 0 0 34.7 12.2 0.0 79.8 0.58 5.32 -2.74 -1.80
σˆ = 1 19 49.9 10.1 2.9 -36.4 4.56 3.73 -3.83 4.81
σˆ = 2∗ 26 49.7 10.8 3.6 -62.5 4.64 2.97 -3.84 5.68
σˆ = 3 29 49.8 10.4 3.5 -76.8 4.64 2.90 -4.01 5.94
σˆ = 4 30 48.9 11.5 4.1 -76.0 4.61 2.52 -3.78 6.05
σˆ = 5 32 49.2 11.3 4.0 -84.2 4.59 2.45 -3.88 6.21
Notes: (*) When σˆ = 2 = σ the welfare function is utilitarian, this is the solution plotted in Figure 2.6. The
values for T/Y and B/Y are the ones from the final steady state. For the welfare decomposition we use the
utilitarian welfare function for comparability.
When σˆ = 0 the planner has no redistributive motive and, accordingly, t∗ = 0 which is
consistent with the results displayed above, in particular in Section 2.6. The benchmark
result that capital taxes should be held fixed at the upper bound for the initial periods is
inherently linked to the redistributive motive of the planner. It follows that higher σˆ imply
higher t∗’s (lower lump-sum-to-output ratios and higher debt-to-output ratios). Otherwise,
overall, specially for σˆ ≥ 1, the results do not change significantly with changes in σˆ. In
particular, the final levels of capital and labor taxes are remarkably similar.
36Notice that
(∫
x¯ (a0, e0)
1−σ dλ0
) 1
1−σ is a monotonic transformation of
∫
x¯(a0,e0)
1−σ
1−σ
dλ0, which is equiv-
alent to the utilitarian welfare function.
37This result can be established following a similar procedure to the one used in proof of Proposition 3.
The online appendix contains the proof.
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2.7.2 Labor income process
The labor income process (summarized by the Markov matrix, Γ, and the vector of pro-
ductivity levels, e) is a key determinant of the amount of uncertainty and inequality faced
by agents in the economy. These parameters are a discrete approximation for a continuous
process for labor income, lit ≡ wetnt, that is
log (lit+1) = ρ log (lit) + ε, where ε ∼ N
(
0, σ2ε
)
.
In our benchmark calibration we target ρ = 0.9 and σε = 0.2. Given the importance of
these choices for our results and the lack of consensus in the literature about them (see
Section 2.4.4 for a discussion), we provide here the results for alternative numbers for ρ
and σε. For each of these we recalibrate the economy modifying only the corresponding
target, Table 2.8 contains the results.
Table 2.8: Robustness: Labor income process
t∗ τk τn T/Y B/Y ∆ ∆L ∆I ∆R
ρ = 0.85 24 34.8 4.8 0.0 -100.2 5.43 4.81 -3.72 4.48
ρ = 0.95 21 42.8 11.5 3.7 -49.5 3.91 3.63 -3.35 3.74
σε = 0.15 28 28.1 4.9 0.1 -126.3 5.64 4.59 -4.09 5.31
σε = 0.25 34 57.8 11.6 4.7 -75.9 4.52 2.51 -4.29 6.52
Benchmark 26 49.7 10.8 3.6 -62.5 4.64 2.97 -3.84 5.68
Notes: The values for T/Y and B/Y are the ones from the final steady state.
As one would expect, the magnitudes of the results do change considerably given
changes in these important parameters. However, reassuringly, the qualitative features
of the fiscal policy instruments and of where the welfare gains come from is not substan-
tially affected.
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2.8 Conclusion
In this paper we quantitatively characterize the solution to the Ramsey problem in the
standard incomplete market model. We find that even though the planner has the ability to
obtain all revenue via undistortive lump-sum taxes, it chooses instead to tax capital income
heavily and labor income to a lesser extent. Moreover, we show that it is beneficial for the
government to accumulate assets over time. With a welfare decomposition we diagnose
that, relative to the current US tax system, this policy leads to an overall reduction of
the distortions of agent’s decisions, to a substantial amount of redistribution and to a
reduction in the amount of insurance provided by the government. Importantly, we also
show that disregarding the transitory dynamics and focusing only on steady states can lead
to severely misleading results.
Finally, we do not view our results as a final answer to our initial question: to what
extent should governments use fiscal policy instruments to provide redistribution and in-
surance? Instead, we understand it as a contribution to the debate. The model we use
abstracts from important aspects of reality, as any useful model must, and we miss some
important dimensions. For instance, in the model studied above an agent’s productivity
is entirely a matter of luck, it would be interesting to understand the effects of allowing
for human capital accumulation. We also assume the government has the ability to fully
commit to future policies, relaxing this assumption could lead to interesting insights.
Chapter 3
Endogenous Borrowing
Constraints in Heterogenous Firms
Economy
3.1 Introduction
Disruptions in the financial markets have been viewed to play an important role in shap-
ing aggregate fluctuations and firm dynamics over the business cycle. In particular, a
conventional belief is that small firms are more sensitive to the business cycle due to a
limited access to credit markets1. In this paper I challenge this belief. I begin with doc-
umenting a key observation that age of the firm rather than its size is a determinant of
the cyclical employment volatility. I look at this observation through the lens of theory
of endogenously frictional financial markets and propose a model of firm dynamics re-
flecting two ubiquitous features of the credit market: relevance of past performance and
long-term nature of financial arrangements. I apply this theory to study, in a quantitative
macroeconomic model, an impact of the aggregate shocks to microeconomic uncertainty
on macroeconomic aggregates and on employment dynamics across various groups of firms.
1One of the numerous examples of such belief is the speech of Ben Bernanke at the Federal Reserve
Meeting Series: ”Addressing the Financing Needs of Small Businesses”.
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My main empirical finding is that age of the firm rather than it’s size is a determinant
of the asymmetric response of firms to changes in the aggregate economic conditions. The
standard deviation of the cyclical component of employment of young firms is 2.6 times
larger relative to the standard deviation of the cyclical component of employment of the
old firms, whereas the small and large firms differ with this regards at most by 30 percent.
Groups of firms that are similar along certain dimensions (share in total employment, aver-
age number of employees) but differ in age exhibit entirely different employment dynamics
at the business cycle frequency. I argue that these differences are not driven by the entry
of new firms to the group of young ones. Relative volatilities remain almost unchanged
after I remove start-ups from the set of young firms. I further validate my main finding by
looking at employment dynamics inside different size groups of firms. I found that, con-
ditional on size, cyclical employment volatility declines with age. Whereas controlling for
age, the cyclical employment volatility increases with size. Thus, the least volatile group
is small, old firms, which constitute a sizeable fraction of the US businesses measured
both in terms of number of firms and share of total employment. The existence of this
group challenges the conventional belief about small firms being particularly sensitive to
the aggregate conditions. I document using the most recent observations from the Business
Dynamics Statistics data that the asymmetry of employment dynamics between young and
old firms was particularly strong in the 2007-2009 recession and following recovery. Young
firms reduced their employment stock by 24.2 percent between the beginning of recession
and the last observation in 2012, accounting largely for jobless recovery. This is in a sharp
contrast with the old firms which by 2012 fully recovered to their pre-recession employment
levels.
Motivated by these facts I develop a theory of economic downturns and asymmetric
cyclical employment dynamics across firms. I propose a general equilibrium model of firm
dynamics with endogenously frictional financial markets. Key ingredients of my theory
are existence of private information on the side of the firm and an efficient, long-term,
lending arrangement between an individual firm and financial intermediary. Financial fric-
tion originates from these two ingredients and manifests itself as an endogenous borrowing
constraint. A key contribution of my theory is an endogenously generated link between
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firm’s age and size and it’s ability to obtain financing. Each firm is run by an entrepreneur
who seeks to maximize the stream of profits from the investment project. Every period a
return on a project is subject to privately observed idiosyncratic shock, which I interpret
as demand shock as it occurs after the production takes place. Moreover, firms differ in
terms of average demand and therefore in the expected return on the project. The firm’s
operation is financed through the loan from the financial intermediaries. The combination
of the history of idiosyncratic shocks, which can be interpreted in the model as proxy for
performance, together with the differences in the mean returns on projects lead to rich
age/size distribution of firms in equilibrium. To begin I show that, for any given expected
return, an optimal contract imposes an endogenous borrowing constraint on a new firm,
i.e. it is unable to obtain a level of financing it would achieve under full information. I
provide sufficient conditions under which as firm ages the incentive problem vanishes and
firm moves towards unconstrained level of financing. Then, I characterize the structure
of consumptions and payments, both conditional on the realizations of the idiosyncratic
shocks, over the firm’s life cycle. Further, I show that an increasing relationship between
firm average demand and access to financing which holds in the full information economy
is preserved in the environment with private information. As a result firms with larger op-
timal scale of operation (size) are able to borrow more relative to firms with lower average
demand even though they still may be constrained relative to their own efficient financing
level. Finally, I show the existence of a stationary distribution of firms in my environment
and further the existence of a recursive, stationary equilibrium.
In the quantitative part of the paper I exploit the dependence of the access to fi-
nancing on firm’s size and age to investigate the effects of the aggregate fluctuations in
microeconomic uncertainty for individual contract policy, distribution of firms and hence
macroeconomic aggregates by studying transitional dynamics of the economy. My findings
in this part are twofold: (i) an increase of microeconomic uncertainty triggers recession
even though contracts are complete (ii) a recession is characterized by an asymmetric
response of employment across different groups of firms. I find that for a realistically cali-
brated economy an unanticipated increase in microeconomic uncertainty, disciplined by the
data on cross-sectional distribution of firm level TFP over the last four recessions, reduces
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aggregate output by 0.71 percent and aggregate employment by 0.61 percent, causing a
significant recession. Moreover, an economic downturn in my model, in line with the data,
is characterized by a fall of credit to GDP ratio, drop of investment and labor productivity.
Furthermore, employment stock of young firms falls 4.1 times more relative to the employ-
ment of the old accounting for 51 percent of the average difference in the pre-2007 recessions.
At the same time small firms reduce employment by 23 percent less relative to the large
ones, in line with the data. These results are in a stark contrast with two natural bench-
marks I consider: aggregate shock to microeconomic uncertainty operating in the economy
with the full information and aggregate productivity shock as a source of fluctuations. In
a frictionless economy an aggregate shock to micro uncertainty has absolutely no effects,
i.e. an economy remains in the initial equilibrium. The reason is that with full information
only the expected return on the firm’s project matters for the lending, consumptions and
payments and there are no incentive considerations. Therefore efficient level of lending can
be sustained every period in line with perfect insurance in terms of consumption. Since
the aggregate shock to micro uncertainty is mean preserving it has no effects on allocations
and prices. If instead productivity shock drives the fluctuations the economy falls into
recession regardless of the presence of the informational friction. However, the economic
downturn in this case is characterized by a symmetric fall of employment, investment and
output across all firms and constant credit to GDP ratio, counter to the data. It is due to
the homogeneity result I establish in a theoretical part. Since the aggregate productivity
shock implies a symmetric reduction of the expected return to the project and the contract
policy functions are monotonous with respect to the return, the shock affects all firms
the same way regardless of age and size. Therefore my quantitative results indicate it is
a combination of fluctuations in microeconomic uncertainty and private information that
are crucial to account jointly for a decline of main macroeconomic aggregates and asym-
metric response of employment across various groups of firms observed in the US recessions.
To shed more light on the economics of my model consider first an individual contract-
ing problem between entrepreneur (firm) and financial intermediary. Entrepreneur, who
has access to a decreasing returns to scale technology, is risk averse and lender (financial
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intermediary) is risk neutral. In the initial period of operation firm draws a type deter-
mining it’s average demand and hence an average return on the project. Every period
demand is subject to idiosyncratic shock, that is privately observed by the entrepreneur.
Before the shock is realized production inputs need to be paid and production takes place.
Since entrepreneur (firm) has no wealth at the beginning of the operation it enters into a
mutually beneficial, efficient, long-term lending relationship with the financial intermediary
that allows for financing the production process every period.
Absent informational friction, within considered environment, the lender would com-
pletely insure the borrower and would provide a statically efficient level of financing in ev-
ery period, which equalizes marginal benefit from additional investment with it’s marginal
cost. Entrepreneur would receive, independent of the realization of the demand shock, a
constant stream of consumption. Moreover, the realization of the shock would have no
effect on the continuation of the contract and every firm would start operating at it’s own
optimal scale. Private information in the financial market paired with an efficient, dy-
namic contract between entrepreneur and lender introduces a tradeoff between production
efficiency, providing insurance and maintaining proper intertemporal incentives. Financial
intermediary no longer provides efficient level of financing to the firm, thus informational
asymmetry generates financial friction which manifests itself as an endogenous borrowing
constraint. After demand is realized and observed by entrepreneur, an efficient arrangement
imposes revealing true realizations through the combination of payments to the financial
intermediary and continuation utilities that are contingent on the realization of the id-
iosyncratic shock. Following low demand realization financial intermediary requires low
repayment, but also delivers low continuation value. After high realization of demand
shock intermediary requires high repayment, but also delivers high continuation value for
the entrepreneur. This way financial contract provides some insurance against idiosyn-
cratic risk, albeit imperfect. Such patterns of lending, payments and continuation values
together with equilibrium interest rate level induce firm is growing with age towards it’s
optimal size determined by initially drawn type and production technology. Conditional
on receiving a long enough sequence of high demand realizations, which can be thought of
a proxy for good performance, the endogenous borrowing constraint relaxes with age and
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firm has more access to borrowing.
A combination of lending dynamics over the firm’s lifetime and initial type of the firm
leads to a non-degenerate age/size distribution of firms in equilibrium of my model. A
key element disciplining my quantitative exercise is to match the data counterpart of this
distribution. I make sure in my model in line with the data most of the firms are small but
not necessarily young. Moreover, I target employment shares among age and size groups.
Matching joint age/size distribution of firms and employment is crucial for the analysis
of the effects of uncertainty shocks. As idiosyncratic uncertainty increases dispersion of
demand realizations rises, which induces larger incentives for the entrepreneur to misreport
his type and consume the additional output. In order to separate the types (provide
incentives) and prevent misreporting the continuation utilities need to be spread away
more, which is costly for the financial intermediary. Thus, facing tradeoffs introduced
by private information intermediary balances this cost with reduction of insurance and
more importantly with tightening of the endogenous borrowing constraint. In a calibrated
version of the model it is the young firms, irrespective of their initially drawn type, that are
constrained in borrowing, so they reduce their demand for labor and capital the most as
constraint gets tighter. Old firms, again regardless of size, are on average less constrained
in borrowing, in particular there exists a fraction of them which already achieved their
optimal size. Thus, due to this composition effect young firms as a group reduce demand
for labor inputs more relative to the old ones, regardless of the size determined by the
initially drawn type, over the deterministic transition following the uncertainty shock.
Moreover, in my quantitative experiment more firms which drew a low average demand
(small firms) are unconstrained relative to the group with high average demand. As a result
employment of small firms in my economy is less responsive relative to the employment
of the large ones, in line with the data. Reduction of demand for labor input leads to a
decline in wage rate. This downward pressure tends to raise capital and labor demand,
as well as output of unconstrained firms. This group consists almost entirely of old firms,
irrespective of their size. Thus general equilibrium effect counters the initial effect of the
uncertainty shock. In my quantitative exercise the initial impulse dominates the decline in
wage rate and economy falls into a recession. Economic downturn in my model resembles
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actual recessions observed in the US data. Output, employment and investment falls. More
importantly credit to GDP declines. Finally, an economy in recession exhibits asymmetric
employment patterns across various groups of firms, in particular young firms are more
volatile than old ones and small vary less than large ones.
Related literature
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, it corresponds to the em-
pirical literature on firm dynamics over the business cycle. Thus far most of this lit-
erature has focused on the role of firm size and the cycle (Gertler and Gilchrist (1994),
Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (2008), Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012)). The main con-
clusion from the existing studies is that large firms are more responsive to the NBER
recessions, whereas small firms tend to respond more to credit market tightening. Re-
cently, Fort, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2013) explored the role of local housing
market and aggregate financial conditions for the dynamics of the net growth rate in the
business cycle context. They find innovation to the state-specific cyclical indicator associ-
ated with a downturn (e.g., a rise in the state unemployment rate) reduces the differential
in the net job creation rate between young/small and large/mature businesses and that
the effect persists for a number of years. In other words net growth rate of young/small
businesses falls more in contractions than does the net growth rate of large/mature busi-
nesses. They interpret this as evidence that young/small businesses are more vulnerable
to business cycle shocks. Also they find that a decline in housing prices in the state yields
a further reduction in the differential in the net job creation rate between young/small and
large/mature businesses. The approach in this paper is somehow different. Firstly, my
focus is on the employment stock, rather than the growth rates, of different group of firms.
I extract cyclical components of the employment time series among different groups and
report their properties. Unlike Fort et al. (2013), I compare the cyclical dynamics among
groups of firms that share certain characteristics (share in total employment, average num-
ber of employees) but differ in age and argue the latter is a key determinant of asymmetric
patterns of employment. Secondly, I document entry margin does not contribute to the
observed differences, the fact that is not highlighted by Fort et al. (2013). Finally, I provide
a decomposition quantifying the contribution of the extensive margin to the employment
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volatility of size and age groups. I view my analysis and findings as complementary to
those by Fort et al. (2013).
Secondly, this paper contributes to the large literature on financial frictions. They are
viewed to play central role in a propagation of aggregate fluctuations and they have been ex-
tensively explored in the economic literature (Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), Kocherlakota (2000) and also Quadrini
(2011), Brunnermeier, Eisenbach, and Sannikov (2012) for recent surveys). A common as-
sumption in this literature is that markets are exogenously incomplete and firms utilize
one period debt contracts to overcome the incompleteness. When borrowers and lenders
are able to form long-term lending relationship, which are contingent on all public infor-
mation (complete contracts), the macroeconomic consequences might be quite different.
Though, the role of long-term financial contracts in shaping dynamics of macroeconomic
aggregates remains largely unexplored2 and this paper provides some new insights to this
issue. I propose an environment in which financial friction originates from the presence
of the private information and efficient, long term financial contract between a firm and a
financial intermediary and manifests itself as an endogenous borrowing constraint. More-
over, in a quantitative literature on financial frictions the severity of the distortion is
determined by exogenous shocks (for example shocks to the value of the collateral like in
Zetlin-Jones and Shourideh (2012) or Buera and Shin (2013)). I develop a model in which
credit frictions fluctuate endogenously and I link these fluctuations to changes in microe-
conomic uncertainty, which are disciplined by the data on cross sectional distribution of
firm level TFP and sales.
The latter links my paper to the strand of the literature on the fluctuations in idiosyn-
cratic uncertainty. The main conclusion from this literature is that at the micro level, the
recessions have been accompanied by large increases in the cross-section dispersion of TFP
and sales (Bachmann and Bayer (2009), Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry
2Notable exceptions are Cooley, Marimon, and Quadrini (2004) and Verani (2013) who study the role
of limited commitment and private information respectively in a general equilibrium, business cycle models
subject to technology shock.
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(2014), Bloom (2014)). Stock and Watson (2012) document role of the heightened uncer-
tainty was particularly large in the recent recession. Bloom et al. (2014), motivated by
these regularities, build a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms where fluc-
tuations of micro uncertainty are the source of the aggregate shocks. In their model the
micro uncertainty and real economic activity nexus operates through the existence of the
adjustment costs preventing firms from actions in times of heightened uncertainty. Alterna-
tively, uncertainty can also increase the probability of default, by expanding the size of the
left-tail default outcomes, raising the default premium and the aggregate deadweight cost
of bankruptcy. This role of uncertainty in raising borrowing costs can reduce micro and
macro growth, as emphasized in papers on the impact of uncertainty in the presence of
financial constraints (Arellano, Bai, and Kehoe (2012), Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno
(2014), Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajsek (2014)). All these papers though hinge on the in-
complete markets assumption and one period debt contracts. My main contribution rel-
ative to this strand of the literature is to propose and quantify a novel mechanism where
uncertainty shocks, within a complete contract environment, are endogenously translated
into movements in the borrowing constraints and further cause real effects. Moreover, my
model generates asymmetric response to aggregate shocks across firms of different size and
age, which this literature is silent about.
Finally this paper contributes to the dynamic contracting literature with private in-
formation. It relates to two branches of existing literature. The first branch studies the
optimal consumption insurance among risk-averse agents when individual endowments or
efforts are unobservable (Green (1987), Thomas and Worrall (1990), Atkeson and Lucas
(1992), Atkeson and Lucas (1995)). Smith and Wang (2006) embody this insurance prob-
lem into a stationary recursive equilibrium and find in a comparative statics exercise that
changes in microeconomic uncertainty have negligible effects on aggregates. The second
branch assumes risk-neutral agents and studies the optimal investment schedule maximiz-
ing the resources generated by the firm (Quadrini (2004),Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006),
DeMarzo and Fishman (2007)). The general equilibrium version of this environment sub-
ject to technology shocks is studied by Verani (2013). The current paper combines the
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main features of these two branches and the contract solves the trade-off between the opti-
mal consumption insurance - as entrepreneurs are risk averse - and the optimal investment
schedule - as resources depend on investment. It embodies the contracting problem into a
general equilibrium framework with heterogenous firms and studies an impact of aggregate
shocks to microeconomic uncertainty.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents facts on firm dynamics
over the business cycle. Next, in Section 3.3 I present a dynamic model of firms with
asymmetric response to uncertainty shocks. Further, in Section 3.4 I provide a theoretical
results characterizing my environment, in particular an access to exogenous financing as a
function of size and age. Then, in Section 3.5 I present calibration and quantitative results
of my paper. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Business cycle facts on firm dynamics
In this section I document facts about the firm dynamics over the business cycle among
different group of firms. I provide evidence to support the following facts:
1. Standard deviation of employment of the young firms is 2.6 larger than the standard
deviation of employment of the old firms at the business cycle frequency. The least
volatile group of firms are small and old ones.
2. Movements in the number of firms (extensive margin) account for 34% of the ag-
gregate employment variance. This contribution varies between different groups of
firms: it is positive for young and negative for old.
3. Since 2007 employment of the young firms went down by 24.5% and in 2012 it was
at the historically lowest level.
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3.2.1 Data
Data source. The primary data source I use is the Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS).
It contains data on employment and job flows of establishments and firms by their charac-
teristics for practically total non-agricultural sector of the US economy. I use the data on
a large cross section of firms from 1982 to 2012, to construct the detrended series. I argue
BDS is a useful and reliable source of information, compared to the most commonly used
like Current Population Survey and Establishment Survey, about the cyclical movements
of the aggregate employment in the US and as such can be used to quantify the contribu-
tions of different groups of firms and margins into the aggregate employment fluctuations
(Appendix B.1.1). While working with the BDS data some complications arise. Firstly,
while the benefit of the BDS is its large coverage its the main drawback is that it is a
cross-sectional data. Thus, one can only track the employment and job flows of the partic-
ular group of firms, without knowing which firms are growing and which are contracting.
To observe the latter one would need panel data. Secondly, there have been significant
low-frequency secular trends in the number of firms, age and size structure over the pe-
riod that the data covers. To remove the systematic changes I detrend the data using a
Hodrick-Prescott filter.
Definitions. To document business cycle regularities among different groups of firms I
consider three ways of partitioning the total population of the firms in the BDS. First, I
consider young vs. old firms division, where I define young firms to be five years old and
less and old firms to be six years and older. Secondly, I consider the small vs. large firms
partition, where I define small firms to have less than 20 employees and large firms to have
20 and more employees. The third way of partitioning the sample is to divide it into small
firms with less than 100 employees and large firms which have 100 and more employees. I
chose the employment cutoff in the second and third partition to create groups that are
comparable with the young firms with regards to the share in the total employment and
the average number of employees. In the following sections, I use these three definitions to
illustrate my main empirical findings.
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3.2.2 Age rather than size matters.
I start by examining the differences in volatility of the employment stock between certain
groups of firms at the business cycle frequency. Table 3.1 summarizes my findings. Young
firms in the US economy account for 16.0% of the aggregate employment and hire on av-
erage 8.1 employees. Old firms account for 84.0% of the aggregate employment and hire
on average 31.6 employees. The first group of small firms, with less than 20 employees, ac-
counts for 19.7% of total employment, a number comparable to the share of the young firms,
and the average number of employees is 4.9 in this group. The second group, firms with less
than 100 employees, accounts for 37.7% of total employment and the average number of
employees is 8.4 in this group, which is a similar figure to the average for young firms. Third
column of the table reports the standard deviation of the logged, HP-filtered time series of
employment time series for all three divisions of the BDS sample. It illustrates the main
point of this section, i.e. age rather than size is a determinant of the asymmetric response
of employment across different groups of firms to the cyclical changes in the aggregate
economic conditions. The standard deviation of employment of young firms is 2.6 times
larger relative to the standard deviation of the old firms. It is also 3.2 times larger relative
to the small firms with less than 20 employees (2.5 times larger for the second definition
of the small firms). The groups of firms that are similar along certain dimension (share
in total employment, average number of employees) exhibit entirely different employment
dynamics at the business cycle frequency. These differences are not driven by the entry
of new firms to the group of young ones. Relative standard deviations remain almost un-
changed after I restrict the definition of young firms to those at age between 1 and 5 years.
The fact that age is a major determinant of employment volatility can be further
validated by looking at the employment dynamics inside the size groups of firms. Table
3.2 presents volatility of employment across subgroups in the age/size distribution of the
population of firms3. Left panel documents standard deviations of employment for the size
threshold of 20 employees, whereas the right panel for the size threshold of 100 employees.
Regardless of the size threshold employment volatility declines with age and increases
3In the Appendix B.1.2 I provide companion tables documenting firms distribution, employment shares
and volatilities after restricting definition of young firms to those between 1 and 5 years old for presented
age/size categories.
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Table 3.1: Employment volatility for different groups of firms.
Share of Average Standard deviation
total number of employment
employment of employees
All firms 100 21.8 1.47
Young (0-5) 16.0 8.1 3.20
Old (5+) 84.0 31.6 1.25
Young, no entry (1-5) 13.0 8.8 3.32
Small (0-19) 19.7 4.9 1.04
Large (20+) 80.3 149.2 1.64
Small (0-99) 37.7 8.4 1.31
Large (100+) 62.3 695.4 1.67
Notes: Employment series are logged and HP filtered with parameter λ = 6.25. Share of total employment
and average number of employees are average values. Annual data, 1982-2012. Source: Business Dynamics
Statistics (BDS).
with size. Put differently even inside size groups young firms are more volatile than old
ones in terms of employment. This robust finding strengthens the main message of the
empirical section of my paper: age of the firm is the relevant margin if one seeks for the
volatility differences. Table 3.2 also documents an existence of a group of small old firms
that are the least volatile of all groups. For the size threshold of 20 employees this groups
accounts for 49.9% of all firms (for 100 employees threshold the number is 56%) and for
11.9% of the total employment (25.1% for 100 employees threshold). The existence of such
groups of firms challenges the conventional view that small firms are those who reduce their
employment the most in recessions and highlights the key role of firm’s age for response to
changes in the aggregate economic conditions.
Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 document differences between firms of various size and age in terms
of employment volatility. They are however silent on the comovement over the cycle of these
groups and GDP. Figure 3.1 presents the time series of logged, filtered employment used to
compute the standard deviations in Table 3.1. Apart from illustrating the main point about
the role of age rather than size in determining the asymmetric cyclical behavior it reveals
two additional features of the data. Firstly, the employment time series for all groups
of firms are positively correlated with each other with the correlation coefficient ranging
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Table 3.2: Standard deviation of employment over age and size distribution.
Small Large All sizes
(0-19) (20+)
Young (0-5) 1.96 4.93 3.20
Old (6+) 0.85 1.40 1.25
All ages 1.04 1.64 1.47
Small Large All sizes
(0-99) (100+)
Young (0-5) 2.37 7.66 3.20
Old (6+) 1.02 1.50 1.25
All ages 1.31 1.67 1.47
Notes: Employment series are logged and HP filtered with parameter λ = 6.25. Source: Own calculations.
Business Dynamics Statistics, 1982-2012.
between 0.71 and 0.99. Secondly, all groups exhibit positive contemporanous correlation
with the cyclical component of GDP with the correlation coefficient varying between 0.45
and 0.67. I report all contemporanous correlations in Table B.4 in the Appendix B.1.3. In
fact, also the phase shifts of employment and GDP for different groups of firms look alike,
which I document in Figure B.2 in Appendix B.1.3. The bottom line is that the magnitude
of the response to the changes in the aggregate conditions is a factor differentiating the
young from the old firms (also the young from small), while the timing of the response is
similar across different groups of firms.
3.2.3 The role of the extensive margin
Large differences between various groups of firms are driven by the movements in employ-
ment per firm (intensive margin) as well as by the movements in the number of firms by
itself (extensive margin). In this section I document that contribution of each margin dif-
fers largely across age groups but is almost identical for size groups. One way to quantify
the role of extensive margin for the changes in employment over the business cycle is to
consider the following simple decomposition. Let employment within a group of firms j be
denoted by Ej and the number of firms by Fj . Then the following identity holds
Ej =
Ej
Fj
× Fj
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Figure 3.1: Cyclical component of employment for different group of firms.
(a) Young vs. old (σy/σo = 2.61)
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(b) Small vs. large (σs/σl = 0.65)
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Notes: Shaded areas are NBER recessions. Employment series are logged and HP filtered with parameter
λ = 6.25. Source: Own calculations. Business Dynamics Statistics, 1982-2012
This decomposition says one can write the employment as a product of employment per
firm and the number of firms within group j. Then taking logs and variances yields
V (log (Ej)) = V
(
log
(
Ej
Fj
))
+ V (log (Fj)) + 2Cov
(
log
(
Ej
Fj
)
, log (Fj)
)
Table 3.3 reports the result of this decomposition across different groups of firms. Move-
ments in the extensive margin account for 34.1% of total employment variance (all firms)
at the business cycle frequency. This contribution however differs significantly as one looks
at the first partition of the sample i.e. young vs. old firms. An extensive margin accounts
for 55.7% of the young firms employment variance. Thus, more than half of the cyclical
employment movements in this group of firms is due to the entry and exit. This is in stark
contrast with the group of old firms, where the extensive margin contributes negatively to
the cyclical movements of employment and it dampens its variance. The movements in
the extensive margin for the old firms reduces by 28.7% the variance of the employment
per firm4. Such difference suggests that the role extensive margin is another factor that
4It is important to highlight this decomposition does not attribute life time employment patterns to the
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distinguishes young and old firms. As I report in Table 3.3 this is not the case for the
small vs. large firms partition. The role of extensive margin is virtually the same for both
groups. The movements in the number of firms and covariance term account for more than
half of the cyclical employment movements of these two groups of firms.
Table 3.3: Decomposition of employment variance for different group of firms
All firms Young (0-5) Old (5+) Small (0-19) Large (20+)
V
(
log
(
Ej
Fj
))
65.9 44.3 128.8 45.6 42.3
Contribution of the extensive margin
34.1 55.7 -28.7 54.3 57.6
V (log (Fj)) 27.8 28.6 49.5 55.9 68.2
2Cov
(
log
(
Ej
Fj
)
, log (Fj)
)
6.3 27.1 -78.5 -1.6 -10.6
Notes: Series are logged and HP filtered with parameter λ = 6.25. Annual data, 1982-2012. Source: Own
calculations. Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS).
3.2.4 The Great Recession and it’s aftermath
The 2007-2009 recession was extraordinary, relative to previous recessions, not only in
terms of depth and length when measured with the standard macroeconomic aggregates,
but also in terms of the response across different group of firms. Two empirical findings
that differentiate the recent downturn and following recovery from the previous business
cycle episodes are: (i) between 2007 and 2012 young firms reduced employment by 24.2
percent, whereas in previous episodes young firms recovered to their initial employment
level after 5 years (ii) in pre-2007 downturns large firms reduced their employment more
relative to the small ones. During the last recession this pattern was reversed - small firms
reduced employment more. Figure 3.2 illustrates these facts.
variance of employment. Since the data set is a repeated cross section of the firms thus employment time
series tracks employment over time within a particular group with the use of the same definition over the
whole time period. Therefore the variance of employment can be thought of as the cyclical movements of
the employment life cycle patterns.
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The asymmetric employment patterns of young and old firms between 2007 and 2012
consists of two phases. Firstly, the drop in employment of young firms during the actual
recession (2007-2009) time was larger than in any pre-2007 recessions, which reflected the
depth of the recent downturn. Secondly, and more importantly, since 2009 young firms did
not recover and reduced the employment even more, so that the cumulative employment
fall amounts to 24.5 percent by 2012. As a result in March 2012 the employment level of
the young firms was on the historically lowest level since 1982, the first data point in the
BDS for which the employment of young firms can be computed. Table 3.4 sheds more light
on the sources of this un-precedential fall. It reports the number of young firms, entering
firms (firms of age 0) and old firms in 2007, 2011 and pre-2007 period. Note, that the sum
of young and old firms amounts to the total number of firms in the BDS. The number of
old firms is growing since the sample of firms in the BDS is getting older, i.e. there is a
secular trend due to change in the demographic structure of the data set. The number of
young firm however is not subject to this issue and it reflects more accurately the role of
extensive margin in the Great Recession. In 2011 the number of young firms in the US
economy was the lowest since 1982. To put the size of changes into perspective, note the
US economy lost 389.1 thousands of young firms between 2007 and 2011, which amounts to
18.5% of their number before the Great Recession. To large extent this change was driven
by the historically small number of new businesses. In 2010 and 2011, the inflows of newly
born firm to the US economy were two lowest since 1982.
Table 3.4: Number of firms in pre- and post-2007 period.
Young firms Entering firms Old firms
Lowest level before 2007 1,748.5 411.8 1,801.1
2007 2,109.5 529.2 3,189.0
2011 1,720.4 409.0 3,260.3
Source: Own calculations. Business Dynamic Statistics (BDS).
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Figure 3.2: Employment index for various groups of firms in pre-2007 and 2007-2009 re-
cessions.
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Notes: Employment normalized at the year of NBER recession start to 100. Pre-2007 recessions are the
downturns starting in 1981, 1990, and 2001. Source: Business Dynamic Statistics (BDS).
3.3 Model of firm dynamics with asymmetric response to
uncertainty shocks
In this section I develop a dynamic model with heterogenous firms and define a recursive
stationary equilibrium. Each firm is run by an entrepreneur. Firms have private infor-
mation about their demand and enter into a long-term lending relationship in order to
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finance their operation. These two features generate endogenously a borrowing constraint
that is binding for a fraction of firms in the economy and are crucial to account for asym-
metric employment patterns over business cycles documented in the data. One can view
my model as incorporating jointly features of model of a firm dynamics with variable in-
vestment (Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), DeMarzo and Fishman (2007)) and dynamic
insurance problem (Thomas and Worrall (1990), Atkeson and Lucas (1992)) under private
information into a general equilibrium framework suited for a quantitative work.
3.3.1 Environment
Time is discrete, lasts forever and is indexed by t = 0, 1, .... There are three types of
agents in the economy: a large number of homogenous workers, a large number of firms
(entrepreneurs), and a large number of financial intermediaries (lenders). There is a single
consumption good in the economy. Each firm draws a permanent type s from the finite
set of types S in the first period of operation, which determines the average demand of
the firm. The source of idiosyncratic uncertainty is a shock to the demand of the firm,
θs ∈ ΘS . Let θst be the realization of this shock at any time t for the firm of type s and
denote the individual history by θts = (θsj, θsj+1, ..., θst) of the firm starting to operate at
time j ≤ t.
Timing. The timing of the events within a period can be summarized as follows:
1. New firms are born and draw type s.
2. Financial intermediaries lend resources to the firms.
3. Production inputs are hired and production takes place.
4. Idiosyncratic shock θst is realized.
5. Consumption and payments take place. Firms exit exogenously.
Information. Financial intermediaries observe the amount of lending to the firms and
payments received from the firms. Moreover, the initially drawn type s is public infor-
mation. Intermediaries can not observe the realization of the idiosyncratic shock θst and
entrepreneur’s consumption.
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3.3.2 Firms
Preferences. I assume the ownership of the firms is concentrated, i.e. a firm is associated
with an entrepreneur. Each firm faces a time-invariant probability ζ < 1 of surviving into
the next period. The total measure of firms in the economy is equal to one. Newly born firm
draws a type s ∈ S according to the probability distribution Γ, that assigns a probability
Γs to each type. Type determines an expected demand and hence expected revenue from
the project. Firm of type s that starts operating in period j, values a stochastic sequence
of consumption good
{
c
(
θts
)}∞
t=j
through the lens of the entrepreneur’s preferences, i.e.
∞∑
t=j
∑
θts
(βζ)t−j Pr
(
θts
)
U
(
c
(
θts
))
where the period utility function U is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satisfies
standards conditions, Pr
(
θts
)
is a probability of a particular history θts and β < 1 is a
discount factor.
Technology. Each firm of type s operates a long-lived project that produces output in
each period of life of the firm. Every period project requires capital input, k, and labor
input, n, which need to be purchased in advance, i.e. before the production is sold and the
idiosyncratic shock is realized. Each entrepreneur is born without wealth. Therefore every
period in order to finance the project he must borrow resources l in the credit market
to operate a project. Firm has an access to a decreasing returns to scale production
technology f : R2+ → R which satisfies standard conditions listed in Assumption ... Denote
γ to be a degree of returns to scale. Technology transforms the capital and labor inputs
into a consumption good. Produced output is subject to a idiosyncratic demand shock
θst ∈ Θs = {θs1, ..., θsN} with N < ∞, with the fixed probability distribution Πs that
assigns positive probability π (θs) to all θst values and can potentially depend on initially
drawn type s ∈ S. Without loss of generality, let θm < θn if m < n. Demand shock θ is
i.i.d. over time. Thus every period the following feasibility constraint has to hold
c
(
θts
)
+m
(
θts
) ≤ θ1−γst f (k (θt−1s ) , n (θt−1s )) ∀θts, θt−1s (3.1)
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where m denotes the repayment from the firm to the financial intermediary. From 3.1
it becomes clear that given that financial intermediary can not observe consumption and
demand shock it is unable to figure out the actual realization of the demand. Denote wt
to be the wage rate, rt to be the interest rate and δ be a depreciation of capital. Firm
operates under the constraint that both wage bill wtn
(
θt−1s
)
and cost of renting capital
(rt + δ) k
(
θt−1s
)
are covered by the loan l, i.e.
wtn
(
θt−1s
)
+ (rt + δ) k
(
θt−1s
) ≤ l (θt−1s ) ∀θt−1s (3.2)
I assume that the primitives of the entrepreneur’s satisfy the following assumptions
Assumption 2. U : (0,∞) → R is C2, strictly increasing, strictly concave function and
it satisfies limc→0 U ′ (c) = ∞ , limc→∞U ′ (c) = 0 and supU(c) < ∞. The production
technology f : R2+ → R+ is C2, strictly increasing, has decreasing returns to scale of degree
γ.
Firm’s problem. Entrepreneur seeks to maximize the life time utility from consumption
subject to the technological constraints (3.1) and (3.2) and given the loan l and repayment
m. Thus, the problem of the firm is
max
c(·),n(·),k(·)
∞∑
t=j
∑
θts
(βζ)t−j Pr
(
θts
)
U
(
c
(
θts
))
(3.3)
subject to
c
(
θts
)
+m
(
θts
) ≤ θ1−γst f (k (θt−1s ) , n (θt−1s )) ∀θst, θt−1s
wtn
(
θt−1s
)
+ (rt + δ) k
(
θt−1s
) ≤ l (θt−1s ) ∀θt−1s
To economize on notation let the maximized output given the loan be F (l), i.e.
F
(
l
(
θt−1s
)) ≡ max
k(·),n(·)
f
(
k
(
θt−1s
)
, n
(
θt−1s
))
(3.4)
subject to
wtn
(
θt−1s
)
+ (rt + δ) k
(
θt−1s
) ≤ l (θt−1s )
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Then, as I argue in the Appendix ... if the dynamic contract specifies lending and re-
payments the feasibility constraint pins down the consumption of the entrepreneur, which
solves the problem (3.3).
3.3.3 Credit market and Financial Intermediation
Financial intermediaries (lenders) arise as institutions participating in the long-term credit
market in which they provide funds to firms in the exchange for payments. They are risk
neutral and value a stream of consumption good. They discount future with the inverse of
the real interest rate 1(1+r) . A project of an individual firm is long-lived and it’s returns are
private information, therefore it is optimal for financial intermediaries and firms to enter
the long-term dynamic, lending relationships. A detailed specification of the contract will
be discussed in the next section. There is free entry into the financial intermediation
industry. Thus, in equilibrium all financial intermediaries make zero profits and hence
their ownership is immaterial. As a result it is without the loss of generality to consider a
single, representative financial intermediary, which is what I do for the rest of the paper.
At any point in time the representative intermediary holds a portfolio of contracts with a
large number of firms of different types s and histories θts.
3.3.4 Workers
Workers are hand to mouth and do not participate in the asset market. In each period,
they decide how much to work and how much to consume. They maximize the utility
Uw : R2+ → R of consumption goods and labor {cwt , ht}∞t=0 subject to the budget constraint,
i.e. they solve
max
cwt ,ht
Uw (cwt , ht) s.t. c
w
t = wtht (3.5)
where wt is the wage rate.
3.3.5 Dynamic lending contract
Every firm that starts operating at any period j receives an offer from the financial inter-
mediary. The offer consist of a contract menu whose terms can be contingent on all public
information. I assume that both financial intermediaries and firms are fully committed to
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the contract. Hence, no party is allowed to leave the contract in any ex-post state of the
world. Then the contract is defined as follows.
Definition 6. A dynamic contract is a vector xs ≡
{
l
(
θt−1s
)
, c
(
θts
)
,m
(
θts
)}∞
t=j
speci-
fying for a each firm of type s ∈ S an amount of lending l : Θt−1s → R+, entrepreneurs
consumption c : Θts → R+, transfer to the financial intermediary m : Θts → R.
At every t the contract specifies the amount of lending from the financial intermediary
to the firm l, the entrepreneur’s consumption c and transfers from the firm to the financial
intermediary m. The latter two are contingent on the realization of the demand shock
θst. Feasibility imposes a technological restriction on the contract space, i.e. the sum of
entrepreneur’s consumption and payments to the financial intermediary can not exceed the
return on project. Below I provide the definition of feasible contract.
Definition 7. A dynamic contract xs is feasible if ∀t ≥ j and ∀θt−1s ∈ Θt−1s , ∀θst
c
(
θts
)
+m
(
θts
) ≤ θ1−γst F (l (θt−1s )) (BC)
Consider now the restriction on the contract space imposed by the fact that θ is privately
observed. By invoking the Revelation Principle, I can without the loss of generality restrict
the message space to the set Θs for all s ∈ S, i.e. consider only the direct revelation
mechanism in which the firm reports it’s true type. Define the continuation utility for
the entrepreneur associated with the contract xs after history θ
t
s (according to the truth
telling) as
v
(
θts
) ≡ ∞∑
n =1
∑
θt+ns
(βζ)n−1 Pr
(
θt+ns |θts
)
U
(
c
(
θt+ns
))
which is useful to define an incentive compatible contract.
Definition 8. A dynamic contract xs is incentive compatible if it satisfies the following
incentive compatibility constraint ∀t ≥ j and ∀θt−1s ∈ Θt−1s , ∀θst, θ′:
U
(
θ1−γst F
(
l
(
θt−1s
))−m (θt−1s , θst))+ βζv (θt−1s , θst) ≥
U
(
θ1−γst F
(
l
(
θt−1s
))−m (θt−1s , θ′))+ βζv (θt−1s , θ′) (IC)
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Incentive compatibility requires that actual realization of the demand θst is more or
equally profitable to report relative to any other realization θ′. On the top of the feasibility
and incentive compatibility the contract has to deliver in period j at least the initial
promised utility of the entrepreneur, v0s ∈ [vmin, vmax]. This is summarized by the following
participation constraint
∞∑
t=j
∑
θts
(βζ)t Pr
(
θts
)
U
(
c
(
θts
)) ≥ v0s (PC)
The financial intermediary seeks to maximize the net present value of the payments from
the firm subject to the feasibility constraint, incentive compatibility constraint and partic-
ipation constraint. Thus, the optimal dynamic lending contract solves
J
(
v0s
)
= max
xs
∞∑
t=j
∑
θts
(
ζ
1 + r
)t−j
Pr
(
θts
) [
m
(
θts
)− l (θt−1s )] (3.6)
subject to
(BC) , (IC) and (PC) .
Define the set I ≡{v | ∃ x s.t. (BC) , (IC) and (PC) holds} of utility values that can
be generated by feasible and incentive compatible contracts. For any initial utility vs the
optimal dynamic lending contract solves problem (3.6) i.e. it maximizes the value obtained
by the financial intermediary among all the feasible, incentive compatible contracts.
Randomization. The constraint set in problem (3.6) is not necessarily convex because of
the presence of a concave function, U
(
θ1−γst F
(
l
(
θt−1s
))−m (θt−1s , θ′)), on the right hand
side of the incentive compatibility constraint. Thus, randomization may be optimal. It is
possible to rule out randomization as part of the optimal contract by making an additional
assumption following Aguiar, Amador, and Gopinath (2009).
Assumption 3. Let C : [U(0), U(∞)] → R and C = U−1, H = F−1 and u(θ) = U(c(θ))
and u = U ((θi + θj)F (l) + C(U(cj))) and . Define a function
G (u, u) = −H
(
C(u)− C(u(θi))
θi − θj
)
+
C(u)− C(u(θj))
θi − θj
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where θi > θj. G is concave.
This assumption allows me to transform the constraint set into the linear in u and u
(see Appendix B.2.2 for the proof). In the quantitative part of the paper I check ex-post
for every solution of the individual contract whether the optimal contract satisfies the
assumption.
Recursive formulation. Following arguments and techniques by Atkeson and Lucas
(1992) one can show that the dynamic contracting problem (3.6) admits a recursive for-
mulation using the entrepreneur’s continuation utility vs ≡ v
(
θts
)
, as a state variable. It
solves the following recursive problem for vs ∈ [vmin, vmax]
Bs (vs) = max
l,m(θs),v′(θs)
−l + ∑
θs∈Θs
π (θs)
[
m (θs) +
ζ
(1 + r)
Bs
(
v′ (θs)
)] (3.7)
subject to
vs =
∑
θs∈Θs
π (θs)
[
U
(
θ1−γs F (l)−m (θs)
)
+ βζv′ (θs)
]
U
(
θ1−γs F (l)−m (θs)
)
+ βζv′ (θs) ≥ U
(
θ1−γs F (l)−m
(
θ′
))
+ βζv′
(
θ′
) ∀θs, θ′
where Bs (vs) is the maximal discounted value of net payments that the financial interme-
diary can attain subject to the constraint that the recursive contract delivers a value vs
to the firm (promise keeping constraint) and recursive version of the incentive compatibil-
ity constraint. Using the fact that c (θs) = θ
1−γ
s F (l) − m (θs) the problem (3.7) can be
rewritten as
Bs (vs) = max
l,c(θs),v′(θs)
−l + ∑
θs∈Θs
π (θs)
[
θ1−γs F (l)− c (θs) +
ζ
1 + r
Bs
(
v′ (θs)
)] (3.8)
subject to
vs =
∑
θs∈Θs
π (θs)
[
U (c (θs)) + βζv
′ (θs)
]
U (c (θs)) + βζv
′ (θs) ≥ U
((
θ1−γs − θ′1−γs
)
F (l) + c
(
θ′
))
+ βζv′
(
θ′
) ∀θ, θ′
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It becomes clear from this formulation of the contracting problem that incentive consid-
erations affect lending given the presence of
(
θ1−γs − θ′1−γs
)
F (l) term in the incentive
compatibility constraint. Also, the dispersion of demand outcomes (ceteris paribus) affects
the tightness of the incentive compatibility constraint. These two features of the dynamic
contract are going to play crucial role in the propagation of the aggregate shock.
3.3.6 Aggregation
At any period the financial intermediary holds the portfolio of lending contracts with a
large number of firms of different types s ∈ S. This portfolio can be summarized by the
probability distribution over the space of the continuation utilities. Let V = [vmin, vmax]
and let (V ,B (V )) be a measurable space of promised utilities, where B (V ) denotes the
Borel set. Define a measure µs : B (V )→ [0, 1] over the space of continuation utilities for
firms of type s. The type s is fixed, thus the updating operator for each s is defined as
follows
Tµs (V ) =
∫
V
Q (vs, V ) dµs (vs) ∀A ∈ B (V )
where Q (vs,A) : V × B (V )→ R is a transition function defined as
Q (vs,A) =
{
ζ
∑
θs∈Θs π (θs) I {v′ (vs, θs) ∈ A} for ∀A ∈ B (V )
(1− ζ) for A = v0s
Aggregate lending in the economy is then defined by
L =
∑
s∈S
Γs
∫
V
l (vs) dµs (vs) =
∑
s∈S
Γs
∫
V
(wn (vs) + (r + δ) k (vs)) dµs (vs)
whereas the aggregate payments received by the financial intermediary are
P =
∑
s∈S
Γs
∫
V
π (θs)m (vs, θs) dµs (vs)
Note that by the law of large numbers the fraction of firms of type s that received shock
θs is exactly π (θs), so there is no uncertainty about the size of the aggregate payments
for the financial intermediary. As a result, the asset holdings of the financial intermediary
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evolve according to
A′ = (1 + r)A+ (P − L)
i.e. the stock of assets in the portfolio of financial intermediary depends on the assets
inherited from the previous period (1 + r)A and the aggregate net aggregate payments
(P − L). In the stationary equilibrium this equation becomes rA+P −L = 0. To complete
the description of the financial intermediary I have to pin down the initial promised utility
for the entrepreneur who starts to operate a firm of type s, v0s . Lending market is perfectly
competitive thus in equilibrium the financial intermediary earns zero profits. Then the v0s
is determined by the following free entry condition
Bs
(
v0s
)
= 0 (3.9)
Before I state the formal definition of the equilibrium I define the rest of aggregate variables
in the economy. The aggregate output is given by
Y =
∑
s∈S
Γs
∫
V
π (θs)
[
θ1−γs F (ls (vs))
]
dµs (vs)
the aggregate consumption of the entrepreneurs is
Ce = Y − P
the aggregate labor input is
N =
∑
s∈S
Γs
∫
V
ns (vs) dµs (vs)
and the aggregate capital input is
K =
∑
s∈S
Γs
∫
V
ks (vs) dµs (vs)
The markets clearings are K = A and N = h for the capital and labor market respectively.
Then by the Walras law the market clearing for the consumption good becomes (see the
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Appendix B.2.1 for derivation)
Y = Ce + Cw +K ′ − (1− δ)K (3.10)
i..e. the aggregate output is divided into consumption of the entrepreneurs, consumption
of workers and investment.
3.3.7 Recursive equilibrium
The aggregate state of the economy in any period can be summarized by S=dimensional
vector of distributions over continuation utilities µ = (µ1, ..., µS). Thus a stationary, re-
cursive equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 9. A stationary recursive equilibrium consists of: (i) an allocation of the
household {cw, h} (ii) a contract policy {l (vs) ,m (vs, θs) , c (vs, θs)}s∈S (iii) an allocation
of the firm {n (vs) , k (vs)}s∈S (iv) prices {r, w} (v) initial promised utility value v0s (vi) the
measure µs over the space of promised utility, such that :
1. Given {w}, an allocation of the workers {cw, h} solves the (3.5).
2. Given {r, w}, Contract policy {l (vs) ,m (vs, θs) , c (vs, θs)}s∈S solves the problem (3.8).
3. Given {r, w}, an allocation of the firm {n (vs) , k (vs)}s∈S solves the problem (3.4).
4. Markets clear: A = K and N = h.
5. The initial promised utilities
{
v0s
}
s∈S solves the problem (3.9).
6. The measures {µs}s∈S are stationary.
3.4 Theoretical results
In this section I describe theoretical results that shed light on the properties of the dynamic
lending contract and their implications for access to the financing as a function of firm’s
size and age. Further, I provide an analysis of how aggregate shocks to microeconomic
uncertainty affect properties of the contract policy functions.
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3.4.1 Preliminaries
I start with the simplification of the constraint set of the problem 3.7. Denote the incentive
compatibility constraint for all s ∈ S and m,n ∈ N by
Csn,m ≡ U
(
θ1−γsn F (l)−m (θsn)
)
+ βζv′ (θsn)−
[
U
(
θ1−γsn F (l)−m (θsm)
)
+ βζv′ (θsm)
]
where n is the actual demand state and m is the reported demand state. The lemma
below allows me to consider only the local constraints. Satisfying local downward and
upward constraints implies all the global constraints are also satisfied. This result is stan-
dard in dynamic contracting environment with private information either in case of risk
neutral agents and optimal investment or in case of risk-averse agents with unobservable
endowments. It holds also in my environment, which embodies both features.
Lemma 4. If the local downward constraints Csm,m−1 ≥ 0 and upward constraint Csm,m+1 ≥
0 hold for each m ∈ N , then the global constraints Csm,n ≥ 0 holds ∀m,n ∈ N .
Proof. Appendix B.2.2
Another standard result can also be established in my model. Financial intermediary
imposes a weakly lower payment on an entrepreneur reporting a lower demand in exchange
for a lower future continuation utility. Entrepreneur reporting higher demand shock returns
a weakly higher payment in exchange for higher continuation utility in the future. This
way financial intermediary is able to provide partial insurance to risk averse entrepreneurs.
In the Proposition 7 I further characterize payments and consumptions of entrepreneurs in
my environment and compare it to the case with risk neutral entrepreneurs with variable
investment.
Lemma 5. An incentive compatible contract policy satisfies m (θsn) ≥ m (θsn−1) and
v′ (θsn) ≥ v′ (θsn−1) for θsn > θsn−1 and for all s ∈ S.
Proof. Appendix B.2.2
In the next lemma I establish useful properties of the value function Bs (v).
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Lemma 6. (i) Under Assumptions 2 and 3 for every s ∈ S value function Bs : [vmin, vmax]→
R is strictly concave and maximizers v′ (θs) ,m (θs) : [vmin, vmax] → R and c (θs) , l (vs) :
[vmin, vmax]→ R+ are continuous, singled-valued functions.
(ii) Under Assumption 2, the value function Bs is differentiable.
Proof. Appendix B.2.2
Under Assumption 2, strict concavity follows from G(u, u) being concave and constraint
set to be convex. As a result by standard dynamic programming arguments I can argue
that contract policy functions are continuous and single valued functions. This, paired with
the differentiability (which holds independently on Assumption 3) of the value function is
useful for theoretical characterization of a dynamic contract as well as for a a computational
algorithm I use in the quantitative part of the paper (see Appendix 12).
3.4.2 Borrowing constraint as a function of age.
To illustrate the role of private information in my model, and in particular it’s role in access
to exogenous financing, it is useful to introduce a full information benchmark first. Con-
sider a relaxed version of the contracting problem 3.8 in which the incentive compatibility
constraint is dropped. With no incentive considerations, firm’s project will be financed to
maximize the flow of the profits of the financial intermediaries i.e. up to the point where
marginal cost of lending an additional unit of resources is equalized with the expected
marginal benefit of it. Hence, lending would be determined by the solution to the following
problem
max
l
E
[
θ1−γs
]
F (l)− l (3.11)
This leads to the following definition of a static efficiency.
Definition 10. A statically efficient level of lending, l∗s , is determined by
E
[
θ1−γs
]
F ′ (l∗s) = 1.
Moreover define the value of the financial after realization of the demand shock
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Definition 11. Let the value of the discounted stream of profits for the financial in-
termediary after realization of the shock be denoted by g (vs, θs) = l(vs) − m(vs, θs) +
ζ
1+rB (v
′(vs, θs)).
The next proposition establishes three properties of the dynamic contract policies that
I will later use to characterize an access to financing as a function of firm’s age.
Proposition 7. For all s ∈ S a contract policy is such that:
(i) The contract policy is dynamic: ∀vs ∈ [vmin, vmax], m (vs, θsi) > m (vs, θsj), c (vs, θsi) >
c (vs, θsj), and v
′ (vs, θsi) > v′ (vs, θsj) for θsi > θsj.
(ii) There are distortions in lending. There exists v∗ ∈ [vmin, vmax] such that l (v) < l∗ for
all v ∈ [vmin, v∗] and l (v) = l∗ for all v ∈ [v∗, vmax].
(iii) There is a coinsurance. For ∀v ∈ [vmin, vmax], g (v, θi) > g (v, θj).
Proof. Appendix B.2.2
Part (i) states that optimal contract policy is dynamic, i.e. it uses a variation in the
continuation utility and payments to the financial intermediary to provide intertemporal
incentives and partial insurance. An efficient arrangement imposes revealing true realiza-
tions through the combination of payments to the financial intermediary and continuation
utilities that are contingent on the realization of the idiosyncratic shock. Following low
demand realization financial intermediary requires low repayment, but also delivers low
continuation value. After high realization of demand shock intermediary requires high
repayment, but also delivers high continuation value for the entrepreneur. This way fi-
nancial contract provides some insurance against idiosyncratic risk, albeit imperfect. The
entrepreneur who received high realization of the demand shock consumes strictly more
relative to the one with lower realization. Part (ii) states that for any there exists a point v∗
in the continuation utility domain such that providing statically efficient level of financing
is feasible and incentive compatible. For any point left to v∗ the informational informa-
tional friction implies an existence of the endogenous borrowing constraint, tightness of
which can be measured by (l∗ − l(v)), a difference between efficient level of financing and
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level implied by the optimal contract with private information. The existence of this con-
straint is induced by the presence of key tradeoffs between production efficiency, providing
insurance and maintaining proper intertemporal incentives. I discuss them in details in the
next section. The existence of the endogenous borrowing constraint is crucial for the eco-
nomic mechanism driving an asymmetric response of firms to the uncertainty shocks. As I
argue in Section 3.4.5 shocks to microeconomic uncertainty induce movements in endoge-
nous borrowing constraint, in particular increase in uncertainty tightens the constraint.
Finally, part (iii) states that there is a coinsurance since following a low demand shock net
payments for financial intermediary are lower relative to the payments after high demand
shock. Thus, there is some relief in the amount of repayments when the marginal utility
of consumption for entrepreneur is high. At the same time financial intermediary benefits
from high realizations by extracting larger payments from the firm.
Given the existence of the v∗ the question arises whether firms on average grow to-
wards the unconstrained levels. There are two counteracting forces and a general theo-
retical characterization is not possible5. Firstly, due to the private information full in-
tertemporal risk sharing is not achievable, and the optimal, dynamic contract induces that
on average an entrepreneur borrows against his future income. As a result, this force
pushes the entrepreneur’s expected utility downwards over time. In particular, whenever
(1 + r) = β−1 then v > E [v] as argued by Green (1987), Thomas and Worrall (1990) or
Atkeson and Lucas (1992). I label this tendency of continuation utility to fall over the
lifetime as an incentive effect. Secondly, the rate (1 + r) at which financial intermedi-
ary discounts future cash flows matters for the evolution of the continuation utilities. As
interest rate increases financial intermediary is less patient and it is optimal to receive
payments from the firm earlier. Other things equal increase in the interest rate pushes the
expected continuation value up. The way to see it is to inspect the condition derived from
the necessary and sufficient first order conditions (see Appendix B.2)
B′ (v) =
1
β (1 + r)
E
[
B′ (v)
]
5This is contrary to the environment with risk neutral entrepreneurs as in Clementi and Hopenhayn
(2006) where one can show the firm’s equity is a submartingale with two absorbing states, where one of
them is unconstrained level of financing.
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as interest rate increases the 1
β(1+r) falls the absolute value (given the utility function I
impose in Assumption 7 B′ (v) is negative over the entire domain of v) of E [B′ (v)] has to
increase. Given that limv→vmin B
′ (v) = 0 and limv→vmax B′ (v) = ∞ and monotonicity of
the value function B (v) it has to be that on average v increases. I label this force as the
interest rate effect. Therefore a net effect of the two forces determines whether on average
firms move towards v∗ and hence the unconstrained level of financing.6. In the quantitative
section I make sure that firms on average are growing in the economy. This property of
the model as well as the presence of the endogenous borrowing constraint is illustrated in
Figure 3.3.
Key tensions. Absent informational friction, within considered environment, the lender
would completely insure the borrower and would provide a statically efficient level of financ-
ing in every period, which equalizes expected revenue from additional investment with it’s
marginal cost. Entrepreneur would receive, independent on the realization of the demand
shock, a constant stream of consumption. Moreover, the realization of the shock would
have no effect on the continuation of the contract. The presence of the private information
introduces a tension between production efficiency, providing insurance and maintaining
incentives for the financial intermediary. To illustrate this trade-offs skip the dependence
of the problem on s ∈ S and let N = 2 with Θ = {θH , θL} and consider the following vari-
ation: for some ε ∈ R sufficiently close to zero, decrease v′H and v′L by ε/β and increase cH
and cL such that U (cH) and U (cL) increase by ε. Then the feasible, incentive compatible
lending under considered deviation increases by εl =
ε
F ′(l)Ω1 where
Ω1 =
1(
θ1−γH − θ1−γL
)
 1
U ′
((
θ1−γH − θ1−γL
)
F (l (v)) + cL
) − 1
U ′ (cL)
 > 0
6Somehow less restrictive requirement in my environment is the presence of any positive mass of uncon-
strained firms in equilibrium. This can happen even if the sufficient condition for average firm to grow, i.e.
E [(v)] > v is not satisfied. Conditional on on survival and receiving long enough sequence of high demand
shocks a firm can reach unconstrained level of financing, even if on average firms are not growing in the
economy
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This variation leaves the value of the intermediary unchanged, i.e. ∆B
ε
= 0, where
∆B
ε
≈ Ω1
(
E
[
θ1−γ
]
F ′ (l)− 1)
F ′ (l)
−
[
πH
U ′ (cH)
+
πL
U ′ (cL)
]
− 1
β (1 + r)
[
πLB
′ (v′L)+ πHB′ (v′H)]
(3.12)
By strict concavity of value function B and the fact that v′L < v
′
H the third term in the
equation above is positive. It reflects the benefit from reduction in continuation values.
As resources are transferred from future to current period the promise keeping constraint
requires an increase of both consumptions. This is costly for the intermediary and is
reflected by the second, negative term in the equation 3.12 above. The first term reflects
the incentive effects on lending. Note that absent informational frictions E
[
θ1−γ
]
F ′ (l) =
1 and the first term vanishes. However, if only the incentive compatibility constraint
is binding transferring resources from future to current periods optimal contract implies
the intermediary lends more to an entrepreneur and thus it’s profit increases, given that
E
[
θ1−γ
]
F ′ (l)− 1 > 0 whenever the constraint is strictly binding.
3.4.3 Access to financing increases with average return
The access to exogenous financing grows with age as argued in the previous section. In
this section I argue that the type s which determines the expected return on a project
matters for the level of financing in my environment, firms are able to borrow more if their
expected return on project (terminal size) is larger. Absent any information friction it
follows directly from the problem (3.11) that lending increases with expected return on
a project. Though it is not straightforward to see that this property extends to the case
with private information. To argue that it does consider the following assumption on the
structure of uncertainty, which I will later also use in the quantitative section.
Assumption 7. Assume U (c) = c
1−ρ
1−ρ with ρ > 1. Let N = 2 with Θ = {θsL, θsH} for all
s ∈ S with πL = 1− πH and let
θsH =
(
θs +
σ
πH
) 1
1−γ
, θsL =
(
θs − σ
πL
) 1
1−γ
implying E
[
θ1−γs
]
= θs and std
(
θ1−γs
)
= σ√
piLpiH
.
Thus, the type s the firm draws at the beginning of operation affects only the average
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return on a project, but not the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock. Given this
assumption I establish the following proposition.
Proposition 8. Under Assumption 7 the optimal contract policies x =
{
c
(
θts
)
,m
(
θts
)
, l∗
(
θt−1s
)}
are functions homogenous of degree one in histories of idiosyncratic shocks.
Proof. Appendix B.2.2
The relevance of this proposition can be illustrated by considering the existence of only
one type s. Suppose x∗ is a solution to the optimal contracting problem (3.6). Then let
a history of shocks be scaled by a factor of λ > 0, i.e. Θ = {λθL, λθsH}, implying that
E
[
θ1−γs
]
= λ1−γ θ¯. The solution to the optimal contracting problem then, according to the
proposition above, is λx∗, i.e. it is scaled. Given the Assumption 7 the following corollary
holds
Corollary 8. Under Assumption 7, amount of lending l(v) increases at a constant rate as
a function of the average returns on a project.
Proof. Appendix B.2.2
Hence, the larger the average return on a project the more resources are lent to the
firm. This property is illustrated in Figure 3.3. Also the initial value of the continuation
utility v0, pinned down by the free entry condition 3.9, increases with firm’s average return
on a project. The fact that financing increases with expected return is an intuitive feature
of my environment, if a project is on average more profitable for the entrepreneur efficiency
dictates for the financial intermediary to invest more resources in it to maximize profits.
The presence of private information distorts the efficient allocation of resources although
the monotonicity of investment with respect to the average return on project is preserved.
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Figure 3.3: Life cycle of an average firm and role of the aggregate uncertainty.
(a) Life cycle of an average firm
Age
Size
n*(sH)
n0
n0
n*(sL)
t*(sL) t*(sH)
(b) Endogenous borrowing constraint
Age
Size
n*(sH)
n0
t*(sH)
Endogenous borrowing
constraint
(c) Effects of the uncertainty shock
Age
Size
 
 
low uncertainty high uncertainty
n*(sH)
n0
n0
t*(sH)
Tighter borrowing constraint
Notes: Size is measured in terms of employment n. sH stands for high initial technology draw, sL stands for low
initial technology draw.
3.4.4 Existence of a stationary equilibrium
So far my theoretical characterization has been limited to an individual contract proper-
ties. One of the contributions of my paper is to embody dynamic, contracting problem
into a general equilibrium model with a large number of firms, which further is used to
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conduct a quantitative analysis. Though, before that I make sure that recursive stationary
equilibrium defined in Section 3.3 actually exists. I establish and prove the existence in
the following proposition.
Proposition 9. Stationary recursive competitive equilibrium exists.
Proof. Appendix B.2.2
3.4.5 Policy functions, equilibrium and movements in uncertainty
In previous sections I characterized the optimal contract policy functions. In this section
I illustrate and discuss the qualitative properties of the policy functions and illustrate the
effect of an increase in microeconomic uncertainty on the equilibrium of my model. Figure
3.4 illustrates value of the contract, continuation values, payments to the financial inter-
mediary and lending in two scenarios: (i) low microeconomic uncertainty equilibrium (ii)
high microeconomic uncertainty equilibrium. Start with the low uncertainty equilibrium.
Consider a newly born firm. It’s initial value vlow0 (initial utility of entrepreneur) is pinned
down by the zero profit condition which is illustrated in panel (a) of Figure 3.4 by a point
at which value of the contract crosses zero. Then, the evolution of the continuation utility
is governed by the policy functions depicted in panel (b). Following high demand real-
ization an optimal contract delivers high continuation value v′H(v) > v, whereas after low
realization contract delivers low continuation value vL(v) < v. As I argue in Section 3.4.2
I make sure the average firm’s continuation utility increases with age, which is reflected
by asymmetry between v′H(v) − v and v′L(v) − v. Average payments from the firm to the
financial intermediary falls with the continuation value. Thus, at the beginning of the
operation firm makes positive payments to the financial intermediary and as it ages the
payments become negative, i.e. it uses resources deposited for consumption. Finally, panel
(d) presents lending over the domain of continuation utilities. Dashed red line depicts the
full-information benchmark, in which firm receives statically efficient level of financing. The
informationally constrained case (solid red line) level of lending increases with promised
utility of entrepreneur7. Given, that on average promised utility of the firm is increasing
7I was unable to show any monotonicity result with regards to lending function. In most of my numerical
simulations lending was strictly increasing albeit I also encountered the presence of decreasing part close to
vmin. The reason for existence of such part can be as follows. It happens at the region of the state space
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with time in my economy as firm ages it grows out of the constraint. Now consider, under
Assumption 7, a comparative statics exercise with respect to the level of microeconomic
uncertainty parameter σ. The response of the economy is illustrated with the blue lines in
Figure 3.4. Facing higher risk in order to provide proper intertemporal incentives financial
intermediary has to spread away more the continuation utilities, which given the strict con-
cavity of the value function is costly. As a result due to tradeoffs illustrated by equation
3.12 amounts of insurance and lending have to decline. This is reflected firstly by larger
spread in payments and more importantly by tightening of the borrowing constraint faced
by the firms. The general equilibrium effect of falling wages and interest rates induces
an increase in the full information level of financing by increasing the marginal benefit of
investment. The net effect of these two forces matters. As a result firm, dependent on
the position of the firm in the state space, can either be more constrained in borrowing or
less constrained in borrowing. The latter case though holds for just a small interval of the
domain of promised utilities (see the arrows in panel (d)). In particular firm is, on average,
more constrained when young and less constrained when very old. This constitutes the first
channel through which my model generates an asymmetric response to uncertainty shocks.
Secondly, note that in the high uncertainty equilibrium the initial continuation value for
the entrepreneur is lower (vhigh0 < v
low
0 ) inducing smaller size of new entrants in times
of heightened uncertainty. This is another channel contributing to asymmetric response
across young and old firms. The effects of the uncertainty shocks for the employment over
the life cycle of an average firm is illustrated in Figure 3.3.
where value of the contract flatters, i.e. it is relatively cheaper to spread away the continuation values
rather than distort so much the efficiency margin. Taking this argument to the limit from the properties of
B (v) we have limv→vmin B
′′ (v) = 0 i.e. cost of spreading promised utilities goes to zero at the left endpoint,
so a financial intermediary has room for not distorting so much the efficiency margin.
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Figure 3.4: Qualitative properties of the value and contract policy functions
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3.5 Calibration and Quantitative results
In this section I present the calibration of the model and undertake quantitative exercise
illustrating the role of shocks to microeconomic uncertainty. I calibrate the economy to
match steady state moments of the model and their counterparts in the data. I then
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conduct impulse response analysis and discuss the macroeconomic impact of aggregate
shock to microeconomic uncertainty shock. Next, I compare it’s effects to those arising
from the movements in aggregate productivity.
3.5.1 Calibration
A period in my model is a quarter. To calibrate the model, I partition my model parameters
into those which I fix in advance following estimates typically found in the macroeconomic
literature and those which I calibrate by matching model implied moments with the data.
First, I set the functional forms for preferences and technology. I assume GHH preferences
of workers with period utility given by
Uw(c, h) =
1
1− ρ
(
c− ψ h
1+ 1
ν
1 + 1
ν
)1−ρ
.
Moreover, I assume entrepreneurs have does not supply labor and hence their period utility
is given by
U(c) =
c1−ρ
1− ρ
Technology of production is a decreasing returns to scale function of capital and labor
f(k, n) = kαnγ . As for parameters set in advance, I set the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution 1/ρ to 0.5; the number frequently used in the literature (e.g. Davila et al.
(2012) and Conesa et al. (2009b)). For the Frisch elasticity, ν, I rely on estimates from
Heathcote et al. (2010b) and use 0.72. This value is intended to capture both the intensive
and the extensive margins of labor supply adjustment together with the typical existence of
two earners within a household. It is also close to 0.82, the number reported by Chetty et al.
(2011) in their meta-analysis of estimates for the Frisch elasticity using micro data. Share
of capital, α, is disciplined by the long run properties of the US time series. Parameters
exogenously imposed on the model are summarized in Table 3.5.
The value for ψ is chosen so that average hours worked equals 0.3 of total available time
endowment. Depreciation rate, δ, is set to match the investment to output ratio of 0.24.
The discount factor of entrepreneurs is set so that the interest rate in the initial stationary
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Table 3.5: Exogenously Determined Parameters of the Baseline Economy
Parameter Value
Inverse of IES, ρ 2.0
Frisch elasticity of labor, ν 2.0
Share of capital, α 0.35
Share of labor, η 0.60
equilibrium is equal to 4% annually (equivalently to 0.099 quarterly). Note that implied
product is (1 + r)β > 1 implying under my calibration firms on average are growing, since
v < E(v). The survival probability ζ controls directly the average age of firms in the
economy and therefore it is disciplined by the percentage of young firms in the data equal
to 0.41. I use a constant A to normalize output in the economy to 1.
Table 3.6: Preference and Technology Parameters and Associated Targets
Parameter Value Target Value Model
A 0.97 Aggregate output 1.0 1.0
δ 0.06 Investment-to-Output ratio 0.24 0.24
β 0.99 Average growth rate of firms 0.02 0.02
ζ 0.92 Share of young firms in total 0.41 0.41
ψ 2.2 Average hours worked 0.30 0.30
Size-Age Distribution. A key and novel aspect of the calibration of my model is to
match jointly the age and size distribution of the firms in the US economy. Firstly, I
assume firm can be of one of three fixed types, i.e. I = {1, 2, 3}, with expected returns on
project θ¯1 < θ¯2 < θ¯3. Moreover, let Γs be a probability of drawing a type s ∈ S. Table 3.7
summarizes the choices of parameters and associated targets which determine the size/age
distribution of firms in the model. Business Dynamics Statistics provides data for firms
of different size, where size is measured in terms of number of employees and classified in
12 bins. In my calibration I associate firms with less than 20 employees to be of type 1,
firms with 20 to 99 employees to be of type 2 and firms with more than 100 employees to
be of type 3. I use the fraction of firms within each of three groups to discipline Γs. Note,
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88% of firms in the US economy is classified in group 1, 10% in groups 2 and only 2% in
group three. In terms of employment share, the third group of firms account for 69% of
total employment, the second group accounts for 15% and the first group for 16%. I use
the former two numbers to discipline the θ¯2 and θ¯3, so that the models exactly matches
employment shares from the data. I impose the idiosyncratic uncertainty to evolve in line
with Assumption 7, i.e. N = 2 and
θ1−γsL = θ¯s −
σs
πL
θ1−γsH = θ¯s +
σs
πH
Thus, the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock, which is privately observed in my
model, is controlled by σ and πH (given that πL = 1− πH). I use these two parameters to
reflect the shares of employment of young firms across size groups. My preferred definition
of small firms that I use for the rest of the quantitative part and which I relate to it’s data
counterpart is firms with less than 100 employees. Thus, I target the share of employment
of young firms in employment of small and large firms defined this way. Ability of the
model to replicate joint age/size distribution of employment is a crucial feature for the
quantitative part of the paper.
Table 3.7: Size/Age Distribution Parameters and Associated Targets
Parameter Value Target Value Model
θ¯2 1.13 Employment share of group 2 0.18 0.18
θ¯3 1.57 Employment share of group 3 0.62 0.59
Γ1 0.88 Firm’s share of group 1 0.88 0.88
Γ2 0.10 Firm’s share of group 2 0.10 0.10
Γ3 0.02 Firm’s share of group 3 0.02 0.02
σ1 0.34 Employment share of young in group 1 0.33 0.35
σ2 0.31 Average growth rate for group 2* 0.012 0.014
σ3 0.27 Average growth rate for group 3* 0.006 0.007
Notes: Group 1 has 1-20 employees; Group 2 has 20-99 employees; Group 3 has 100+ employees. Young firms are
less 0-5 and old 6+. Source: BDS
*Numbers based on calculations by Haltiwanger et. al. (2013)
88
Transitional dynamics: a stand on existing contracts. In my quantitative exercise
I compute a transitional dynamics (under the perfect foresight) between steady states
after an increase in standard deviation of the demand shock θ. In my environment such
exercise requires taking an explicit stand on on what happens with existing contracts
after the economy is hit with the uncertainty shock. Denote by µ∗s,0 (vs,0;σl) a stationary
distribution over the state space associated with a low uncertainty. Denote value functions
associated with low and high uncertainty by Bs (vs;σl) and Bs (vs;σh) respectively. An
evolution of the distribution over deterministic transition is determined by the following
law of motion
µs,t+1 (vs,t+1) = Tµs,t (vs,t) =
∫
V
Q (vs,t, vs,t+1) µs,t (vs,t)
where µs,1 (vs,1;σh) is first period distribution from which the iteration is started after the
economy is hit with the shock in this period. In terms of what happens with existing
contracts two possible cases are possible: (i) all the risk is absorbed by the financial in-
termediary (ii) all the risk is absorbed by an entrepreneur. For (i) we have vs1 = vs0 i.e.
there is no change in the value of the continuation utility for any entrepreneur and hence
Bs (vs1;σh) 6= Bs (vs0;σl)
given that an idiosyncratic risk is greater in economy with σh. This implies
µs,1 (vs,1;σh) = µ
∗
s (vs;σl)
so the economy starts with the distribution inherited from the low uncertainty economy.
For case (ii) we have
Bs (vs;σl) = Bs (v̂s;σh)
for some v̂s 6= vs and hence
µs,1 (vs,1;σh) = µ
∗
s (v̂s;σl)
which implies a shift in distribution over continuation utilities. In what follows I compute
transitional dynamics for case (i) in which the financial intermediary absorbs the risk
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induced by movements in micro uncertainty.
3.5.2 The Effects of Uncertainty Shocks
In this section I present the main quantitative result of my paper. I evaluate the impli-
cations of the aggregate shock to microeconomic uncertainty faced by firms. I model the
uncertainty shock as an increase in standard deviation of the demand shock θ. I assume
that the shock declines upon impact and this decline dacays over time. I fix the decay of
the impulse so that the shock has a half-life of 4 quarters. I calibrate the initial impulse
so that on impact, a standard deviation of θ increases by 60% a number comparable to
the increase in the standard deviation of the firm-level TFP8 in the US during last four
recession, as argued by Bloom (2014). I compute the impulse response path of the econ-
omy as it transitions back to the steady state (under perfect foresight). In the current
version I fix the interest rate at the initial equilibrium level. Figure 3.5 presents impulse
responses of output, employment, investment, credit to GDP ratio, consumption and labor
productivity all as percentage deviations from the steady state of the model. The impact
on the employment among different groups of firms is summarized in Table 3.8. I draw
four important conclusions from this impulse response exercise.
Firstly, a economy hit with an uncertainty shock falls into a recession. Impulse to the
economy generates a 1.53% decline in output on impact. Decline is output is driven by
the fact that constrained firms in the model are now more constrained and reduce their
demand for both capital and labor. This is a direct consequence of tradeoffs faced by the
financial intermediary in the dynamic contracting environment with private information.
As idiosyncratic uncertainty increases maintaining intertemporal incentives becomes more
expansive since, given the strict concavity of the value function, continuation values need
to be more spread away. This lowers the value of the contract for the lender and thus re-
sources devoted to provide insurance and in particular to make loans to firms fall, inducing
tightening of the borrowing constraint. Importantly, employment falls by 1.35%, which is
8I interpret the idiosyncratic shock in my model as demand shock, since it occurs before the produc-
tion takes place. However, equivalently, in line with arguments by Foster et al. (2012) this shock can be
interpreted as firm-level TFP shock.
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88% fall relative to the GDP, a number close to the data counterpart. Interestingly, re-
duction of employment and output is not driven by mis-allocation, measured productivity
remains at it’s initial steady state level. This is contrary to the mechanism common in
the literature on financial friction relying on the exogenously imposed collateral constraint
(see for example Zetlin-Jones and Shourideh (2012)). There the collateral shock induces
a greater degree of mis-allocation relative to the steady state outcome. Constrained firms
in those models are the firms that experience positive shock to uninsurable, idiosyncratic
productivity and these highly productive firms then grow more slowly along the impulse
path than they would have in steady state. In my model mechanism is quite different.
The presence of private information induces in times of high, microeconomic uncertainty
firms will actually grow (or contract) faster (continuation utilities are more spread away),
albeit the path towards unconstrained level is more steep which is reflected in a tighter
borrowing constraint. The economic downturn is accompanied by a fall in credit to GDP
ratio by roughly 0.3%. Contraction of credit is an ubiquitous feature of recessions in the US
data, which my model is able to replicate. Finally, consumption of entrepreneurs increases
whereas consumption of workers falls. An immediate drop of workers consumption reflects
a combination of decline in wage and employment.
Secondly, the general equilibrium effect counters the initial impact of the uncertainty
shock. A reduction in demand for labor by constrained firms imposes downward pressure
on wages (interest rate is fixed in my transitional dynamics exercise). Thus the net effect
of the two implies whether the macroeconomic aggregates fall or increase. Unconstrained
firms who already receive the efficient level of financing facing lower wage rates increase
their employment and investment. Thus the composition of firms between constrained
(also the tightness of the constraint matters) and unconstrained ones in the economy is
crucial for the behavior of the economic aggregates. In my environment this composition
is endogenous. Although, I impose discipline on the distribution of firms by calibrating
age/size firms and employment distribution observed in the data. Thus implicitly, through
the discipline on fundamentals of the economy, my calibration procedure determines the
fraction of the unconstrained firms in the economy. It turns out initial impulse dominates
the general equilibrium effect and economy experiences recession, which is reflected by the
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behavior of macroeconomic aggregates illustrated in Figure 3.5.
My third observation highlights the role of private information in my model as a prop-
agation mechanism. A natural benchmark for baseline experiment is an economy with full
information. Dotted lines in Figure 3.5 present impulse responses to the uncertainty shock
in an economy with no informational frictions. Uncertainty shock in this economy has
absolutely no effects on allocations and prices. The shock is mean preserving, thus it does
not change the expected revenue of the project. With no informational friction statically
efficient level is sustained and perfect insurance is provided by the financial intermediary
at the same levels as in the initial steady state. Hence, shock has no effects on the economy
(see also Table 3.8). The economy remains in the initial steady state. Therefore a differ-
ence between between solid lines and dotted lines illustrates a role of private information
as a mechanism shaping macroeconomic aggregates over transition.
Finally, Table 3.8 compares the response to the uncertainty shock across different groups
of firms. My key finding is that employment of young firms. My key finding is that em-
ployment of young firms responds 6.4 times more relative to the employment of the old
firms. This roughly accounts for a 71.5% of differential response between young and old
firms which was observed in the US economy (see Section 3.2.4). However, so far the model
is nowhere close to reproduce a huge decline in employment of young firms following the
recent recession. There are two channels through which uncertainty shocks triggers asym-
metric response. Firstly, young firms are mostly financially constrained and thus since
uncertainty shock tightens the endogenous borrowing constraint their employment, invest-
ment and therefore output is reduced more. Since the firms in my economy are growing over
time and conditional on survival they eventually grow out of the endogenous constraint,
a population of the old firms is concentrated more in a region where the financial friction
is less severe, i.e. borrowing constraint is less strict or does not bind at all. Moreover,
the general equilibrium effect counters the initial impact of the uncertainty shocks. For a
fraction of unconstrained firms or those close to the unconstrained level the effect of falling
wages is dominating and they expand by increasing employment and investment. Thus age
composition, for each size type, of firms over the continuation utilities and hence over the
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Figure 3.5: Effects of Uncertainty Shock on macroeconomic outcomes.
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access to borrowing is a key feature determining an asymmetric response between young
and old firms. Second channel through which uncertainty shocks induce larger reduction of
the employment of young firms is reduction of the size of start-ups. The stream of financial
intermediary’s profit from an individual lending contract is lower in times of heightened
uncertainty, therefore a free entry condition implies initial utility of entrepreneur, deter-
mining initial size, declines contributing to reduction of employment by young firms. This
channel by definition is absent in the group of old firms. The model also generates asym-
metric patterns of employment between small and large firms. Recall, I define in line with
the data small firms to be less than 100 employees, which in my calibration are types one
and two. As for the small vs. large firms margin there are two counteracting forces. Firstly,
firms which drew the high average demand will start larger relative to the other start-ups,
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since an optimal contract is more profitable and offers (due to zero profit condition) higher
initial utility. This pushes the large star-ups closer to the unconstrained level. However,
given that standard deviation of the uncertainty shock is common across firms large firms
would require longer sequence of high demand shocks to grow out of the constraint. The
first force contributes to lower variability of large firms employment relative to the small
ones, whereas the second induces higher volatility since it keeps large firms longer in the
constrained region. Which one dominates is a quantitative question. Given my calibration
I found my model generates employment response of small firms which is 11 percent larger
relative to the response of the large, accounting for 60.2% percent of difference in the data
(see Table 3.8).
Table 3.8: Effect of shocks on employment (% dev. from steady state)
Uncertainty Uncertainty Productivity
Age/Size Data shock shock shock (1%)
(Baseline) (Full-info) (Baseline)
Total -2.75 -1.35 0.00 -1.71
Young (0-5) -10.15 -4.61 0.00 -1.71
Old (6+) -1.19 -0.72 0.00 -1.71
Small (1-99) -2.48 -1.26 0.00 -1.71
Large (100+) -2.94 -1.40 0.00 -1.71
3.5.3 The Effects of Productivity Shocks
I now compare the effects of uncertainty shocks to the effects of aggregate productivity
shock in my model. This is also a natural benchmark given a popularity of the real busi-
ness cycle models. This exercise has two purposes. Firstly, it allows me to provide context
for the magnitude of the effects of uncertainty shocks. Secondly it allows, within my envi-
ronment, to disentangle the sources of aggregate fluctuations that are plausible to generate
movements of the macroeconomic aggregates and asymmetric response across firms that
are observed in recessions in the US. Here, I consider the transition dynamics that results
from purely unanticipated decline in the aggregate productivity which slowly returns to
94
steady state. Similarly to the uncertainty shock I fix the half-life of the impulse to 4 quar-
ters. I discipline the size of the productivity shock so that a measured productivity in the
model falls on impact by one standard deviation of measured Solow residual in the United
States. This implies, roughly, drop of measured productivity in the model by 1%. On
impact employment falls by 1.71%. Hence, uncertainty shock that induces one standard
deviation fall in the standard deviation of the microeconomic uncertainty leads to a reces-
sion of 79% the size of the one caused by the one standard deviation fall in the aggregate
productivity. Employment series exhibit similar ratio. Although, counter to the uncer-
tainty shock and to the data productivity shock does not induce a fall in credit to GDP
ratio. Therefore, I consider uncertainty shock as an important contributor to the move-
ments of the macroeconomic aggregates and plausible driving force of economic downturns.
This conclusion is further validated by inspecting response of employment across differ-
ent groups of firms, which are illustrated in Figure 7 and presented Table 3.8. Economy hit
with productivity shock exhibits a symmetrical response of employment across age and size
groups of firms, which stands in stark contrast to the uncertainty shock case and more im-
portantly contrary to the data. Aggregate productivity shock induces fall in the expected
return on project of all firms, thus given the homogeneity result I prove in Section 3.4, the
access to financing falls symmetric for all firms implying symmetric fall of employment.
These findings validate the most important conclusion from the quantitative part of my
paper i.e. it is a combination of fluctuations in microeconomic uncertainty paired with the
private information friction that are essential to account jointly for phenomena observed
during recessions in the US.
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Appendix A
This appendix presents concise versions of the proofs. Extensive versions with more details
are contained in a separate online appendix which can be found in our websites.
A.1 Proofs for two-period economies
A.1.1 Uncertainty economy
Define τkR ≡ rτk/ (1 + r). Six equations determine a tax distorted equilibrium (K,nL, nH , r, w;
τn, τkR, T ) according to Definition 1: the first order conditions of the agent’s problem (one
intertemporal and two intratemporal), the first order conditions of the firm’s problem
r = fK (K,N) , and w = fN (K,N) , where N = πeLnL + (1− π) eHnH (A.1)
and the government’s budget constraint. Using equation (A.1) to substitute out for r
and w we are left with a system of four equations that any vector
(
K,nL, nH , τ
n, τkR, T
)
of equilibrium values must satisfy. The two degrees of freedom are a result of the fact
that the planner has three instruments
(
τn, τkR, T
)
that are restricted by one equation, the
government’s budget constraint. Defining welfare by
W ≡ u (ω −K, n¯) + βE
[
u
(
(1− τn) fN (K,N) eini +
(
1− τkR
)
fK (K,N)K + T
)
, ni
]
and totally differentiating the four equilibrium equations together with this definition and
making the appropriate simplifications using Assumption 1 we obtain the following equation
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(the algebra is tedious and, therefore, suppressed1):
dW = Θndτn +ΘkdτkR,
where Θn and Θk are complicated functions of equilibrium variables2.
Lemma 9. Under Assumption 1, in equilibrium nH > nL and uc (cL, nL) > uc (cH , nH).
The proof of this Lemma is contained in the online appendix.
Proof of Proposition 1. First notice that the optimal tax system must satisfy Θn = 0 and
Θk = 0, otherwise there would exist variations in
(
τn, τkR
) ∈ (−∞, 1)2 that would increase
welfare. Θk = 0 simplifies to θk1 + θ
k
2τ
n + θk3τ
k
R = 0 where
θk1 ≡ fNfKNN (Vc − Uc) , θk2 ≡ fNfKNN ((1 + κ)Uc − Vc) , and θk3 ≡ fK (fN + fKNKκ)Uc.
Solving this equation for τkR, substituting it in Θ
n = 0 and simplifying entails
Vc (1− τn)− Uc (1− (1 + κ) τn) = 0.
Solving for τn we obtain equation (2.1) and substituting it back in the equation for τkR we
obtain τkR = 0; and, therefore, τ
k = 0. This is the only pair
(
τn, τkR
) ∈ (−∞, 1)2 that solves
1Mathematica codes that compute all the algebraic steps are available upon request.
2Here are the exact formulas:
Θk ≡
fKKUc
Φ
{
fNfKNN [(1− τ
n) (Vc − Uc) + τ
nκUc] + τ
k
RfK (fN + fKNKκ)Uc
}
.
Θn ≡
fNN
(1− τn) Φ
{
(
1− τkR
)
f2KfNK
[
(1− τn)
(
Ucc (Uc − Vc) + τ
k
R (Vcc − Ucc)Uc
)
−
(
1− τkR
)
τnκUccUc
]
+ fN [(1− τ
n) (Vc − Uc) + τ
nκUc]
[(
1− τkR
)
fKNNUc −Ku
0
cc
]
+
(
1− τkR
)
τkRfKNfKKκU
2
c }.
where
Uc ≡ β [piuc (cL, nL) + (1− pi)uc (cH , nH)] , Ucc ≡ β [piucc (cL, nL) + (1− pi)ucc (cH , nH)] ,
Vc ≡ β
[
piuc (cL, nL)
eLnL
N
+ (1− pi)uc (cH , nH)
eHnH
N
]
, Vcc ≡ β
[
piucc (cL, nL)
eLnL
N
+ (1− pi)ucc (cH , nH)
eHnH
N
]
,
Φ ≡
(
1− τkR
) (
fKfNfKNKN ((1− τ
n) (Vcc − Ucc) + τ
nκUcc) + (fN + fKNKκ) f
2
KKUcc − fNfKNNUc
)
+ (fN + fKNKκ)Ku
0
cc.
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the system Θn = 0 and Θk = 0. The fact that the optimal level of τn > 0 follows from
Lemma 9.
A.1.2 Inequality economy
The proof of Proposition 2 is entirely analogous and for that reason suppressed here. It
can be found in the online appendix.
A.2 Proofs for complete market economies
The proofs follow straight-forwardly the approach introduced by Werning (2007). Hence,
for details on the logic behind the procedure we refer the reader to that paper, here we
focus mainly on the parts that comprise our value added. We depart from Werning (2007)
in following ways: we use the GHH utility function (whereas he studies the separable and
Cobb-Douglas cases), we do not allow the Ramsey planner to choose time zero policies and
impose an upper bound of 1 for capital income taxes. These departures make the Ramsey
planner’s problem comparable to our benchmark experiment. The restriction on time
zero policies is particularly important because it prevents the planner from confiscating
the (potentially unequal) initial capital levels eliminating the corresponding redistribution
motives.
Consider Economy 4 as described in Section 2.6. For simplicity, we assume that agents
are divided into a finite number of types i ∈ I of relative size πi. Type i has an initial asset
position of ai,0 and a productivity level of ei. Let pt denote the price of the consumption
good in period t in terms of period 0. Since markets are complete we can write down the
present value budget constraint of the agent (remember that τ c is a parameter),
∞∑
t=0
pt ((1 + τ
c) ci,t + ai,t+1) ≤
∞∑
t=0
pt ((1− τnt )wteini,t +Rtai,t + Tt) ,
where Rt ≡ 1+
(
1− τkt
)
rt. Rule out arbitrage opportunities by setting pt = Rt+1pt+1, and
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define T ≡∑∞t=0 ptTt. Then, the budget constraint simplifies to
∞∑
t=0
pt ((1 + τ
c) ci,t − (1− τnt )wteini,t) ≤ R0ai,0 + T . (A.2)
Similarly, the government’s budget constraint simplifies to
R0B0 + T +
∑
t
ptG =
∑
t
pt
(
τ cCt + τ
n
t wtNt + τ
k
t rtKt
)
. (A.3)
The resource constraint is given by
Ct +G+Kt+1 = f (Kt, Nt) , for all t ≥ 0. (A.4)
Definition 12. Given {ai,0}, K0, B0 and
(
τn0 , τ
k
0 , T0
)
, a competitive equilibrium is a policy{
τnt , τ
k
t , Tt
}∞
t=1
, a price system {pt, wt, rt}∞t=0, and an allocation {ci,t, ni,t,Kt+1}∞t=0, such
that: (i) agents choose {ci,t, ni,t}∞t=0 to maximize utility subject to budget constraint (A.2)
taking policies and prices (that satisfy pt = Rt+1pt+1) as given; (ii) firms maximize profits;
(iii) the government’s budget constraint (A.3) holds; and (iv) markets clear: the resource
constraints (A.4) hold.
Given aggregate levels Ct and Nt, individual consumption and labor supply levels can
be found by solving the following static subproblem
Um (Ct, Nt;ϕ) ≡ max
ci,t,ni,t
∑
i
πiϕiu (ci,t, ni,t) s.t.
∑
i
πici,t = Ct and
∑
i
πieini,t = Nt
(A.5)
where u is given by equation (2.4), for some vector ϕ ≡ {ϕi} of market weights ϕi ≥ 0. Let
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cmi,t (Ct, Nt;ϕ), and n
m
i,t (Ct, Nt;ϕ) be the argmax of this problem. It can be shown that
3
cmi,t (Ct, Nt;ϕ) = ω
c
iCt + χ
κ
1 + κ
(
(ωni )
1+κ
κ − ωciΩn
)
(Nt)
1+κ
κ
nmi,t (Ct, Nt;ϕ) = ω
n
i eiNt
Um (Ct, Nt;ϕ) =
Ωc
1− σ
(
Ct − Ωnχ κ
1 + κ
(Nt)
1+κ
κ
)1−σ
Then, implementability constraints can be written as
∞∑
t=0
βt(UmC (Ct, Nt;ϕ) c
m
i,t (Ct, Nt;ϕ) + U
m
N (Ct, Nt;ϕ)n
m
i,t (Ct, Nt;ϕ)) (A.6)
= UmC (C0, N0;ϕ)
(
R0ai,0 + T
1 + τ c
)
for all i ∈ I
Proposition 10. An aggregate allocation {Ct, Nt,Kt+1}∞t=0 can be supported by a compet-
itive equilibrium if and only if the resource constraints (A.4) hold and there exist market
weights ϕ and a lump-sum tax T so that the implementability conditions (A.6) hold for all
i ∈ I. Individual allocations can then be computed using functions cmi,t and nmi,t, prices and
taxes can be computed using the usual equilibrium conditions.
The Ramsey problem is that of choosing policies
{
τnt , τ
k
t , Tt
}∞
t=1
, taking {ai,0}, K0, B0
and
(
τn0 , τ
k
0 , T0
)
as given, to maximize a weighted sum of the individual utilities,
∞∑
t=0
βtπiλiu (ci,t, ni,t) , (A.7)
where {λi} are the welfare weights normalized so that
∑
i πiλi = 1 with λi ≥ 0, subject to
allocations and policies being a part of a competitive equilibrium and τkt ≤ 1 for all t ≥ 1.
First notice that in equilibrium it must be that UmC (t) = β
(
1 +
(
1− τkt+1
)
rt+1
)
UmC (t+ 1),
3Where constants are defined as follows:
ωci ≡
(ϕi)
1
σ∑
j
pij (ϕj)
1
σ
, ωni ≡
(ei)
κ∑
j
pij (ej)
1+κ , Ω
c ≡
(∑
i
pii (ϕi)
1
σ
)σ
, and Ωn ≡
(∑
j
pij (ej)
1+κ
)
−
1
κ
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so that
UmC (t) ≥ βUmC (t+ 1) , (A.8)
is equivalent to τkt+1 ≤ 1. Moreover, notice that τk0 and T0 have not been substituted out
in the implementability constraint. The fact that τn0 is given together with the equilibrium
condition (1− τn0 )w0 = −UmN (0) /UmC (0) is equivalent to
N0 = N¯0, (A.9)
where N¯0 is defined implicitly as a function of variables given to the Ramsey planner,
(1− τn0 ) fN
(
K0, N¯0
)
= Ωnχ
(
N¯0
) 1
κ .
Finally, we can use Proposition 10 to rewrite the Ramsey problem as that of choosing
{Ct, Nt}∞t=0, T , and ϕ to maximize (A.7) subject to (A.4) for all t ≥ 0, (A.6) for all i ∈ I
with multiplier µi, (A.8) for all t ≥ 0 with multiplier ηt, and (A.9). Equivalently, we can
write it as that of solving the following auxiliary problem
max
{Ct,Nt}∞t=0,T,ϕ
∞∑
t=0
βtW (Ct, Nt;ϕ, µ, λ) − UmC (C0, N0;ϕ)
∑
i∈I
µi
(
R0ai,0 + T
1 + τ c
)
,
subject to (A.4) for all t ≥ 0, (A.8) for all t ≥ 0, and (A.9), where
W (Ct, Nt;ϕ, µ, λ) ≡
∑
i
πi{λiu
(
cmi,t (Ct, Nt;ϕ) , n
m
i,t (Ct, Nt;ϕ)
)
+ µi
(
UmC (Ct, Nt;ϕ) c
m
i,t (Ct, Nt;ϕ) + U
m
N (Ct, Nt;ϕ) n
m
i,t (Ct, Nt;ϕ)
)}.
110
With some algebra it can be shown that4
W (Ct, Nt;ϕ, µ, λ) =
1
1− σ
(
Ct − Ωnχ κ
1 + κ
(Nt)
1+κ
κ
)−σ (
ΦCt − (Φ + (1− σ)Ψ)Ωnχ κ
1 + κ
(Nt)
1+κ
κ
)
(A.10)
Define R∗t ≡ 1 + rt and
η−1 ≡ R0
β (1 + τ c)
∑
i
πiµiai,0,
and first order conditions (for the following proofs we need only necessary conditions)
together with equilibrium conditions imply the following equations5
∑
i
πiµi = 0 (A.11)
τnt + τ
c
1 + τ c
=
ΨΘt
ΦΘt +Ψ(σ +Θt) + Υtσ (βηt−1 − ηt) , for t ≥ 1 (A.12)
Rt+1
R∗t+1
=
ΦΘt+1 +Ψσ +Υt+1σ (βηt − ηt+1)
ΦΘt +Ψσ +Υtσ (βηt−1 − ηt)
Θt
Θt+1
, for t ≥ 0 (A.13)
Notice that Υt > 0 and Θt > 0, for all t ≥ 0.
A.2.1 Economy 2
Lemma 10. If ei = 1 for all i ∈ I, then Ψ = 0 and Φ > 0.
Proof. If ei = 1 for all i ∈ I, then it follows from the definition of Ψ that
Ψ =
Ωc
ε
∑
j πjµj (ej)
1+ε∑
j πj (ej)
1+ε =
Ωc
ε
∑
j πjµj∑
j πj
= 0
4Where constants are defined as follows:
Φ ≡
∑
j
pij
(
λj
ϕj
− σµjω
c
j
)
, and Ψ ≡
Ωc
κ
∑
j
pijµjejω
n
j .
5Where Υt ≡ Ω
c/Ωnχ κ
1+κ
(Nt)
1+κ
κ .
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where the last equality follows from equation (A.11). Next, notice that
u
(
cmi,t (Ct, Nt;ϕ) , n
m
i,t (Ct, Nt;ϕ)
)
=
(ωci )
1−σ
1− σ
(
Ct − Ωnχ κ
1 + κ
(Nt)
1+κ
κ
)1−σ
and, therefore, the solution to the problem must satisfy Ct > Ω
nχ κ1+κ (Nt)
1+κ
κ for all t ≥ 0.
Otherwise, the objective function of the Ramsey problem would be −∞. On the other
hand, since Ψ = 0, it follows from equation (A.10) that
W (Ct, Nt;ϕ, µ, λ) =
Φ
1− σ
(
Ct − Ωnχ κ
1 + κ
(Nt)
1+κ
κ
)1−σ
.
It follows that, if Φ ≤ 0, setting C0 = f
(
K0, N¯0
) − G, and Ct = Nt = 0, for all t ≥ 1
(so that Ct = Ω
nχ κ1+κ (Nt)
1+κ
κ for all t ≥ 1) would maximize the objective function of the
auxiliary problem while being feasible which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4. Using Lemma 10, from equation (A.12) it follows that
τnt = −τ c, for t ≥ 1.
Next, suppose ηt = 0, for all t ≥ 0. Then, it follows from (A.13) that τk1 < 1 if
− 1
β
ΦΘ0
Υ0σ
≡ P1 < η−1 < M1 ≡ 1
β
(R∗1 − 1)ΦΘ0
Υ0σ
,
and that τkt = 0 for t ≥ 2. Hence, if P1 < η−1 < M1, the constraints will in fact never be
binding. Now, suppose ηt > 0, for t ≤ t∗ − 2 and ηt = 0, for all t ≥ t∗ − 1, then it follows
from (A.13) that τkt∗ < 1 if
−
t∗∑
τ=1
1
βτ
ΦΘτ−1
Υτ−1σ
≡ Pt∗ < η−1 < Mt∗ ≡
t∗∑
τ=1
1
βτ
(∏t∗
t=τ R
∗
t − 1
)
ΦΘτ−1
Υτ−1σ
,
and that τkt = 0 for t ≥ t∗ + 1. The result follows from the fact that η−1 is finite,
limt→∞ Pt = −∞ and limt→∞Mt =∞.
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A.2.2 Economy 3
Proof of Proposition 5. In this economy there is no heterogeneity in initial levels of asset,
i.e. ai,0 = a0 for all i ∈ I. Then it follows that
η−1 =
R0
β (1 + τ c)
∑
i
πiµiai,0 =
R0
β (1 + τ c)
a0
∑
i
πiµi = 0
where the last equality follows from equation (A.11). Since here we assume that τkt does
not have to be bounded by 1, it follows that ηt = 0 for all t ≥ 1. Then, equation (2.6)
follows directly from equation (A.12), (2.7) from its derivative with respect to Θt, and (2.8)
from equations (A.12) and (A.13).
A.2.3 Economy 4
Proof of Proposition 6. Equation (2.8) can be established for all t ≥ 1, by substituting
(A.12) into (A.13). The existence of a t∗ such that ηt > 0, for t < t∗− 1 and ηt = 0, for all
t ≥ t∗ − 1, follows from a very similar logic to the one used in the proof of Proposition 4,
which we suppress here6. Hence, for t ≥ t∗ we can obtain τnt by using (2.6), which follows
from (A.12) with ηt = 1. For the same time period τ
k
t can then be found by using (2.8).
Now, having τnt∗ we can use the fact that τ
k
t = 1 and (2.8) moving backwards to obtain τ
n
t
for t < t∗.
A.3 Welfare decomposition
Let v (x) ≡ u (c, n) where x is the consumption-labor composite defined in Section 2.5.3
and u is defined in (2.4). Consider a policy reform. Denote by xRt
(
a0, e
t
)
the equilib-
rium consumption-labor composite path of an agent with initial assets a0 and history of
productivities et if the reform is implemented. Let xNRt
(
a0, e
t
)
be the equilibrium path
in case there is no reform. The average welfare gain, ∆, that results from implementing
6With
Pt∗ ≡ −
t∗∑
τ=1
1
βτ
ΦΘτ−1 +Ψσ
Υτ−1σ
, and Mt∗ ≡
t∗∑
τ=1
1
βτ
(∏t∗
t=τ R
∗
t − 1
)
ΦΘτ−1 +
(
Θτ−1
Θ
t∗
∏t∗
t=τ R
∗
t − 1
)
Ψσ
Υτ−1σ
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the reform is defined as the constant percentage increase to xNRt
(
a0, e
t
)
that equalizes the
(utilitarian) welfare to the value associated with the reform, that is,∫
E0
[
U
(
(1 + ∆)
{
xNRt
(
a0, e
t
)})]
dλ0 (a0, e0) =
∫
E0
[
U
({
xRt
(
a0, e
t
)})]
dλ0 (a0, e0) ,
(A.14)
where λ0 is the initial distribution over states (a0, e0) and U
({
xt
(
a0, e
t
)}) ≡∑∞t=0 βtv(xt(a0
, et)) =
∑∞
t=0 β
tu
(
ct
(
a0, e
t
)
, nt
(
a0, e
t
))
.
Define
Xjt ≡
∫
xjt
(
a0, e
t
)
dλjt
(
a0, e
t
)
, for j = R,NR.
to be the average level of x at each t. Then, the level effect, ∆L, is
U
(
(1 + ∆L)
{
XNRt
})
= U
({
XRt
})
, (A.15)
In order to define the other two components we need some previous definitions. Let
x¯j (a0, e0) denote the individual consumption-labor certainty equivalent,
U
({
x¯j (a0, e0)
})
= E0
[
U
({
xjt
(
a0, e
t
)})]
, for j = R,NR, (A.16)
(notice that x¯j (a0, e0) can be chosen to be constant) and let X¯
j be the aggregate consumption-
labor certainty equivalent,
X¯j =
∫
x¯j (a0, e0) dλ (a0, e0) , for j = R,NR. (A.17)
The insurance effect, ∆I , is defined by
1 + ∆I ≡ 1− p
R
unc
1− pNRunc
, where U
((
1− pjunc
) {
Xjt
})
= U
({
X¯j
})
, (A.18)
and the redistribution effect, ∆R, by
1 + ∆R ≡ 1− p
R
ine
1− pNRine
, where U
((
1− pjine
){
X¯j
})
=
∫
U
({
x¯j (a0, e0)
})
dλ (a0, e0) .
(A.19)
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The following proposition holds7.
Proof of Proposition 3. First notice that v (x) ≡ u (c, n) where u is the GHH utility func-
tion, defined in (2.4), satisfies the following regularity property: there exists a totally
multiplicative function h : (i.e. h (ab) = h (a)h (b), and h (a/b) = h (a) /h (b)) such that
for any scalar α,
v (αx) = h (α) v (x) . (A.20)
Hence, suppressing the dependence on (a0, e0), we obtain:∫
E0U
({
xRt
})
dλR0
(A.16)
=
∫
U
({
x¯R
})
dλR0
(A.19)
= U
((
1− pRine
) {
X¯R
}) (A.20)
= h
(
1− pRine
)
U
({
X¯R
})
(A.18)
= h
(
1− pRine
)
U
((
1− pRunc
) {
XRt
}) (A.20)
= h
((
1− pRine
) (
1− pRunc
))
U
({
XRt
})
(A.15)
= h
((
1− pRine
) (
1− pRunc
))
U
(
(1 + ∆L)
{
XNRt
})
(A.20)
= h
(
(1 + ∆L)
(
1− pRine
) (
1− pRunc
))
U
({
XNRt
})
(A.20)
= h
(
(1 + ∆L)
(
1− pRine
) (1− pRunc)
(1− pNRunc)
)
U
((
1− pNRunc
) {
XNRt
})
(A.18)
= h
(
(1 + ∆L) (1 + ∆I)
(
1− pRine
))
U
({
X¯NR
})
(A.20)
= h
(
(1 + ∆L) (1 + ∆I)
(
1− pRine
)(
1− pNRine
))U ((1− pNRine ) {X¯NR})
(A.19)
= h ((1 + ∆L) (1 + ∆I) (1 + ∆R))
∫
U
({
x¯NR
})
dλNR0
(A.18)
= h ((1 + ∆L) (1 + ∆I) (1 + ∆R))
∫
E0U
({
xNRt
})
dλNR0
(A.20)
=
∫
E0U
(
(1 + ∆R) (1 + ∆I) (1 + ∆L)
{
xNRt
})
dλNR0 .
The result follows from the definition of ∆ in equation (A.14).
7This result is similar to the one introduced by Benabou (2002) and used in Floden (2001).
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A.4 Algorithms
Here we describe the algorithms used to obtain our results.
Algorithm for computing the transition between steady states 8
1. Solve for the initial stationary equilibrium.
2. Assume the economy converges to a new stationary equilibrium in t¯ periods and guess
a sequence K2, ...,Kt¯−1.
3. Solve for the new tax on labor such that given K2, ...,Kt¯−1 and the path for the other
taxes, government debt is unchanged between t¯ − 1 and t¯. Compute the associated
path for the government debt, B1, ..., Bt¯−1 (for details see the Final Tax Computation
section in the online appendix).
4. Solve for the final stationary equilibrium given final tax rates τk, τn, τ c and T , and
Bt¯. Compute Kt¯.
5. Solve for households savings decisions in transition.
6. Update the path of capital, i.e. take the initial stationary distribution over wealth
and productivity and use the decision rules computed above to simulate the econ-
omy forward. Then, check for market clearing at each date and adjust K2, ...,Kt¯−1
appropriately.
7. If the new sequence for capital is the close to the old, we have found the equilibrium
path. Otherwise go back to step 5.
8. Increase t¯ until the solution stops changing.
Algorithm for global optimization9
1. Sample a large set X of points from a uniform distribution over the domain10.
8This is an extension of the procedure proposed by Domeij and Heathcote (2004). To solve for agent’s
decision rules we use the endogenous grid method (see Carroll (2006)).
9This procedure is described in more detail in Kucherenko and Sytsko (2005).
10We used pseudo-random numbers from a Sobol sequence which give more efficient results.
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2. Evaluate the objective function for all points in X.
3. Select a reduced set Xr with the highest objective function values. Sort the elements
of Xr into clusters and run a local
11 solver one time for each cluster12.
4. Use a Bayesian stopping rule to determine whether or not the procedure should be
repeated.
11We used an open source local solver called BOBYQA.
12See Rinnooy Kan and Timmer (1987).
117
A.5 Tables and Figures
Table A.1: Distribution of wealth
Bottom (%) Quintiles Top (%) Gini
0-5 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 95-100
Data -0.1 -0.2 1.1 4.5 11.2 83.4 60.3 0.82
Model -0.1 -0.2 1.5 4.7 10.2 83.4 60.8 0.81
Notes: Data come from the 2007 Survey of the Consumer Finance.
Table A.2: Income sources by quintiles of wealth
Quintile Model Data
Labor Asset Transfer Labor Asset Transfer
1st 83.7 -0.1 16.4 82.0 2.0 16.0
2nd 85.4 1.6 13.1 83.0 4.8 12.2
3rd 84.1 4.7 11.2 80.0 7.3 12.7
4th 81.4 8.6 10.0 77.6 10.3 12.1
5th 58.7 36.2 5.2 51.7 40.0 8.3
Notes: Table summarizes the pre-tax total income decomposition. We define
the asset income as the sum of income from capital and business. Data come
from the 2007 Survey of the Consumer Finance, the numbers are based on a
summary by Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (2011).
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Figure A.1: Aggregates: Benchmark
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Notes: Dashed line: initial stationary equilibrium; Solid line: optimal transition.
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Figure A.2: Optimal Fiscal Policy: Fixed Capital Taxes
(a) Capital tax
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Notes: Dashed thin line: initial stationary equilibrium; Dashed thick line: optimal transition with unrestricted
instruments (benchmark); Solid line: optimal transition with fixed capital taxes.
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Figure A.3: Optimal Fiscal Policy: Fixed Labor Taxes
(a) Capital tax
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Notes: Dashed thin line: initial stationary equilibrium; Dashed thick line: optimal transition with unrestricted
instruments (benchmark); Solid line: optimal transition with fixed labor taxes.
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Figure A.4: Optimal Fiscal Policy: Lump-Sum Transfers to Output
(a) Capital tax
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Notes: Dashed thin line: initial stationary equilibrium; Dashed thick line: optimal transition with unrestricted
instruments (benchmark); Solid line: optimal transition with fixed lump-sum transfers to output ratio.
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Figure A.5: Optimal Fiscal Policy: Fixed debt-to-output
(a) Capital tax
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Notes: Dashed thin line: initial stationary equilibrium; Dashed thick line: optimal transition with unrestricted
instruments (benchmark); Solid line: optimal transition with fixed debt-to-output ratio.
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Figure A.6: Aggregates: Constant Policy
(a) Capital
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Notes: Dashed line: initial stationary equilibrium; Solid line: optimal transition.
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Figure A.7: Optimal Fiscal Policy: Constant Policy
(a) Capital tax
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Notes: Dashed line: initial stationary equilibrium; Solid line: optimal transition; The black dots are the choice
variables: the spline nodes and t∗, the point at which the capital tax leaves the upper bound.
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Appendix B
B.1 Data
In this part of Appendix I provide further details complementing facts documented in the
empirical section of the paper.
B.1.1 BDS vs. CPS vs. Establishment survey
In the empirical section I argue Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS) data is a useful source
of information about the movements of the aggregate employment in the US economy.
In order to validate this claim I compare the cyclical properties of the total employment
series from the BDS with the two most common sources of the data on employment, i.e.
the Current Population Survey (CPS) and Establishment Survey. The average level of
employment between 1982 and 2011 in the BDS data amount to 80% and 85% of the
average, annual aggregate employment levels from the CPS and Establishment survey
respectively. The left panel of Figure B.1 presents the raw time series of all three data
sets. Even though there exist significant differences in the coverage of these data sets and
thus in the level of the aggregate employment, the cyclical properties are very similar. The
right panel of Figure B.1 plots the cyclical components of the three series and Table B.1
summarizes the correlations of the cyclical components.
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Figure B.1: Aggregate employment: BDS vs. CPS vs. Establishment survey.
(a) Raw time series
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(b) Cyclical component
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Source: Own calculations, Business Dynamics Statistics, Current Population Survey, Establishment Survey,
1982-2011
Table B.1: Cross correlations of cyclical components of employment and GDP.
Data set Lags
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
CPS 0.07 -0.02 -0.11 -0.26 -0.14 0.18 0.43 -0.12 -0.19 0.05 0.23
Establishment survey 0.08 -0.02 -0.12 -0.21 -0.15 0.05 0.45 -0.05 -0.18 0.05 0.25
BDS 0.06 -0.03 -0.07 -0.23 -0.17 0.04 0.50 -0.01 -0.14 -0.03 0.11
Notes: All series are logged and HP filtered with parameter λ = 6.25. Annual data, 1982-2011.
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B.1.2 Age/Size distribution of firms and employment
Table B.2 presents a distribution of the BDS population of firms over size and age groups.
Table B.2: Distribution of firms over age and size groups (%).
Small Large All sizes
(0-19) (20+)
Young (0-5) 39.7 2.6 42.3
Old (6+) 48.5 9.2 57.7
All ages 88.2 11.8 100.0
Small Large All sizes
(0-99) (100+)
Young (0-5) 42.0 0.3 42.3
Old (6+) 55.9 1.8 57.7
All ages 97.9 2.1 100.0
Table B.3 presents a distribution of the BDS population of firms over size and age groups.
Table B.3: Distribution of employment over age and size groups (%).
Small Large All sizes
(0-19) (20+)
Young (0-5) 8.7 7.3 16.0
Old (6+) 11.0 73.0 84.0
All ages 19.7 80.3 100.0
Small Large All sizes
(0-99) (100+)
Young (0-5) 12.6 3.4 16.0
Old (6+) 25.1 58.9 84.0
All ages 37.7 62.3 100.0
B.1.3 Cross correlations
Table B.4 reports the contemporanous correlations between the cyclical components of em-
ployment for different groups of firms and GDP. Figure B.2 illustrate the cross-correlations
between employment and GDP for different groups of firms.
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Table B.4: Contemporanous correlation of cyclical components of employment and GDP.
GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GDP 1.00 0.59 0.45 0.62 0.67 0.56 0.63 0.54
(1) All firms 1.00 0.88 0.96 0.77 1.00 0.91 0.98
(2) Young (0-5) 1.00 0.70 0.68 0.87 0.80 0.86
(3) Old (5+) 1.00 0.73 0.95 0.87 0.94
(4) Small (0-20) 1.00 0.71 0.95 0.64
(5) Large (20+) 1.00 0.87 0.99
(6) Small (0-100) 1.00 0.81
(7) Large (100+) 1.00
Notes: All series are logged and HP filtered with parameter λ = 6.25. Annual data, 1982-2012. Source:
Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS).
Figure B.2: Cross correlations of cyclical components of employment and GDP.
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B.2 Proofs
This section presents the proofs of results given in the main text.
B.2.1 Goods market clearing.
Note that the market clearing in the consumption goods market can be derived as follows.
Define a consumption of entrepreneurs:
Ce =
∑
s∈S
Γs
∫
V
π (θs)
[
θ1−γs F (ls (vs))
]
dµs (vs)−
∑
s∈S
Γs
∫
V
π (θs)m (vs, θs) dµs (vs)
thus
Ce = Y − P. (B.1)
The budget constraint of the financial intermediary implies
P = L+A′ − (1 + r)A
and using the fact that
L =
∑
s∈S
Γs
∫
V
(wn (vs) + (r + δ) k (vs)) dµs (vs)
hence I get
P = w
∑
s∈S
Γs
∫
V
n (vs) dµs (vs) + (r + δ)
∑
s∈S
Γs
∫
V
k (vs) dµs (vs) +A
′ − (1 + r)A
using market clearing for assets K = A and (B.1) I arrive at
Y − Ce = w
∑
s∈S
Γs
∫
V
n (vs) dµs (vs) + (r + δ)
∑
s∈S
Γs
∫
V
k (vs) dµs (vs) +K
′ − (1 + r)K
furthermore from the problem of the consumer I get
Cw = wh
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and by definition of N =
∑
s∈S Γs
∫
V
ns (vs) dµs (vs) and labor market clearing N = h I
get
Y − Ce = Cw + (r + δ)
∑
s∈S
Γs
∫
V
k (vs) dµs (vs) +K
′ − (1 + r)K
furthermore using K =
∑
s∈S Γs
∫
V
ks (vs) dµs (vs) I get
Y = Cw + Ce +K ′ − (1− δ)K
which is market clearing for consumption goods, see equation 3.10.
B.2.2 Proofs from theory section
In the Appendix I skip the dependence of the value functions and policy functions on the
initial types s since all the results hold for any s. I also relabel the the demand shock so
that θ = θ1−γ wherever the degree of returns to scale does not play any role to economize
on notation. The contracting problem for an individual firm, incorporating a possibility of
randomization, is given by
B̂ (v) = max
l,c(θ),v′(θ)
{
−l +
∑
θ∈Θ
π (θ)
[
θF (l)− c (θ) + ζ
(1 + r)
B
(
v′ (θ)
)]}
(B.2)
subject to
v =
∑
θ∈Θ
π (θ)
[
U (c (θ)) + βζv′ (θ)
]
U (c (θ)) + βζv′ (θ) ≥ U ((θ − θ′)F (l) + c (θ′))+ βζv′ (θ′) ∀θ, θ′
where
B (v) = max
α∈[0,1],v1,v2
αB̂ (v1) + (1− α) B̂ (v2) (B.3)
subject to
v = αv1 + (1− α) v2
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where without loss of generality I can restrict randomization to be between two points. In
order to characterize the contract I use the formulation (B.2) − (B.3). Let the decision
rules associated with (B.2) be l (v) : [vmin, vmax]→ R+, m (v, θ) : [vmin, vmax]×Θ→ R and
v′ (v, θ) : [vmin, vmax]×Θ→ R. Moreover, let ω (v, θ) ≡ U (θF (l (v)−m (v, θ)). Denote by
Vnr ⊂ [vmin, vmax] be the (non-empty) region of the state space for which randomization
is not optimal, i.e. B (v) = B̂ (v). Let Vr ⊂ [vmin, vmax] be the (potentially empty) ran-
domization region i.e. region of the state space for which it is optimal to randomize, i.e.
B (v) > B̂ (v). Without the loss of generality the randomization is between two values in
[vmin, vmax].
It is instructive to establish certain properties of the value function B (v). First, B (v)
can not exceed the value of the unconstrained first-best contract. Under the first-best the
lending is pinned downed by the following condition
l∗ =
(
F ′
)−1 1
E [θ]
moreover the unconstrained first-best contract collects (θF (l∗)− c∗(v)) where c∗(v) solves
the v =
∑∞
t=0
U(c∗)
1−βζ . Thus
Bmax =
1
1− βζ
[
−l∗ +
∑
θ∈Θ
π (θ) [θF (l∗ (v))− c∗ (v)]
]
The value function B (v) is strictly concave, which I show in the Lemma 6, and by as-
sumptions on the utility I have limc→cmin U
′ (c) = ∞. Hence, it becomes very cheap for
the intermediary to increase a promised utility when the current promise is very low, that
is limv→vmin B
′ (v) = 0. On the other hand when promised utility is close to the upper
bound, where the entrepreneur has a low marginal utility of additional consumption vmax,
i.e. limv→vmax B′ (v) = −∞., so it becomes very expansive to to increase promised utility.
Proof of Lemma 4. Follows standard arguments see Chapter 19.5.2 in Sargent and Ljungqvist.
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Proof of Lemma 5. Add downward local constraint Cn,n−1 ≥ 0 and local upward con-
straint Cn−1,n ≥ 0, i.e.
Cn,n−1 ≡ U (θnF (l)−m (θn)) + βζv′ (θn)−
[
U (θnF (l)−m (θn−1)) + βζv′ (θn−1)
] ≥ 0
Cn−1,n ≡ U (θn−1F (l)−m (θn−1)) + βζv′ (θn−1)−
[
U (θn−1F (l)−m (θn)) + βζv′ (θn)
] ≥ 0
to get
U (θnF (l)−m (θn))−U (θnF (l)−m (θn−1))+U (θn−1F (l)−m (θn−1))−U (θn−1F (l)−m (θn)) ≥ 0
therefore
U (θnF (l)−m (θn))−U (θnF (l)−m (θn−1)) ≥ U (θn−1F (l)−m (θn))−U (θn−1F (l)−m (θn−1))
(B.4)
Note that a concavity of the U (·) implies
−Um (θnF (l)−m) < −Um (θn−1F (l)−m) ∀m
where Um =
∂U
∂m
. Suppose that the m (θn) < m (θn−1), hence
−
∫ m(θn−1)
m(θn)
Um (θnF (l)−m) < −
∫ m(θn−1)
m(θn)
Um (θn−1F (l)−m)
U (θnF (l)−m (θn−1))− U (θnF (l)−m (θn)) > U (θn−1F (l)−m (θn−1))− U (θn−1F (l)−m (θn))
−U (θnF (l)−m (θn)) + U (θnF (l)−m (θn−1)) > −U (θn−1F (l)−m (θn)) + U (θn−1F (l)−m (θn−1))
hence
U (θnF (l)−m (θn))−U (θnF (l)−m (θn−1)) < U (θn−1F (l)−m (θn))−U (θn−1F (l)−m (θn−1))
which contradicts (B.4). Hence, it has to be that m (θn) ≥ m (θn−1). Then from Cn,n−1 it
is immediate that v′ (θn) ≥ v′ (θn−1), which completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 6. Under Assumptions 2 and 3 B (v) = B̂ (v). Rewrite the problem
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(B.2) using the change of the variables. Instead of (l, c (θ) , v′ (θ)), consider choosing
(u, u (θ) , v′ (θ)) where u = U (c) and C : [U (0) , U (∞)] → R and C = U−1. Also, let
H : [F (0) , F (∞)]→ [0, l∗] and H = F−1.Then we have
c (θ) = C (u (θ))
and let
u = U
((
θ − θ′)F (l) + C (u (θ′)))
then
F (l) =
C (u)− C (u (θ′))
(θ − θ′)
l = H
(
C (u)− C (u (θ′))
(θ − θ′)
)
and define
G (u, u) = −H
(
C (u)− C (u (θ′))
(θ − θ′)
)
+
C (u)− C (u (θ′))
(θ − θ′)
hence the problem can be rewritten as
B (v) = max
u,u(θ),v′(θ)
{
G (u, u) +
∑
θ∈Θ
π (θ)
[
−C (u (θ)) + ζ
(1 + r)
B
(
v′ (θ)
)]}
subject to
v =
∑
θ∈Θ
π (θ)
[
u (θ) + βv′ (θ)
]
u (θ) + βv′ (θ) ≥ u+ βv′ (θ′) ∀θ, θ′
The set of constraints is now linear in the choice variables, therefore convex. By Assumption
2 (strict concavity of the utility function), we have that C = U−1 is strictly convex and
therefore −C is a strictly concave function. Under Assumption 2 (decreasing returns to
scale in production) F is a strictly concave function, therefore H is strictly convex and
−H is strictly concave function. Thus, the function G (u, u) +∑θ∈Θ π (θ) (−C (u (θ))) is
a strictly concave function. Then by Theorem 4.8 in SLP B (v) is strictly concave and
(u, u (θ) , v′ (θ)) are continuous, single-valued functions. This completes a proof of part (i).
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For part (ii), first note that for v ∈ Vr, B is linear, and thus it is differentiable. For v ∈ Vnr
I establish the differentiability by the application of the Beneviste, Sheinkman Theorem
(see SLP Theorem 4.10). Let x = (l, c (θ) , v′ (θ)) be the solution that attains B (v). Take
any v0 ∈ Vnr ∩ [vmin, vmax]. Consider a neighborhood of v0, D (v0, ε) = (v0 − ε, v0 + ε) for
some small ε > 0. Define x̂ =
(
l̂ (v) , ĉ (v, θ) , v̂′ (v, θ)
)
for all v ∈ D (v0, ε) such that
l̂ (v) = l (v0) +
(v − v0)
F ′ (l (v0))
[
1
(θ − θ′)
(
1
U ′ ((θ − θ′)F (l (v0)) + c (v0, θ′)) −
1
U ′ (c (v0, θ′))
)]
,
ĉ (v, θ) = c (v0, θ) +
v − v0
U ′ (c (θ))
,
v̂′ (v, θ) = v′ (v0, θ) ·
Denote to economize on notation that
y (v0) =
(
θ − θ′)F (l (v0)) + c (v0, θ′)
and note it satisfies the promise keeping constraint, i.e. for all v ∈ D (v0, ε)
v =
∑
θ∈Θ
π (θ)
[
u (ĉ (v, θ)) + βζv̂′ (v, θ)
]
=
∑
θ∈Θ
π (θ)
[
u
(
c (v0, θ) +
v − v0
U ′ (c (θ))
)
+ βζv′ (v0, θ)
]
=
∑
θ∈Θ
π (θ)
[
u (c (v0, θ)) + βζv
′ (v0, θ)
]
+ (v − v0)
hence
v0 =
[
u (c (v0, θ)) + βζv
′ (v0, θ)
]
.
Moreover, x̂ satisfies the incentive-compatibility constraints ∀θ > θ′. To see that start with
the constraint at v0, adding (v − v0) both sides
U (c (v0, θ))+(v − v0)+βζv′ (v0, θ) = U
((
θ − θ′)F (l (v0)) + c (v0, θ))+(v − v0)+βζv′ (v0, θ)
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thus the first two terms of the right hand side can be rearranged into
U
((
θ − θ′)F (l (v0) + (v − v0)
F ′ (l (v0))
(
1
(θ − θ′)
(
1
U ′ (y (v0))
− 1
U ′ (c (v0, θ′))
)))
+ c (v0, θ) +
v − v0
U ′ (c (v0, θ′))
)
and analogously the first two terms of the left hand side into
U
(
c (v0, θ) +
v − v0
U ′ (c (v0, θ′))
)
+ βζv′ (v0, θ)
then using definitions of l̂ (v) , ĉ (v, θ) and v̂′ (v, θ) and equalizing both sides I arrive at
U (ĉ (v, θ)) + βv̂′ (v, θ) = U
((
θ − θ′)F (l̂ (v))+ ĉ (v, θ′))+ βζv̂′ (v, θ′) .
Next, define a function B : D (v0, ε)→ R as
B (v) = −l̂ (v) +
∑
θ∈Θ
π (θ)
[
θF
(
l̂ (v)
)
− ĉ (v, θ) + ζ
(1 + r)
B
(
v̂′ (v, θ)
)]
note that for v = v0 it is B (v0) = B (v0), since l̂ (v0) = l (v0) and ĉ (v0, θ) = c (v, θ).
Moreover by the fact that x = (l, c (θ) , v′ (θ)) is the solution that attains B (v) and x̂ =(
l̂ (v) , ĉ (v, θ) , v̂′ (v, θ)
)
is feasible and incentive compatible for all v ∈ D (v0, ε) I arrive at
B (v) ≤ B (v) ∀v ∈ D (v0, ε)
and B′ (v0) = B′ (v) |v0 , where
B′ (v) |v0 =
∑
θ∈Θ π (θ) θF (l (v0))− 1
F ′ (l (v0))
[
1
(θ − θ′)
(
1
U ′ (y (v0))
− 1
U ′ (c (v0, θ′))
)]
−
∑
θ∈Θ
π (θ)
U ′ (c (v0, θ))
which completes the proof.
The value function B (v) is differentiable and under Assumption 3 it is strictly concave.
In order to simplify notation let ci = c (v, θi) and vi = v
′ (v, θi) for i = L,H for every
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s ∈ S. Moreover let λIC (v) and λPKC (v) be the Lagrange multipliers on respectively
incentive-compatibility and promise keeping constraints. I skip the dependence contract
policy functions and multipliers on the continuation utilities v and types s to simplify the
notation. Then, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the interior solution are:
l : F ′ (l)
∑
i∈L,H
πiθi − 1− λIC (θH − θL)F ′ (l)U ′ ((θH − θL)F (l) + cL) = 0 (B.5)
cL : − πL − λPKCπLU ′ (cL)− λICU ′ ((θH − θL)F (l) + cL) = 0 (B.6)
cH : − πH − λPKCπHU ′ (cH) + λICU ′ (cH) = 0 (B.7)
v′L :
πL
(1 + r)
B′
(
v′L
)− λPKCβπL − λICβ = 0 (B.8)
v′H :
πH
(1 + r)
B′
(
v′H
)− λPKCβπH + λICβ = 0 (B.9)
and the envelope condition is
B′ (v) = λPKC (B.10)
which after rearranging together with the promise keeping constraint and incentive compat-
ibility constraint constitute the following set of equations determining allocation {cL, cH , vL, vH , l}
v − πH
[
U (cH) + βζv
′
H
]− πL [U (cL) + βζv′L] = 0 (B.11)
U (cH) + βζv
′
H −
[
U ((θH − θL)F (l) + cL) + βζv′L
]
= 0 (B.12)
−πL − U ′ (cL)
[
B′ (v) πL + λIC
U ′ ((θH − θL)F (l) + cL)
U ′ (cL)
]
= 0 (B.13)
−πH − U ′ (cH)
[
B′ (v) πH − λIC
]
= 0 (B.14)
E [θ]F ′ (l)− 1− λIC (θH − θL)F ′ (l)U ′ ((θH − θL)F (l) + cL) = 0 (B.15)
where
λIC =
πHπL
β (1 + r)
(
B′
(
v′L
)−B′ (v′H)) (B.16)
Proof of Proposition 7. I start with establishing that incentive compatibility constraint
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must bind at the optimal solution. Rewrite the problem (B.2) using the feasibility con-
straint θnF (l)−mn = cn for n = L,H to replace consumption with payments
B (v) = max
l,m(θ),v′(θ)
−l+ ∑
i=L,H
πi
[
mi +
ζ
(1 + r)
B
(
v′i
)] (B.17)
subject to
v =
∑
i=L,H
πi
[
U (θiF (l)−mi) + βζv′i
]
U (θHF (l)−mH) + βζv′H ≥ U (θHF (l)−mL) + βζv′L ∀θ, θ′
and suppose the incentive constraint is not binding at the solution {l,m (θ) , v′ (θ)}, i.e.
U (θHF (l)−mH) + βζv′H > U (θHF (l)−mL) + βζv′L (B.18)
By the Lemma 5, m (θH) ≥ m (θL) and v′ (θH) ≥ v′ (θL), thus it has to be that v′H (v) >
v′L (v). Consider now the following variation
v̂′H (v) = v
′
H (v)− ε
where ε is large enough to that (B.18) holds with equality. Now, let
v̂′L (v) = v
′
L (v) +
πHε
πL
then ∑
i=L,H
πiv̂
′
i (v) = πH
(
v′H (v)− ε
)
+ πL
(
v′L (v) +
πHε
πL
)
=
∑
i=L,H
πiv
′
i (v)
thus the variation satisfies the promise keeping constraint and is a mean preserving de-
crease in spread of the continuation values. Under Assumption 3, the value function B (v)
is strictly concave, hence
∑
i=L,H πiB (v̂
′
i) >
∑
i=L,H πiB (v
′
i) and hence B (v) increases
contradicting the optimality. Hence, incentive constraint is binding at the solution to the
problem B.2. Given Lemma 5 there are 4 possible cases: (1) v′H > v
′
L,mH > mL, (2)
v′H = v
′
L,mH > mL, (3) v
′
H > v
′
L,mH = mL, (4) v
′
H = v
′
L,mH = mL. First note that case
(2) violates the incentive compatibility constraint. Consider case (4) and note whenever
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mH = mL then cH > cL. Collapse first order conditions with respect to v
′
L and v
′
H into
β (1 + r)
πHπL
λIC =
(
B′
(
v′L
)−B′ (v′H))
then since v′H = v
′
L , if only solution is interior, it has to be that λIC = 0, which implies
from collapsed (B.14) and (B.13)
1
U ′ (cL)
=
1
U ′ (cH)
hence cL = cH , a contradiction. Finally, consider case (3). Consider the following deviation
v̂′H (v) = v
′
H (v)−
ε
βζ
, v̂′L (v) = v
′
L (v)
m̂H (v) = mH (v) +
ε
U ′ (cH)
, m̂L (v) = mL (v)
which satisfies the promise keeping constraint and is incentive compatible. By strict con-
cavity of the value function B (v) there is
∑
i=L,H πiB (v̂
′
i) >
∑
i=L,H πiB (v
′
i) and also
we have m̂H (v) > mH (v) implying together that B (v) increases, contradicting optimality.
Therefore under the optimal contract it has to be that v′H > v
′
L,mH > mL. Now, use again
a collapsed conditions (B.8) and (B.9) together with the fact that v′H > v
′
L to conclude
that for any interior solution it has to be that λIC (v) > 0. Use modified conditions (B.6)
and (B.7) respectively
λPKC = − 1
U ′ (cL)
− λIC U
′ ((θH − θL)F (l) + cL)
πLU ′ (cL)
< − 1
U ′ (cL)
− λIC
πL
< − 1
U ′ (cL)
λPKC = − 1
U ′ (cH)
+
λIC
πH
> − 1
U ′ (cH)
where the first inequality in the firs line comes from the fact that for any interior solution l >
0 (see proof of part (ii)) and the second inequality is implied by λIC (v) > 0. Analogously
the inequality in the second line is implied by λIC (v) > 0. Therefore combining the two
conditions
1
U ′ (cH (v))
> −λPKC (v) > 1
U ′ (cL (v))
strict concavity of B (v) implies λPKC (v) < 0 thus I obtain cH > cL. This completes a
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proof of part (i). For part (ii) consider a problem of finding a minimum value of the con-
tinuation utility v∗ such that the statically efficient lending l∗ is both incentive compatible
and feasible. The value v∗ is a solution to the problem where the right hand side of the
participation constraint is an objective function and the incentive and feasibility are the
constraints, i.e.
v∗ ≡ min
cH ,cL,mH,mL,vH,vL
{πH [U (cH) + ζβvH ] + πL [U (cL) + ζβvL]}
subject to
U (cH) + βζvH ≥ U ((θH − θL)F (l∗) + cL) + βζvL
cH +mH 6 θHF (l
∗)
cL +mL 6 θLF (l
∗)
vH > v
∗, vL > v∗
and using the feasibility one can rule out the cH , cL from the problem and rewrite the
objective as
πHU (θHF (l
∗)−mH) + πLU (θLF (l∗)−mL) + ζβ [πH (vH − vL) + vL]
further using binding incentive compatibility constraint objective is reduced to the problem
v∗ ≡ min
mH,mL,vL
πLU (θLF (l
∗)−mL) + πHU (θHF (l∗)−mL) + ζβvL
vL > v
∗
Note that necessary condition is vL = v
∗ and v∗ is a finite by Assumption 2 which completes
the argument that such point exists. Now I argue that for any v < v∗ it has to be that
l < l∗. Suppose now for contradiction that there exists v ∈ [vmin, v∗] such l = l∗. Then l is
determined by ∑
i∈L,H
πiθiF
′ (l)− 1 = 0 (B.19)
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rewriting the first order condition (B.5) using (B.19) we obtain
0 = λICU
′
(
(θH − θL)F
(
F ′(−1)
(
1∑
i∈L,H πiθi
))
+ cL
)
since for any finite cL is the equation above can not hold. By the fact that the solution is
interior and incentive compatibility constraint is binding there is λIC > 0. Thus it has to
be that l < l∗.
Proof of Proposition 8. The most convenient way to prove this result is with the use
of the sequential formulation of the problem
J (v0) = max
x
∞∑
t=j
∑
θt
(
ζ
1 + r
)t−j
Pr
(
θt
) [
m
(
θt
)− l (θt−1)] (B.20)
subject to
c
(
θt
)
+m
(
θt
) ≤ θ1−γn F (l (θt−1)) ∀t ≥ j,∀θt−1 ∈ Θt−1, n = L,H
∞∑
t=j
∑
θt
(βζ)t Pr
(
θt
)
U
(
c
(
θt
)) ≥ v0
U
(
c
(
θt
))
+ βζv
(
θt
) ≥
U
((
(θH)
1−γ − (λθL)1−γ
)
F
(
l
(
θt−1
))
+ c
(
θt−1, θL
))
+ βζv
(
θt−1, θL
)
, ∀θt−1
v0 given.
where
v
(
θt
)
=
∞∑
i =1
∑
θt+i
(βζ)i−1 Pr
(
θt+i|θt)U (ct (θt+i))
Let x∗ =
{
c∗
(
θt
)
,m∗
(
θt
)
, l∗
(
θt−1
)}
be the solution of the problem (B.20). The policy
functions are the functions of a history of shocks, i.e. c∗ : Θt → R+,m∗ : Θt → R and
l∗ : Θt−1 → R+, where Θ = {θL, θH}. Consider any λ > 0, so that Θ = {λθL, λθH} then
under Assumption 7
λθH = λ
(
θ +
σ
πH
) 1
1−γ
, λθL = λ
(
θ − σ
πL
) 1
1−γ
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and thus
(λθH)
1−γ = λ1−γθ
(
1 +
σ
πH
)
, (λθL)
1−γ = λ1−γθ
(
1− σ
πL
)
therefore
E
[
(λθ)1−γ
]
= λ1−γθ, Std
(
(λθ)1−γ
)
=
σ√
πLπH
so that expected return on project increases by λ1−γ and the standard deviation remains
unchanged. Immediately, we have λθt = {λθj, ..., λθt}. Under Assumption 2 output of
the firm is F
(
l
(
θt−1
))
=
[
l
(
θt−1
)]γ
Ω (r, w) where Ω (r, w) is a function of prices and
exogenous parameters of the model only. Note that Pr
(
λθt
)
= Pr
(
θt
)
since probabilities
of the particular history remain unchanged. Then, the contracting problem becomes
Ĵ (v̂0) = max
x
∞∑
t=j
∑
θt
(
ζ
1 + r
)t−j
Pr
(
θt
)
m
(
λθt
)− l (λθt−1) (B.21)
subject to
c
(
λθt
)
+m
(
λθt
) ≤ (λθn)1−γ (l (λθt−1))γ Ω (r, w) ∀t ≥ j,∀θt−1 ∈ Θt−1, n = L,H
∞∑
t=j
∑
θt
(βζ)t Pr
(
θt
)
U
(
c
(
λθt
)) ≥ v̂0
U
(
c
(
λθt
))
+ βζv
(
λθt
) ≥
U
((
(λθH)
1−γ − (λθL)1−γ
) (
l
(
λθt−1
))γ
Ω (r, w) + c
(
λθt−1, λθL
))
+ βζv
(
λθt−1, λθL
)
v̂0 given.
where v̂0 is the initial promised utility pinned down by the free entry condition.
v
(
λθt
)
=
∞∑
i =1
∑
θt+i
(βζ)i−1 Pr
(
θt+i|θt)U (ct (λθt+i))
Guess the solution to the problem (B.21) has the form x̂ = λx∗ =
{
λc∗
(
θt
)
, λm∗
(
θt
)
, λl∗
(
θt−1
)}
and the initial promised utility is v̂0 = λ
1−ρv0. In what follows I will show this policy is
feasible, satisfies the participation constraint and is incentive compatible. Next, I argue
it maximizes the value of the lender and that v̂0 is consistent with zero profit condition.
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Feasibility requires ∀t ≥ j,∀θt−1 ∈ Θt−1, n = L,H
λc∗
(
θt
)
+ λm∗
(
θt
) ≤ (λθn)1−γ (λl∗ (θt−1))γ Ω (r, w)
which clearly holds. For the participation constraint
∞∑
t=j
∑
θt
(βζ)t Pr
(
θt
)
U
(
λc∗
(
θt
)) ≥ v̂0
∞∑
t=j
∑
θt
(βζ)t Pr
(
θt
)
λ1−ρU
(
c∗
(
θt
)) ≥ λ1−ρv0
where the second equation is due to the utility function form imposed in Assumption 7.
Hence it is also satisfied. As for the incentive compatibility
U
(
λc∗
(
θt
))
+ βζv
(
λθt
) ≥
U
((
(λθH)
1−γ − (λθL)1−γ
) (
λl∗
(
θt−1
))γ
Ω (r, w) + λc∗
(
θt−1, θL
))
+ βζv
(
λθt−1, λθL
)
which given the properties of the utility function allows to factor out the λ1−ρ to get
λ1−ρU
(
c∗
(
θt
))
+ λ1−ρβζv
(
θt
) ≥
λ1−ρU
((
(θH)
1−γ − (θL)1−γ
) (
l∗
(
θt−1
))γ
Ω (r, w) + c∗
(
θt−1, θL
))
+ λ1−ρβζv
(
θt−1, θL
)
thus a proposed contract is incentive feasible. Thus, a contract policy x̂ is feasible, satisfies
the participation constraint and is incentive compatible. Moreover, note that since x solves
(B.20) we have
Ĵ (v̂0) = max
x
∞∑
t=j
∑
θt
(
ζ
1 + r
)t−j
Pr
(
θt
) [
λm∗
(
θt
)− λl∗ (θt−1)]
= λmax
x
∞∑
t=j
∑
θt
(
ζ
1 + r
)t−j
Pr
(
θt
) [
m∗
(
θt
)− l∗ (θt−1)]
= λJ (v0)
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and thus
Ĵ
(
λ1−ρv0
)
= λJ (v0) (B.22)
therefore a proposed contract policy maximizes the value of the financial intermediary.
Moreover, it is follows that whenever J (v0) = 0 then Ĵ (v̂0) = 0, hence v̂0 is consistent
with zero profit condition.
Proof of Corollary 8. Consider any b > 1 and suppose that E
[
θ̂1−γ
]
= bE
[
θ1−γ
]
= bθ,
then under Assumption 7 I have
bθ = bE
[
θ1−γ
]
= b
(
πHθ
1−γ
H + πLθ
1−γ
L
)
=
(
πH
(
b
1
1−γ θH
)1−γ
+ πL
(
b
1
1−γ θL
)1−γ)
so it has to be
θ̂H = b
1
1−γ θH , θ̂L = b
1
1−γ θL
then by Proposition 8 the optimal amount of lending is l∗
(
θ̂t−1
)
= b
1
1−γ l
(
θt−1
)
thus it
increases in line with the expected demand as desired.
Sketch of proof of Proposition 9. The proof is conducted in three steps. In the first
step I show that there exists a stationary distribution of firms over the space of continua-
tion utilities which can be attained in a finite number of periods starting from any initial
distribution. In the second step I show the stationary distribution is continuous in prices.
Finally, I define a continuous mapping Φ and apply Shauder Fixed-Point Theorem imply-
ing the mapping has at least one fixed point (stationary recursive equilibrium).
Step(1) Stationary distribution of firms exists. To prove the existence of the sta-
tionary distribution of firms I show that conditions in Theorem 12.12 in SLP are satisfied.
Define the transtion function Q (vs,A) : [vmin, vmax]× B ([vmin, vmax])→ R as
Q (vs,A) =
{
ζ
∑
θs∈Θs π (θs) I {v′ (vs, θs) ∈ A}
(1− ζ)
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Firstly, I have to argue that transition function is monotone and satisfies Feller property. A
transition function is monotone if for any bounded, increasing function f , the function Tf
is also increasing. Consider any v1s > v
2
s and f increasing and note v
′ (v1s , θs) > v′ (v2s , θs),
then ∫
f (x)Q
(
v1s , dx
)
>
∫
f (x)Q
(
v2s , dx
)
and hence Q
(
v1s , ·
)
> Q
(
v2s , ·
)
by Exercise 12.11 in SLP, establishing monotonicity. For
Feller property, note by Lemma 6 policy function v′ (vs, θs) is continuous for all s ∈ S
and therefore by Proposition 9.14 in SLP the transition function Q (vs,A) satisfies Feller
property. I am left to show that Assumption 12.1 in SLP is satisfied. I have to argue that
there exists a mixing point v∗ ∈ [vmin, vmax], a natural number N > 1 and ε > 0, such that
QN (vmin, [vs, vmax]) > ε and Q
N (vmax, [vs, vmin]) > ε. Given the exogenous probability of
exit firm faces every period we have
Q
(
vs, v
0
s
)
= (1− ζ) for all vs ∈ [vmin, vmax]
which clearly implies v∗ = v0s is a mixing point with N = 1 end ε = (1− ζ).
Step(2) Stationary distribution is continuous in prices. In this part of the proof I
apply the Theorem 12.13 in SLP.
Step(3) There exists a fixed point (equilibrium). Use the labor, capital and goods
market clearing conditions to define a mapping Φ : Ω→ R3, where
Φ (ω) =

∑
s∈S Γs
∫
V
ks (ω) dµs (ω)−A (ω)∑
s∈S Γs
∫
V
ns (ω) dµs (ω)− h∑
s∈S Γs
∫
V
π (θs)
[
θ1−γs F (ls (ω))
]
dµs (vs)− Ce (ω)− Cw (ω)−K (ω)

Note prices r and w have to be greater than zero and without loss of generality I assume
they are bounded above by some arbitrarily large number. Thus, Ω compact and convex
set. Then define a mapping
T (ω) = argmax
ω∈Ω
−‖Φ (ω)‖2 (B.23)
145
By arguments from Step 2 a solution to the problem B.23 is continuous in ω and therefore
a correspondence T (ω) is also continuous . Applying the Shauder Fixed-Point threorem
(see SLP Theorem 17.4) establishes the result.
B.3 Algorithms
This section presents numerical algorithms used to compute the individual contracting
problem, stationary recursive equilibrium and then transitional dynamics. Let me start
with the description of the individual contract solution.
Algorithm 11. The algorithm consists of the following steps
1. Discretize space V = [vmin, vmax] using nV points. I set nV = 400.
2. For each i ∈ NV = {1, ..., nV } and each type s ∈ S guess the derivative of the contract
value function B0 (v) =
{
B′0s (vi)
}
i=1,..,nV ,s∈S.
3. Update the guess and obtain B0 (v) using the following procedure:
(a) Given the initial guess B0 (v) use the necessary and sufficient conditions B.11-
B.15 to solve for {c (vi, θsL) , c (vi, θsH) , v′ (vi, θsL) , v′ (vi, θsH) , l (vi)} for each
i = 1, ..., nV , s ∈ S. I use the nonlinear equation solver proposed by Bouaricha and Schnabel
(1994).Also I use linear splines to approximate B0 (v) at any prosed v′ (vi, θsL)
and v′ (vi, θsH) by the solver.
(b) Update the guess using collapsed conditions B.9 and B.8 and envelope condition
B.10, i.e.
B′1s (vi) =
1
β (1 + r)
[
πLB
′0
s
(
v′ (vi, θsL)
)
+ πHB
′0
s
(
v′ (vi, θsH)
)] ∀s ∈ S,∀i ∈ NV
4. Compare B′1 (v) and B
′
0 (v) and compute distance d :
d = max
i∈{1,2,...,nV }
∣∣B′s1 (vi)−B′s0 (vi)∣∣
5. If d 6 εc then the stop. If d > εc then update the derivative of the value function
B′0 (v) = B
′
1 (v) and go back to Step 3.
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6. Back out the value function B (v) using the contract policy functions found in steps
3 and 4.
A recursive, stationary equilibrium can be computed by finding a pair of prices r and w
that solve the pair of equations G1 (r, w) = 0 and G2 (r, w) = 0. I use a nonlinear equation
solver to find them. The function G1 corresponds to the labor market clearing N = h,
while the function G2 corresponds to the market-clearing in the asset market K = A. In
order to evaluate these function I use the following algorithm.
Algorithm 12. The algorithm consists of the following steps:
1. Guess the initial price vector {w0, r0}.
2. Given the prices solve for the optimal contract policies {c (vi, θsL) , c (vi, θsH) , v′ (vi, θsL) , v′ (vi, θsH) , l (vi)
for each i = 1, ..., nV , s ∈ S, and value of the contract Bs (vs) using Algorithm 11.
3. Given the value function obtained in Step 2, solve for the initial utility of entrepreneur
using
Bs
(
v0s
)
= 0
4. Use Monte Carlo simulation to compute a stationary distribution of firms. Simulate a
panel of firms (I use N = 1, 000, 000) for a large number of periods T using decision
rules and initial utility computed in Steps 2 and 3 until the distribution of firms
converges to a stationary one. Specifically, use a (pseudo)random number generator
to generate a sequence
{
θjt
}N
j=1
and
{
ujt
}N
i=1
for each t = 0, ..., T , where ujt are iid
over time and firms and each ujt is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] interval. Use these
simulates sequences generate a simulated sequence of continuation utilities
{
vjt
}T
t=0
for each j = 1, ..., N . In particular, use the following procedure
(a) Set v0 = v
0
s , and age of the firm of type s to be a
j
s = 0 and t = 0.
(b) If ujt 6 ζ
j
t then firm survives and vt+1 = v
′ (vt, θst) and a
j
s = t, otherwise the
firm is replaced by a new one and vt+1 = v0, a
j
s = 0.
(c) Increment t. Iterate on steps (a)-(b) until t = T .
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5. Given a sequence of
{
vjt
}T
t=0
compute policy functions using linear spline interpola-
tion and contract policy functions solved on the grid in Step 2.
6. Compute aggregates defined in Section 3.3.6 using the empirical distribution from the
simulation at time T (check if the distribution converged).
7. Evaluate G1 (r, w) and G2 (r, w), defined as follows
G1 (r, w) = N (r, w) − h (w)
G2 (r, w) = K (r, w)− (1/r) (L (r, w) − P (r, w))
I compute transitional dynamics in my main quantitative section using the following
algorithm.
Algorithm 13. The algorithm consists of the following steps:
1. Fix a transition length T , uncertainty shock vector {σt}Tt=1 and convergence criterion
ε.
2. Solve for the initial stationary equilibrium using Algorithm 12 Denote the initial
distribution by µ0, initial prices clearing the market by {w0, r0}.
3. Solve for the final stationary equilibrium with prices {wT , r0}. Denote the final dis-
tribution by µT .
4. Guess a sequence of aggregate labor stocks
{
Ĥt
}T
t=1
of length T such that Ĥ1 = H
and ĤT = H
∗∗.
5. Back out the vector of wages from household problem. Get from the final stationary
equilibrium BT (v). Solve backward for the policy functions {ct (vi, θsL) , ct (vi, θsH) , v′t (vi, θsL) , v′t (vi, θsH)
and further for value of the contract {Bt (v)}T−1t=1 .
6. Compute a sequence of distributions forward using
µs,t+1 (vs,t+1) =
∫
V
Q (vs,t, vs,t+1) dµs,t (vs,t)
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7. Compute the aggregate variables to check market clearings
N̂t =
∑
s
∫
V
nt (vs) dµs,t (vs,t)
8. Check whether max1 ≤ t ≤ T
∣∣∣Ĥt − N̂t∣∣∣ < ε. If the criterion above is not satisfied at
every t, update a new guess
Ĥnewt = (1− φ) Ĥt + φN̂t
where 0 < φ ≤ 1 and go back to Step 5.
Note this algorithm does not require running costly Monte Carlo experiment, which is
required to track firm’s age, simulation for every iteration. Once the market clearing price
and policy functions are obtained through this algorithm I can run Monte Carlo simulation
just once. To do so proceed as follows.
Algorithm 14. The algorithm consists of the following steps:
1. Use the population of firms to which an economy converged in Algorithm 12 as the
starting one.
2. Simulate the economy over T periods using decision rules and prices computed using
Algorithm 13 in a similar way as in Step 4 of Algorithm 12.
3. Compute the statistics conditional on size and age over tra
